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ABSTRACT 
This thesis consists of three essays that examine theoretical and empirical questions in 
corporate finance. The first essay develops a unified general equilibrium framework examining 
the joint relationships between firm capital structure choice and labor market outcomes in an 
economy featuring two-sided labor market search frictions. I nest a canonical asset pricing and 
capital structure model in the spirit of Leland (1994) into a competitive searching and bargaining 
environment in the spirit of Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides. I obtain highly tractable solutions 
for optimal capital structure choices and equilibrium labor market outcomes in the presence of 
wage bargaining, capital structure posting and labor market search frictions. In particular, an 
increase in labor market search efficiency provokes the employers to adjust their leverage 
upward, which relieves the labor market congestions on the workers’ side. This capital structure 
choice provides an important channel through which labor market search efficiency influences 
various aspects of labor market outcomes. For example, in the presence of optimal leverage 
choices, labor market search efficiency affects the wage of the new hires in a modest and non-
monotonic way. Additionally, the endogenous capital structure choices by the employers are 
shown to influence the relationships between workers’ bargaining power and labor market 
outcomes. Moreover, economic volatility influences the firms’ optimal capital structure choices 
and labor market outcomes: most prominently, both firm leverage and the labor force 
participation rate climb up during turbulent economic times. 
The second essay examines the consequences of leveraged buyout (LBO) transactions 
through the lens of subsequently withdrawn transactions. Using the reason for LBO withdrawal 
and the unfavorable credit market movements during the period when the deal is in play to 
address the endogenous withdrawal decision, I create a sample of LBOs withdrawn for reasons 
not related to target firm fundamentals. This paper documents the following facts. First, target 
firms of failed LBO transactions experience upward revaluation by the stock market. Such 
results are stronger for target firms with more information asymmetry problems. The evidence in 
my paper indicates that private equity investors are able to identify undervalued firms in the 
stock market. Second, I document improvements in operating performance of firms after LBO 
transactions compared to target firms that fail to go through the LBO process.  Third, private 
equity investors adjust the capital structure of target firms to exploit the tax benefit of interest 
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deductions. Fourth, private equity investors also tend to reshuffle the management of target firms 
shortly after the LBO transactions. Overall, the evidence suggests that private equity creates 
value by exploiting the undervaluation of target firms, and also by improving their operational 
performance and financial structure. 
The third essay investigates how executive employment contracts influence corporate 
financial policies during the final year of the contract term.  We find that the impending 
expiration of fixed-term employment contracts creates incentives for CEOs to engage in strategic 
window-dressing activities, including managing earnings aggressively and withholding negative 
firm news.  At the same time, acquisitions announced during the contract renegotiation year yield 
higher abnormal returns than during other periods, suggesting that the upcoming contract 
renewal can also have disciplinary effects on potential value-destroying behaviors of CEOs.  
CEOs who engage in manipulation during contract renewal obtain better employment terms in 
their new contracts. 
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CHAPTER 1: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
UNDER LABOR MARKET SEARCH 
1.1 Introduction 
It is widely acknowledged that the labor market outcomes and firms’ capital structure 
decisions are interdependent. A large volume of empirical research focuses on the joint 
relationship between labor market dynamics and corporate finance dynamics1. However, economic 
theories traditionally examine labor market dynamics and capital structure dynamics in isolated 
models2. This paper bridges the gap between empirical and theoretical research on joint dynamics 
of labor market outcomes and firms’ capital structure choices. Specifically, I develop a general 
equilibrium framework answering the following questions: How do employers optimally choose 
their capital structures facing the frictional search in the labor market? How do the capital structure 
choices by the individual firms collectively feed back to the labor market and affect the labor 
market outcomes in the economy?  
In this paper, I nest a standard dynamic asset pricing and capital structure model (Leland, 
1994) to an equilibrium frictional labor market searching and matching framework in the spirit of 
Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP hereafter), and examine how a firm in a frictional labor 
market designs its capital structure, and how these individual capital structure decisions 
collectively affect labor market outcomes in the economy. The framework captures two common 
themes in labor market models — wage bargaining and frictional search. The resulting model is 
highly tractable, featuring closed-form expressions of labor market outcomes. A simple numerical 
exercise generates novel and empirically testable implications regarding the influence of labor 
market characteristics, namely, workers’ bargaining power and job market search efficiency, on 
employers’ capital structure choices. One novel prediction is that an increase in labor market 
search efficiency provokes the employers to choose higher leverages, which relieves the 
                                                        
1 One strand of empirical literature documents that employers’ capital structure decisions influence the employment 
and wage dynamics (e.g., Hanka, 1998; Chemmanur, Cheng and Zhang, 2013). Meanwhile, firms’ costly search for 
workers and workers’ collective bargaining powers in wage negotiations affect the capital structure decisions on the 
firm side (e.g., Bronars and Deere, 1991; Cavanaugh and Garen, 1997; Klasa, Maxwell and Ortiz-Molina, 2009; Matsa, 
2010; Bae, Kang and Wang, 2011; Agrawal and Matsa, 2013; Brown and Matsa, 2016). 
2 There are a few scholarly works that put labor market and capital structure under the same umbrella. However, this 
strand of research focuses on either frictionless labor market (e.g, Berk, Stanton Zechner, 2010), or simple debt 
instruments in a random matching framework (e.g., Monacelli, Quadrini and Trigari, 2011; Chugh, 2013; Petrosky-
Nadeau, 2014). 
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congestions among searching workers. This capital structure decision provides an important 
channel through which labor market search efficiency influences various aspects of labor market 
outcomes. For example, in the presence of this capital structure choice, labor market search 
efficiency affects the wages of the new hires in a modest and non-monotonic way. This contrasts 
to the situation without consideration of firms’ endogenous capital structure choices, in which the 
wages of new hires monotonically increase with the labor market search efficiency for obvious 
reasons: higher search efficiency increases the searching workers’ outside option value, thereby 
increasing the required surplus they demand from a matching relationship. Moreover, the 
endogenous capital structure choices by the employers are shown to influence the relationships 
between workers’ bargaining power and labor market outcomes. What is more, employers’ 
endogenous capital structure choices in the frictional labor market provide a novel explanation for 
the empirically confirmed positive co-movement between economic volatility, aggregate leverages 
and labor market outcomes: both firm leverage and the labor force participation rate climb up 
during turbulent economic times. The baseline model is shown to be easily extended to two 
empirically prevalent environments: the environment featuring Bayesian learning about the 
matching quality and the environment with asymmetric information problem regarding the 
matching quality. 
The model is motivated by two empirical observations in the relationship between capital 
structure choice and labor market characteristics. Firstly, several papers highlight the role of debt 
in strategic bargaining between firms and workers. Firms respond to higher bargaining power on 
the workers’ side by employing a higher leverage (e.g., Bronars and Deere, 1991; Matsa, 2010). 
A more important conundrum comes from the second empirical observation: firms care about their 
employees’ welfare. They are more conservative in debt usage when their employees are faced 
with higher unemployment risk or incur enormous loss upon unemployed (Agrawal and Matsa, 
2013; Chemmanur, Cheng and Zhang, 2013). This is inconsistent with canonical view that a firm’s 
sole objective is to maximize shareholder value3. To examine theoretically the role of debt in a 
strategic bargaining environment, as motivated by the first strand of empirical literature, I assume 
                                                        
3 Recent empirical researches reveal the tip of the economic force behind the second empirical regularities. Brown 
and Matsa (2016) uses a proprietary data from a job matching platform and finds that job seekers have precise 
information about the employers’ financial conditions for job vacancies they apply for. Moreover, they utilize such 
information and avoid applying for jobs posted by employers with higher leverage. 
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that the firm and the worker split the matching surplus induced by the labor market search friction, 
according to a generalized Nash bargaining rule based on the current state of the cash flow. I 
further assume that firms are able to issue debt to reduce the “size of the pie” shared with the 
workers. Specifically, firms issue debt against future cash flows from the match and the pay out 
the proceeds to the shareholders, immediately after the match is formed4. To examine theoretically 
the role of debt in the hiring practice, as motivated by the second strand of empirical literature, I 
develop a novel equilibrium concept — competitive search equilibrium with capital structure 
choice. Under this equilibrium concept, the firms compete for workers by posting the job vacancies 
and the associated debt level they intend to use. The firms commit to their posted capital structures. 
Job seekers observe all the job vacancies and have information regarding the leverage of each job 
vacancy. Job seekers apply for the jobs that give them the highest expected value of active 
searching. There are “congestions” on both the employer side and worker side of the labor market, 
preventing instantaneous matches between vacancies and workers5. In the equilibrium, the firm 
chooses the capital structure that maximizes the expected value of its job vacancy, subject to the 
constraint that it must provide the searching workers with the expected value comparable to other 
searching firms, in order to attract searching workers to apply for its job vacancy.  As a result, two 
countervailing forces come into play in determining optimal leverage: a higher leverage enhances 
the shareholder value after the match, by expropriating a larger share of post-match cash flow in 
the form of debt issuance proceeds. Meanwhile, since workers have information regarding the 
leverage associated with each job vacancy, higher leverage choice leads to fewer job applications, 
thereby reducing the hiring rate. In the model, the former benefit is summarized by the elasticity 
of expected post-match shareholder value with respect to leverage choice, and the latter cost is 
captured by the elasticity of the expected hiring rate with respect to leverage choice. Individual 
firm optimally chooses its capital structure that balances the benefit and the cost associated with 
leverage. Mathematically, it equalizes the absolute value of the two elasticities.  The expected 
                                                        
4 The extant literature (e.g., Monacelli, Quadrini and Trigari, 2011) makes the same timing assumption regarding the 
payout of proceeds from debt issuance in the presence of wage bargaining. 
5 The searching friction demarcates my labor market from most of the competitive markets. For example, in a standard 
retail product market where the consumers search for the best price and suppliers post their prices, suppliers are able 
to satisfy any demand and consumers always visit the suppliers who announce the lowest price. Notice that in the 
absence of search frictions, my economy resembles the retail market economy, and the optimal leverage ratio is always 
zero. 
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value of a searching worker is pinned down by the free-entry condition of the firms. The labor 
market tightness is then determined by the searching worker’s value function. 
Once I characterize the optimal leverage, expected value of a searching worker, and labor 
market tightness, other labor market outcomes can be solved in closed forms. I first solve for the 
optimal separation threshold of a matching relationship6. The individual firm’s optimal choice of 
capital structure, together with the optimal separation threshold characterize the expected matching 
durations in the economy. The two optimal policies also characterize the stationary cross-sectional 
distribution of the wage rate, among the matches in the steady-state economy7. The steady-state 
cross-sectional distribution in turn gives rise to the equilibrium unemployment rate of the 
economy8.  
A simple numerical exercise, based on empirically confirmed matching function 
specifications and model parameters, generates rich and novel predictions regarding the 
comparative statics of optimal capital structure choice. Consistent with existing empirical research, 
the optimal debt level increases with the workers’ bargaining power (e.g., Bronars and Deere, 1991; 
Matsa, 2010). Novel to the literature, the model is able to generate a positive relationship between 
the labor market search efficiency and firms’ optimal leverage choices. The underlying logic is as 
follows: on one hand, the marginal benefit of a higher leverage on post-match shareholder value 
scales up with the labor market search efficiency. On the other hand, the negative impact of a 
higher leverage on the hiring rate is dampened when labor market search is more efficient. This is 
consistent with the recent literatures that document a negative relationship between unemployment 
risk of the workers and employers’ debt usage (e.g., Agrawal and Matsa, 2013; Chemmanur, 
Cheng and Zhang, 2013). Another interesting fact is that the leverage increases as economic 
volatility increases. This is consistent with findings from other research on the relationship 
between leverage and aggregate volatility (e.g., Johnson, 2016). However, I provide a novel 
                                                        
6 The worker and firm in a matching relationship optimally choose the identical cash flow threshold to leave the 
matching relations, by the virtue of generalized Nash bargaining sharing rule. 
7 This stationary cross-sectional distribution can be conveniently characterized by an analytically solvable Fokker-
Planck equation with proper boundary conditions. The resulting density function follows a Double Pareto form, which 
is similar to the literature on power laws in the stochastic growth models featuring population births and deaths (e.g., 
Gabaix, 2009). Refer to subsection 1.3.5 for details. 
8 The equilibrium unemployment rate is represented by a probability mass of the density function of the stationary 
cross-sectional distribution. 
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mechanism originated from labor market frictions 9 . To my best knowledge, this is the first 
theoretical research that tackles the positive leverage-volatility co-movement puzzle from a 
frictional labor market perspective. Lastly, the optimal leverage decreases with the cost of 
bankruptcy, which is again consistent with most of the extant corporate finance research (e.g., 
Leland, 1994).  
The numerical exercise of the model also provides a rich set of empirically testable 
predictions regarding the impacts of the labor market search friction, workers’ bargaining power 
and economic volatility on labor market consequences, through a novel channel of endogenous 
capital structure choice. One novel prediction is that in the presence of endogenous leverage 
decisions, labor market search efficiency affects the wage of the new hires in a modest and non-
monotonic way: More efficient labor market search even suppresses the wage rate for a certain 
range of search efficiency levels, because of the higher leverage policy by the firms facing more 
efficient labor market. Moreover, the workers’ bargaining power and labor market search frictions 
affect various other aspects of labor market outcomes, through the endogenous capital structure 
choice channel. For example, a lower workers’ bargaining power or a lower search efficiency 
generates a fatter left tail of stationary cross-sectional cash flow distribution, thus wage distribution, 
in the economy. Unemployment rate increases with workers’ bargaining power and decreases with 
the labor market search efficiency. Moreover, more efficient matching technology induces the 
workers to exert more job searching effort, in order to capitalize a more “productive” matching 
process. Lastly, the model opens up a novel explanation for the observed relationship between 
volatility and labor market outcomes. One prominent result is that a higher economic volatility 
elicits more searching effort by the workers. This finding is in line with the empirical regularities 
that the transition rate from out-of-labor-force to unemployment pool is countercyclical, ramping 
up during the recessions (e.g., Elsby, Hobijn and Sahin, 2015; Krueger, 2016). Although the 
economic recessions are characterized by both lower productivity and higher uncertainty, I have 
shown that the volatility certainly contributes to the observed countercyclical behavior of labor 
force participation, which is, to my best knowledge, novel to the literature. 
                                                        
9 Johnson (2016) resorts to a deposit insurance mechanism to explain the positive leverage-volatility co-movement 
puzzle. 
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I go on to extend the baseline model using alternative assumptions about the information 
structure of the productivities of the matches in the economy. First, I extend the model to an 
unobservable matching-specific productivity and Bayesian learning framework. The same set of 
equilibrium solutions goes through. Secondly, I assume that only the employer knows about its 
own productivity and it cannot credibly commit to a particular leverage choice. A High-
productivity firm suffers from an asymmetric information and capital market undervaluation. 
Consequently, it has incentive to signal quality to the capital market through excessive debt 
issuance compared with the full-information first best scenario. I show a separating equilibrium 
always exists. Under the separating equilibrium, the high-productivity firm may issue more debt 
compared with its first best capital structure choice under symmetric information. In this case, the 
post-match shareholder value of a high-productivity firm is reduced by the asymmetric information 
problem. Therefore, high-productivity firms post fewer vacancies and the labor market is less tight. 
I also demonstrate that under certain restrictions on the model parameters, there also exist two 
types of pooling equilibria. This part of analysis takes the first step toward an understanding about 
the joint movement of capital market misvaluation and its impact on employment dynamics. 
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First of all, the modeling choice of 
this paper, i.e., bringing together the Leland-type capital structure model and the DMP labor 
market searching and matching model adds to the burgeoning macroeconomic literature that 
studies the relationship between financial market conditions and labor market conditions (e.g., 
Wasmer and Weill, 2004; Monacelli, Quadrini and Trigari, 2011; Chugh, 2013; Petrosky-Nadeau, 
2014). The underlying mechanisms through which the labor market and financial market are 
interrelated demarcate this paper from most of extant literature (e.g., Chugh, 2013; Petrosky-
Nadeau, 2014). The mechanism proposed in Chugh (2013) and Petrosky-Nadeau (2014) is the 
traditional credit channel where firms could be financially constrained and the financing cost of 
vacancy creations plays a central role in the transmission of shocks10. In this sense these papers 
share similar features to models proposed by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore 
(1997), which document the amplification of productivity shocks through financial constraints and 
depressed asset prices. In my model the wage bargaining between firms and workers and the 
                                                        
10 Similar channels also play a central role in Wasmer and Weil (2004), which considers an environment where 
bargaining is between entrepreneurs and financiers. In their model, financiers are needed to finance the cost of posting 
a vacancy and the surplus extracted by financiers is similar to the cost of financing investments. 
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impact of debt on hiring rate jointly determine the optimal leverage choice11. A salient feature of 
my paper is the equilibrium concept, in which the firms internalize the effect of the leverage on 
the welfare of searching workers when choosing their capital structures, which is absent in the 
extent models12,13. From a methodological point of view, the continuous time approach enables 
me to characterize the various aspects of labor market outcomes in closed forms. The optimal 
leverage, expected value of being unemployed, and labor market tightness are characterized by a 
simple system of equations.  
Moreover, this paper also complements to the micro-economic level analyses on human 
capital and capital structure choices (Berk, Stanton and Zechner, 2010). In Berk, Stanton and 
Zechner (2010), firms compete for scarce labor force in a frictionless labor market. They only 
focus on the firm’s optimal capital structure choice and do not consider the collective impact of 
individual firms’ optimal capital structure choices on the aggregate labor market outcomes. On the 
contrary, my paper nests a dynamic capital structure model into a frictional labor market and is 
able to generate the individual firm’s optimal capital structure choice in a frictional labor market 
searching and bargaining environment. More distinctively, my model is able to demonstrate the 
impact of the labor market search friction, workers’ bargaining power and economic volatility on 
a rich set of aggregate labor market outcomes. Employers’ optimal leverage decisions play a 
crucial role in determining such influences. More generally, several microeconomic analyses build 
models on the capital structure and debt maturity structure of firms facing frictional credit markets 
(e.g., He and Milbradt, 2014; Hugonnier, Malamund and Morellec, 2015). A common theme is 
that the imperfect credit market, featuring searching for financiers, can dramatically alter the firms’ 
security issuance behaviors and default choices. My paper extends the literature by considering an 
alternative market friction, labor market friction, and its impact on firms’ capital structure choices. 
                                                        
11 In Monacelli, Quardrini Trigari (2011), wage bargaining between firms and workers also plays a central role in 
determining the optimal leverage choice, but they do not consider the hiring role of debt. 
12 In most of the extent models (e.g., Monacelli, Quadrini and Trigari, 2011) the leverage is chosen to maximize the 
matching surplus only, since the leverage choice is determined only after the match is formed. This is similar to my 
last part of analysis, where the firms lack commitment power and are unable to credibly inform workers their capital 
structure choices early in workers’ job hunting stage. 
13 My modelling of debt instrument is consistent with the classic dynamic corporate finance literature, in which debt 
is typically modeled as a perpetual coupon-bearing bond with endogenous bankruptcy threshold. My paper also 
embraces much richer features about the productivity shocks, default decisions, and information structure. 
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A unique feature of my paper is the feedback from individual firms’ optimal capital structure 
choices to the labor market consequences at macroeconomic level.  
Lastly, the findings of this paper generate novel and empirically testable implications and 
call for a thorough welfare analysis of government labor market polices. For example, battling 
against the recent financial crisis, many countries from Europe, to name a few, UK, Germany and 
Ireland, expand current vocational training program and initiate new programs to reduce the labor 
market mismatches (Heyes, 2012). These active labor market programs that improve the labor 
market search efficiency are argued to swiftly increase the national welfare in the short run (Brown 
and Koettl, 2015). However, one subtlety is that employers might take advantage of these job 
creation programs by increasing their leverages. As a result, the employment rate might rise at a 
cost of lower wage. A complete welfare implication of these programs might yield more complex 
results than the original expectations.   
The paper is organized as follows. The next section lays out some common structures of 
the model environment used throughout the paper. Section 1.3 considers the core model in which 
firms post their capital structures to job seekers under perfect information about matching 
productivity and gives a numerical example. Section 1.4 relaxes the assumption about the perfect 
information, and solves the model in the context of Bayesian learning about matching quality 
through cash flow performance. The next section considers the no-commitment case in which no 
capital structure posting is allowed. The first subsection deals with the perfect information case, 
followed by the subsection that concentrates on asymmetric information case and the resulting 
capital market signaling. Section 1.6 concludes the paper with some possible directions of future 
research. 
1.2 Model environment 
1.2.1 Labor market participants 
Time is continuous. The labor market consists of a continuum of workers and a continuum 
of firms. The measure of workers is normalized to one. The measure of job vacancies is 
endogenously determined to ensure free entry on the firm side14. In the core model, the productivity 
                                                        
14 I assume that each firm can only post one vacancy in the job market. However, this assumption only facilitates the 
expressions and has no material consequences. 
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of a match, 𝜃, is deterministic and public knowledge. Firms post vacancies and the associated 
capital structure to the potential job seekers. A firm incurs a flow cost 𝜅 to keep the vacancy open. 
I assume that the labor market is so large and workers can only select a subset of job vacancies to 
apply for. The important assumption here is: 
 Assumption 1 Workers have perfect information about the leverage of each job vacancy 
prior to their search, or at least at an early stage in the job search process.  
Whether the workers’ knowledge is perfect or with small noises is not crucial. For the 
expositional purpose, I assume that workers possess perfect knowledge on the leverage associated 
with each posted job vacancy they apply for. Both workers and firms are risk-neutral. They 
optimize and discount future cash flows at rate 𝑟 > 0. The workers are ex-ante identical. All the 
benefits15 accrued to an unemployed worker are summarized by a flow value 𝑏. I assume that 𝑏 is 
small so that no matches are rejected by the workers and all the matches are socially efficient.  
1.2.2 Production upon matching 
The production starts immediately after the match is made, capital structure is set up, and 
the wage bargaining outcome is accepted by both parties. The matching-specific cash flow of a 
match 𝑖 at time 𝑡 is equal to 𝜃𝑋𝑖𝑡 − 𝑓. 𝑓 > 0 represents a constant flow of operating costs
16. In the 
remaining parts of the paper, except Section 1.4, the cash flow of the match is subject to two 
orthogonal sources of idiosyncratic noises. First of all, for each successful match 𝑖,  𝑋𝑖𝑡 starts at 
𝑋0, and evolves according to a geometric Brownian motion process:  
𝑑𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑋𝑖𝑡
= 𝜇𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑑𝑍𝑖𝑡   𝜃𝑋0 > 𝑓 
where 0 < 𝜇 < 𝑟 and 𝜎 > 0. Moreover, there exists a Poisson process that governs the 
exogenous destruction rate of the matching relationship, with intensity17 𝑠. Upon exogenous match 
                                                        
15 The benefits include, but not limited to, unemployment allowance, leisure, social welfare, and income from self-
employment. 
16 My model implications are qualitatively unchanged if I assume that a fixed investment amount 𝐼 is required to start 
the production after a match is formed, and the firm designs optimal capital structure to finance the fixed investment. 
17 The exogenous separation of a match is standard in literature (e.g., Pissarides, 2009; Moen and Rosen, 2011). This 
could reflect the risk of technological obsolescence, natural disasters and worker relocations, etc. 
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destruction, the salvage values for all financial claims are zero. I emphasize here that both sources 
of idiosyncratic noises are independent across matches.  
1.2.3 Job search and match  
Both the job search process and the labor hiring process are frictional. Specifically, the 
flow of new worker-firm matches is captured by the homogeneous-of-degree-one concave 
matching function  𝑚(𝑢, 𝑣) . 𝑢  and 𝑣  denotes the unemployment rate and vacancy rate in the 
economy, respectively. Let 𝑔 denote the matching rate of workers, representing the rate at which 
an unemployed worker meets a vacancy.  Let ℎ denote the matching rate of firms, representing the 
rate at which an idle firm meets an unemployed worker. Obviously,  𝑔 ≔
𝑚(𝑢,𝑣)
𝑢
= 𝑚(1, 𝜖) ≔
𝑔(𝜖) and ℎ ≔
𝑚(𝑢,𝑣)
𝑣
= 𝑚(
1
𝜖
, 1) ≔ ℎ(𝜖)18, where 𝜖 =
𝑣
𝑢
 stands for the labor market tightness. I 
assume that lim
𝜀→0
𝑔(𝜖) = lim
𝜖→∞
ℎ(𝜖)  = 0 and lim
𝜀→∞
𝑔(𝜖) = lim
𝜖→0
ℎ(𝜖) = ∞. Sometimes it is useful to 
introduce the following expression: ℎ = ℎ(𝜖) = ℎ(𝑔−1(𝑔)) = ℎ(𝑔), where ℎ′(𝑔) < 0. 
1.2.4 Debt contract 
Consistent with Leland (1994), debt contract in this paper is represented by a consol bond 
with a constant coupon rate 𝑐. Consistent with Monacelli, Quadrini and Trigari (2011), a crucial 
assumption regarding the timing of the debt issuance and payment of proceeds to shareholders is:  
Assumption 2 The proceeds of debt issuance are immediately distributed to shareholders, 
before the wage bargaining takes place.  
Firms may declare bankruptcy at any time. If a bankruptcy occurs, a fraction 0 < 𝛼 ≤ 1 of 
net present value will be lost to the bankruptcy costs, leaving creditors with abandonment value 
net of bankruptcy costs, and shareholder with nothing. Upon bankruptcy, the match ends.  
1.2.5 Wage bargaining 
I assume that neither firms nor the workers have the commitment power to enter into long-
term employment contracts. Either party can leave the match at any time and return to search. This 
                                                        
18 Following conventions in mathematics, throughout the paper, " = " means “equal to”, and " ≔ " means “denoted 
as” 
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reflect the fact that in the United States, most of the employment relationships are “at will”. A 
consequence of lack of commitment power is that the wage during a particular matching 
relationship is determined by continuous bilateral bargaining between the firm and the worker. 
Following the literature, unless otherwise specified, I take an axiomatic approach and use 
continuous generalized Nash bargaining solutions to characterize the bargaining outcome, 
conditional on cash flow at time 𝑡. 𝛽 stands for the bargaining power of the workers, and 1 − 𝛽 
stands for the bargaining power of the firms. 
1.2.6 Discussion 
The key assumption is that searching workers have perfect information about the firm’s 
intentional capital structure choice of each job vacancy. This assumption may be extreme at the 
first sight. However, this assumption has found empirical support recently (e.g., Brown and Matsa, 
2016). With the help of newly available survey data from an online job search platform, Brown 
and Matsa (2016) finds that the job seekers’ information on employers’ financial conditions are 
consistent with employers’ true financial conditions, such as indicated by their CDS prices. 
Moreover, job seekers act upon their information and are reluctant to apply job vacancies posted 
by firms with poor financial conditions and high leverages. Their findings corroborate my 
assumption here that workers have precise information about the leverages associated with job 
vacancies in the job market when searching for jobs. Another piece of evidence for predictable 
capital structure is that most of public firms often stick to particular capital structures over the 
course of many years (Lemmon, Roberts and Zender, 2008). Assumption 1 is harmless even if one 
has strong prior that workers’ information collection takes time. Consider the following thought 
experiment: Firms build up their reputation for leverage usage in the labor market through repeated 
matching and financing choices. Workers learn about each firm’s reputation for leverage usage 
through observations.  My analysis focuses on the economy at the steady state. Without loss of 
generality, I may still assume that workers have perfect knowledge about the firms’ leverage 
choices and firms do not have incentives to deviate from their long-term leverage targets. Lastly, 
I conjecture that the insights from this paper will be qualitatively unaffected as long as the workers 
can glean some information regarding the capital structure choices by the potential employers in 
the labor market.  
1.3 Baseline model — Perfect knowledge about deterministic 𝜽 
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In the baseline model, the match productivity 𝜃 is deterministic and both the firms and the 
workers have the perfect knowledge about it. I begin with derivation of post-match values of debt 
𝐷(𝑋), equity 𝐸(𝑋), worker’s compensation 𝑊(𝑋). Then I define submarket in the economy, after 
which I present the asset values of unemployed workers, 𝑈, and asset values of idle vacancies, 𝑉. 
Equation for 𝑈 plays a central role in individual firm’s equilibrium expectation about the unique 
relationship between the leverage choice and the probability of matching with workers. I continue 
to introduce and the key definition of this section: the competitive search rational expectation 
equilibrium. This section culminates with characterization of equilibrium leverage, separation 
threshold and stationary cross-sectional distribution of cash flow states. I use matching surplus 
𝑆(𝑋) to obtain solutions. 
1.3.1 post-match Asset values 
It is convenient to introduce the following notations. Let the de facto discount rate, 𝛿 =
𝑟 + 𝑠, the present value of operating cost, 𝐹 ≔ ∫ 𝑒−𝛿𝑡𝑓𝑑𝑡 =
𝑓
𝛿
∞
0
, and the expected present value 
of a perpetual streams of value 𝑋 starting at 𝑋0 = 𝑥: 
𝛱(𝑥) ≔ 𝐸[∫ 𝑒−𝛿𝑡𝑋𝑡𝑑𝑡|𝑋0 = 𝑥] =
𝑥
𝛿 − 𝜇
∞
0
 
1.3.1.1 Debt 
For a given coupon rate 𝑐 and unemployment value 𝑈, the debt value 𝐷(𝑋) of a matched 
firm-worker pair satisfies the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB hereafter) equation 
𝑟𝐷(𝑋) = 𝑐 + 𝜇𝑋𝐷′(𝑋) +
1
2
𝜎2𝑋2𝐷″(𝑋) − 𝑠𝐷(𝑋) (1.1) 
The boundary condition are standard value-matching conditions19: 
𝐷(𝑋) = 𝐷𝐵 = (1 − 𝛼) (𝜃𝛱(𝑋) − 𝐹 −
𝑟𝑈
𝛿
 ) ; 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑋→∞
𝐷(𝑋) =
𝑐
𝛿
 (1.2) 
                                                        
19 According to the specification of abandonment value, the abandonment value drops to zero following exogenous 
separation, while equal to the abandonment value of the firm net of default costs in case of endogenous default by the 
firms. This specification reflects the fact that exogenous separation, for example, a natural disaster, often wipes out 
the entire equipment and premise of the firms, rendering zero recovery value of the firm. Monacelli, Quadrini and 
Trigari (2011) has used the same specification.  
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By standard results from dynamic capital structure literature (e.g., Goldstein, Ju and Leland, 2001). 
The solution of the above boundary value problem is  
𝐷(𝑋) =
𝑐
𝛿
− (
𝑐
𝛿
− (1 − 𝛼) (𝜃𝛱(𝑋) − 𝐹 −
𝑟𝑈
𝛿
))(
𝑋
𝑋
)
𝜈
(1.3) 
where 𝜈 is the negative root of the equation 𝜈(𝜈 − 1) +
2𝜇
𝜎2
𝜈 −
2𝛿
𝜎2
= 0.  
𝜈 = (
1
2
−
𝜇
𝜎2
) − √(
1
2
−
𝜇
𝜎2
)
2
+
2𝛿
𝜎2
(1.4) 
1.3.1.2 Equity 
Similarly, for a given coupon rate 𝑐, wage rate 𝑤, and vacancy value 𝑉,  the equity value 
obeys the following HJB equation 
𝑟𝐸(𝑋) = 𝜃𝑋 − 𝑓 − 𝑐 − 𝑤 + 𝜇𝑋𝐸′(𝑋) +
1
2
𝜎2𝑋2𝐸″(𝑋) − 𝑠(𝐸(𝑋) − 𝑉) (1.5) 
The boundary conditions are: 
𝐸(𝑋𝐸) = 𝑉(𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔);
𝐸′(𝑋)| 𝑋=𝑋𝐸 = 0 (𝑠𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔); 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑋→∞
(
𝐸
𝑋
) < ∞ (𝑛𝑜 𝑏𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑒) (1.6)
 
𝑋𝐸 denotes the optimal bankruptcy threshold 𝑋 for the firm.                           
1.3.1.3 Employed worker 
For a given wage rate 𝑤 and unemployment value 𝑈, an employed worker’s value 𝑊(𝑋) 
satisfies the following HJB equation: 
𝑟𝑊(𝑋) = 𝑤 + 𝜇𝑋𝑊′(𝑋) +
1
2
𝜎2𝑋2𝑊″(𝑋) − 𝑠(𝑊(𝑋) − 𝑈) (1.7)                        
The boundary conditions are:  
𝑊(𝑋𝑊) = 𝑈(𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔); 
𝑊′(𝑋)| 𝑋=𝑋𝑊 = 0(𝑠𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔); 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑋→∞
(
𝑊
𝑋
) < ∞(𝑛𝑜 𝑏𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑒) (1.8)
 
?̲?𝑊 denotes the optimal separation threshold 𝑋 for the worker. 
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The optimal separation threshold for a matched firm-worker pair merits some additional 
explanation. Unlike the standard dynamic capital structure models, like Leland (1994), the no-
commitment assumption on both sides of the match enables both parties of the matched pair to 
walk away at any time at his/her will. Therefore, the match lasts until 𝑋 hits max {?̲?𝐸  , ?̲?𝑊}. The 
party with higher valuation of the match might be tempted to make side payments to the other 
party after 𝑋 hits the other party’s separation threshold, only to hope that the other party stay in 
the matching relationship for a longer time. Such considerations significantly complicate the 
optimal stopping problem. Fortunately, as will be shown below, under generalized Nash 
bargaining, the worker and the firm always agree with each other on the separation threshold.  
To facilitate the intuition behind my equilibrium concept, I first introduce a notion of 
submarket in the labor market20: 
Definition 1.1 (Submarket) A submarket with coupon 𝑐𝑖 , which I call it submarket 𝑖 , 
consists all firms posting job vacancies with coupon 𝑐𝑖 and all the workers applying for the job 
vacancies with this coupon.  
1.3.2 Unemployed worker 
I focus on a searching worker’s behavior in the steady state labor market with 𝐼 nonempty 
submarkets indexed by 𝑖 ∈ {1,2, … , 𝐼}. Each submarket 𝑖 is characterized by a coupon choice 𝑐𝑖, 
posted by a measure of 𝑚𝑖 firms. 
Let 𝑈𝑖 denote the value of being unemployed, in other words, the value of active searching 
for jobs in submarket 𝑖, the HJB equation for an actively searching worker in submarket 𝑖 with 
coupon choice 𝑐𝑖 is: 
𝑟𝑈𝑖 = 𝑏 + 𝑔(𝜖𝑖)[𝑊𝑖(𝑋0) − 𝑈𝑖] (1.9) 
Since workers are ex-ante identical, and they have perfect information regarding the leverage 
associated with all the job vacancies in the labor market. They will enter the submarket that provide 
them with the highest expected value of active job search. All the submarkets with nonempty job 
applicants must grant the same level of expected value to the unemployed workers, which I denote 
                                                        
20 This is similar to submarket concept in Moen (1995) on wage posting in labor market.  
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this value as 𝑈.  Bringing 𝑈 into (1.9), the value of an unemployed worker satisfies the following 
HJB equation: 
𝑟𝑈 = 𝑏 + 𝑔(𝜖𝑖)[𝑊𝑖(𝑋0) − 𝑈] (1.10)                                            
Simple algebraic manipulation gives: 
𝑔(𝜖𝑖) =
𝑟𝑈 − 𝑏
𝑊𝑖(𝑋0) − 𝑈
(1.11) 
For a given 𝑈, (1.11) defines a unique relationship between the coupon rate 𝑐 and the labor market 
tightness 𝜖 in each submarket 𝑖. In other words, 𝜖 is a function, specified by (1.11), of 𝑈 and 𝑐. 
Note that 𝑈 only depends on the aggregate debt level in the labor market. Since in the 
baseline model, all the firms have the same productivity and face the same optimization problem 
for coupon rate, all the firms choose the same coupon 𝑐  in equilibrium. There is only one 
submarket. 
1.3.3 Idle vacancies 
Denote 𝑉(𝑐; 𝑈) as the expected value of a vacancy for which the firm chooses coupon rate 
𝑐, given unemployment value 𝑈. Then 𝑉(𝑐; 𝑈) obeys the following HJB equation: 
𝑟𝑉(𝑐; 𝑈) = −𝜅 + ℎ𝑒(𝜖(𝑐; 𝑈))[𝐸(𝑋0) + 𝐷(𝑋0) − 𝑉] (1.12) 
where ℎ𝑒(𝜖(𝑐; 𝑈)) is a firm’s belief about relationship between the announced coupon choice 
𝑐 and the arrival rate of workers, given 𝑈. In equilibrium, the firm’s expectation is always equal 
to the true relationship between announced capital structure and the arrival rate of workers, with 
𝜖(𝑐; 𝑈) is an implicit function of 𝑐 given by (1.11). This identity holds even for off-equilibrium 
coupon announcements21. By free-entry condition, in equilibrium, 𝑉(𝑐; 𝑈) = 0.  
1.3.4 Competitive search rational expectation equilibrium 
Now I am ready to introduce the definition of competitive search rational expectation 
equilibrium (CSREE).  
                                                        
21 Moen (1995) has shown that such belief restriction is also consistent with a stable equilibrium concept first 
introduced by Gale (1992), in which impact of deviating coupon choices associated with a subset of job vacancies on 
the equilibrium converges to zero as the measure of deviating job vacancies approaches to zero. 
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Definition 1.2 (CSREE) A competitive search rational expectation equilibrium consists of 
a coupon rate  𝑐,  a separation threshold 𝑋, a vector of asset values (𝐷, 𝐸, 𝑈, 𝑉,𝑊), a labor market 
tightness 𝜖, an unemployment rate 𝑢, and the firm’s belief ℎ𝑒 such that the following holds: 
I. Profit-maximization: Given 𝑈, 𝑐 solves the following profit-maximization problem: 
𝑐 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑐≥0𝑉(𝑐; 𝑈) (1.13) 
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜: (1.3) (1.5) (1.6) (1.7) (1.8) (1.10) (1.11) (1.12)  
and 
𝑋 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑋′𝐸(𝑋0), 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑋″𝑊(𝑋0)} (1.14) 
II. Asset values: Given the optimal  (𝑐, 𝑋) and 𝑈, 𝐷 satisfies (1.3); 𝐸 satisfies (1.5) and 
(1.6); 𝑊 satisfies (1.7) and (1.8) where 𝑤 is determined by generalized Nash bargaining. 
III. Free entry: Given the optimal  (𝑐, 𝑋), 𝑈 is such that 𝑉(𝑐; 𝑈) = 0 
IV. Labor market tightness: Given the optimal (𝑐, 𝑋), 𝑤 and 𝑈, 𝜖 solves 
𝑔(𝜖) =
𝑟𝑈 − 𝑏
𝑊(𝑋0) − 𝑈
 
V. Belief consistency 
ℎ𝑒(𝜖(𝑐; 𝑈)) = ℎ(𝜖(𝑐; 𝑈)) (1.15) 
VI. Stationary labor market: An unemployment rate 𝑢  characterized by the stationary 
cross-sectional distribution density function 𝒻(𝑋)  such that outflow from the unemployment 
population is equal to the inflow to the unemployment population in every 𝑑𝑡, which is equivalent 
to the requirement that the inflow to employment population is equal to the outflow from the 
employment population in every 𝑑𝑡.  
1.3.5 Solve the equilibrium 
1.3.5.1 Wage function 
Notice that according to Definition 1.2, the equilibrium separation threshold for a given 
match is the higher value of the worker’s and the firm’s optimal separation thresholds. In this 
subsection, I will show that the two separation thresholds always coincide with each other, thereby 
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greatly simplifying my subsequent analyses. As a byproduct, I also present a wage function linear 
in current cash flow state 𝑋. 
After a match is created and the debt is issued, the worker and the firm split the remaining 
matching surplus through continuous bilateral bargaining according to a generalized Nash 
bargaining rule. The generalized Nash bargaining selects the wage: 
𝑤(𝑋) ∈ argmax
𝑤
[𝑊(𝑋) − 𝑈]𝛽[𝐸(𝑋) − 𝑉]1−𝛽 
As repeated shown in labor market search literature, this maximization yields as a 
necessary and sufficient first-order condition:  
𝛽[𝐸(𝑋) − 𝑉] = (1 − 𝛽)[𝑊(𝑋) − 𝑈] 
In equilibrium, 𝑉 = 0. The worker’s outside option value is 𝑈. Therefore, I have 
𝛽𝐸(𝑋) = (1 − 𝛽)[𝑊(𝑋) − 𝑈] (1.16)                                         
Taking derivatives of both sides of (1.16) with respect to 𝑋. I have: 
𝛽𝐸′(𝑋) = (1 − 𝛽)𝑊′(𝑋) (1.17)                                                    
and  
𝛽𝐸″(𝑋) = (1 − 𝛽)𝑊″(𝑋) (1.18)                                                  
One direct consequence of equation (1.17) is that the matched firm and worker agree to 
separate the matching relationship and return to search when 𝑋 hits the same threshold, i.e., 𝑋𝐸 =
𝑋𝑊 ≔ 𝑋. Therefore, the asset values in the economy have similar expressions as in Leland (1994), 
which greatly simplifies my analyses. I also obtain the following lemma with regard to the wage 
function, which is linear in current cash flow state 𝑋. 
Lemma 1.1 (Wage function) In equilibrium, under generalized Nash bargaining, the wage 
function is linear in 𝑋 
𝑤(𝑋) = 𝛽(𝜃𝑋 − 𝑓 − 𝑐) + (1 − 𝛽)𝑏 + 𝛽𝑔(𝜖)𝐸(𝑋0) 
             = 𝛽(𝜃𝑋 − 𝑓 − 𝑐) + (1 − 𝛽)𝑏 + (1 − 𝛽)𝑔(𝜖)[𝑊(𝑋0) − 𝑈] (1.19) 
Proof: Appendix A. 
1.3.5.2 Matching surplus 
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It is easier to work with the matching surplus than to derive the expected discounted values 
of equity and wage. First, I define matching surplus as 𝑆 ≔ 𝐸 +𝑊 − 𝑉 − 𝑈. Then by generalized 
Nash bargaining: 
𝐸 − 𝑉 = (1 − 𝛽)𝑆 
and  
𝑊 −𝑈 = 𝛽𝑆 
Denote 𝐷0 ≔ 𝐷(𝑋0) , 𝑆
0 ≔ 𝑆(𝑋0), 𝑔 ≔ 𝑔(𝜖), 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ℎ ≔ ℎ(𝜖) . The value function of being 
unemployed (1.10) can be expressed in terms of 𝑆: 
𝑟𝑈 = 𝑏 + 𝑔𝛽𝑆0 (1.20)                               
Similarly, the value function of an idled vacancy becomes 
𝑟𝑉 = −𝜅 + ℎ[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0 + 𝐷0] (1.21)  
By the definition of 𝑆, the HJB equation for 𝑆 is as follows: 
𝛿𝑆(𝑋) = 𝜃𝑋 − 𝑓 − 𝑐 − 𝑏 + 𝜅 − [𝑔𝛽 + ℎ(1 − 𝛽)]𝑆0 − ℎ𝐷0 + 𝜇𝑋𝑆′(𝑋) +
1
2
𝜎2𝑋2𝑆″(𝑋) (1.22) 
Using (1.20) and (1.21), 
𝛿𝑆(𝑋) = 𝜃𝑋 − 𝑓 − 𝑐 − 𝑟𝑈 − 𝑟𝑉 + 𝜇𝑋𝑆′(𝑋) +
1
2
𝜎2𝑋2𝑆″(𝑋) (1.23) 
with boundary conditions:   
𝑆(𝑋) = 0 (𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔);
𝑆′(𝑋)|𝑋=𝑋 = 0(𝑠𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔); 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑋→∞
(
𝑆
𝑋
) < ∞(𝑛𝑜 𝑏𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑒) (1.24)
 
In the Appendix A, I obtain a closed-form solution of the boundary problem (1.22), (1.23) 
and (1.24). Taking derivative of 𝑆(𝑋) with respect to 𝑋 and setting this expression equal to zero 
at 𝑋 = 𝑋, I achieve Proposition 1.1 regarding the optimal separation threshold: 
Proposition 1.1 (Optimal separation threshold) Given 𝑈 and 𝑐, the matching surplus 𝑆(𝑋) 
is given by 
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𝑆(𝑋) = 𝜃𝛱(𝑋) − 𝐹 −
𝑐 + 𝑏 − 𝜅 + [𝑔𝛽 + ℎ(1 − 𝛽)]𝑆0 + ℎ𝐷0
𝛿
−
                        [𝜃𝛱(𝑋) − 𝐹 −
𝑐 + 𝑏 − 𝜅 + [𝑔𝛽 + ℎ(1 − 𝛽)]𝑆0 + ℎ𝐷0
𝛿
] (
𝑋
𝑋
)
𝜈
                         = 𝜃𝛱(𝑋) − 𝐹 −
𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈 + 𝑟𝑉
𝛿
− [𝜃𝛱(𝑋) − 𝐹 −
𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈 + 𝑟𝑉
𝛿
] (
𝑋
𝑋
)
𝜈
(1.25)
 
The optimal separation threshold 𝑋 is  
𝑋 =
−𝜈
1 − 𝜈
𝛿 − 𝜇
𝜃 
[𝐹 +
𝑐 + 𝑏 − 𝜅 + [𝑔𝛽 + ℎ(1 − 𝛽)]𝑆0 + ℎ𝐷0
𝛿
]
=
−𝜈
1 − 𝜈
𝛿 − 𝜇
𝜃 
[𝐹 +
𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈 + 𝑟𝑉
𝛿
]                                              (1.26)
 
 In equilibrium, the matching surplus becomes 
𝑆(𝑋) = 𝜃𝛱(𝑋) − 𝐹 −
𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
𝛿
− [𝜃𝛱(𝑋) − 𝐹 −
𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
𝛿
](
𝑋
𝑋
)
𝜈
(1.27) 
The equilibrium optimal separation threshold 𝑋 is  
𝑋 =
−𝜈
1 − 𝜈
𝛿 − 𝜇
𝜃 
[𝐹 +
𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
𝛿
] (1.28) 
The optimal separation threshold 𝑋 is decreasing in productivity 𝜃, and is increasing in 𝑐 and 𝑈. 
Proof: Appendix A. 
The fact that the optimal separation threshold is increasing in 𝑐 echoes the finding from 
risky debt and capital structure literature, for example, Leland (1994). The optimal separation 
threshold and 𝑈 move in the same direction is new to the literature. The separation threshold can 
be triggered by either party of the firm-worker match. Therefore, the optimal separation threshold 
incorporates the worker’s outside option value 𝑈.  
1.3.5.3 Optimal coupon 𝑐∗ 
The optimal coupon rate 𝑐∗ solves the following constrained maximization problem: 
𝑟𝑉∗(𝑈) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑐≥0
−𝜅 + ℎ[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0 + 𝐷0] (1.29) 
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subject to the following constraints: 𝐷0 is specified by (1.3) with 𝑋 = 𝑋0; 𝑆
0 is specified by (27) 
with 𝑋 = 𝑋0; 𝑋 is specified by (1. 28); ℎ = ℎ(𝜖(𝑐; 𝑈)) is such that 𝜖ℎ(𝜖) = 𝑔(𝜖) =
𝑟𝑈−𝑏
𝛽𝑆0
 
In the appendix, I show that the first order condition for the above problem is characterized by 
the following two equations22,23 : 
Proposition 1.2 (Optimal coupon rate 𝑐) In equilibrium, the first order condition for optimal 
coupon rate 𝑐 satisfies the following first order condition: 
ℎ(𝜖(𝑈, 𝑐)) [
𝛽
𝛿
+
1
𝛿
(𝛼𝜈
𝑐
𝛿𝐹 + 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
− 𝛽)(
𝑋0
𝑋
)
𝜈
] +
ℎ(𝑐)(𝜖(𝑈, 𝑐))
{
 
 
 
 (1 − 𝛽) [𝜃Π(𝑋0) − 𝐹 −
𝑟𝑈
𝛿
]  + 𝛽
𝑐
𝛿
+(
𝛼 − 𝛽
1 − 𝜈
𝛿𝐹 + 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
𝛿
−
𝛼𝑐
𝛿
) (
𝑋0
𝑋
)
𝜈
}
 
 
 
 
= 0 (1.30)
 
where ℎ(𝑐)(𝜖(𝑈, 𝑐)) = ℎ(𝑔)𝑔(𝑐) < 0 and 𝑔(𝑐) = −𝑔
𝑆0 (𝑐)
𝑆0
> 0. A sufficient condition for optimal 
𝑐 defined by (1.30) is the solution of constrained optimization problem defined by (1.29) are: 
𝑆0 (𝑐)
𝑆0
 
is decreasing in 𝑐 and ℎ(𝑔𝑔) < 024. 
Proof: Appendix A. 
(1.30) gives me an intuitive result regarding the optimal coupon choices of individual firms. 
When posting coupon rate to workers, the firm balances three opposing forces that 𝑐 imposes to 
the expected shareholder surplus. All three forces are consistent empirical regularities. First of all, 
larger coupon rate increases post-match shareholder surplus, because the “size of the pie” divided 
between shareholders and workers shrinks, and workers cannot get their hands on the proceeds of 
debt issuance. A similar effect has been derived in Monacelli, Quadrini and Trigari (2011), under 
a discrete time setting featuring one-period short term debt.  This so-called “strategic role of debt” 
                                                        
22To conserve space, I use 𝑐 to denote the optimal coupon hereafter unless explicitly specified otherwise.  
23 In order to confirm optimality, I need to consider the second order condition at the optimal coupon rate 𝑐. In the 
appendix, I give sufficient conditions for the second order derivative to be negative. However, a complete 
characterization of optimal coupon rate depends on the specific matching functional form and model parameters. 
24 For any function 𝑙, 𝑙(.) denotes the partial derivative of 𝑙 with respect to .,  
𝜕𝑙
.
, and 𝑙(..) denotes the second order 
partial derivative of 𝑙 with respect to .,  
𝜕2𝑙
.2
. 
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is empirically proved by, for example, Matsa (2010), which finds that firms respond to stronger 
pro-union state laws by using higher leverage. The second effect is the classic cost of financial 
distress. Since higher debt issuance triggers bankruptcy earlier and bankruptcy is costly by the 
model assumption, a higher 𝑐 reduces the equity value by forcing premature separation of a firm-
worker match. This effect is absent in the traditional labor economics literature, since most 
scholarly works focus on all-equity financed firms. The cost of financial distress associated with 
high leverage is widely documented in the tradeoff theory of capital structure with risky debt, for 
example, Leland (1994). The last effect, which is novel to the theoretical literature on labor market 
search, is that a higher coupon rate 𝑐 reduces the arrival rate of the applicants to the posted job 
vacancy, thus reduces the probability of the matching formation in the first place. This effect has 
met great empirical success recently. For example, Brown and Matsa (2016) uses newly available 
data from an online job search platform and finds that job vacancies posted by firms with poor 
financial conditions and higher leverage result in fewer applicants. In equilibrium, individual firm 
optimally chooses its coupon rate, that balances the benefit of leverage, the strategic role of debt, 
and two costs of leverage, the cost of financial distress and the hiring role of debt. Mathematically, 
the firm chooses optimal 𝑐 that equalizes the following two absolute values of elasticities with 
respect to 𝑐: the elasticity of expected post-match shareholder surplus, (1 − 𝛽)𝑆0 + 𝐷0, and the 
elasticity of before-match hiring rate, ℎ(𝜖(𝑈, 𝑐)). 
|𝜂𝑐[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆
0 + 𝐷0]|= |𝜂𝑐[ℎ(𝜖(𝑈, 𝑐))]| (1.31) 
where |𝜂𝑐(. )| stands for the absolute value of respective elasticity with respect to 𝑐.  
1.3.5.4 Expected job tenure 
My model settings allow me to derive a closed-form representation of the expected 
remaining job tenure, i.e., the expected match duration, when current cash flow state is 𝑋 . 
Specifically, 𝑇(𝑋) stands for the expected remaining duration of a match when current cash flow 
state is 𝑋. Standard results from stochastic process literature (e.g., Karlin and Taylor, 1981, 15.3) 
shows that 𝑇(𝑋) solves the following boundary value ODE problem. 
𝜇𝑋𝑇′(𝑋) +
1
2
𝜎2𝑋2𝑇″(𝑋) − 𝑠𝑇(𝑋) = −1 (1.32) 
The boundary conditions are: 
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𝑇(𝑋) = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑋→∞
𝑇(𝑋) =
1
𝑠
(1.33) 
Heuristically, the remaining tenure is zero if 𝑋 hits the separation threshold, 𝑋. Meanwhile, if 𝑋 
is very large, only event that could end the match is the exogenous match destruction event, with 
arrival intensity 𝑠 . Solving explicitly the boundary value problem (1.32) and (1.33) for the 
expression of 𝑇(𝑋), we have the following proposition: 
Proposition 1.3 (Expected tenure) Given the expected value of a searching worker 𝑈 and 
optimal coupon rate 𝑐, the expected job tenure in equilibrium is  
𝑇(𝑋) =
1
𝑠
[1 − (
𝑋
𝑋
)
𝜌
] (1.34) 
where 𝜌 = (
1
2
−
𝜇
𝜎2
) − √(
1
2
−
𝜇
𝜎2
)
2
+
2𝑠
𝜎2
. 𝑇(𝑋) is decreasing in coupon rate 𝑐 and is increasing in 
the current cash flow state 𝑋 and vacancy productivity 𝜃.  
Proof: Appendix A. 
Recall that wage is also increasing in the current cash flow state 𝑋, therefore I obtain a 
positive relationship between job tenure and wage. Many empirical labor economists find a robust 
positive relationship between seniority and wage, in both the United States (e.g., Topel, 1991) and 
Europe (e.g., Dustmann and Meghir, 2005).  
1.3.5.5 Stationary distributions of cash flow state 𝑋 
In this section, I characterize the stationary cross-sectional distribution of the cash flow 
state 𝑋  in the economy. This exercise serves two purposes. First of all, the steady-state 
unemployment rate 𝑢  is expressed in terms of stationary cross-sectional distribution density 
function, since the total mass of workers is one. Moreover, as seen from Lemma 1.1 and 
Proposition 1.3, wages and expected job tenures are deterministic function of cash flow state 𝑋. 
By deriving the stationary cross-sectional distribution of 𝑋, I am able to pin down the stationary 
cross-sectional distribution of wages and expected job tenure in the economy.  
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My economy is a stochastic growth economy featuring matching pair deaths and births25, 
with labor market search being the only friction. The stochastic process governing the dynamic 
evolution of the cash flow state 𝑋, by assumption, is a geometric Brownian process with drift. 
Obviously, 𝑋  belongs a class of Kolmogorov-Feller diffusion process 26 . Let 𝒻(𝑋; 𝑋0) be the 
transition probability density function for 𝑋 in the economy with the starting value 𝑋0. From the 
classic treatment (e.g., Karatzas and Shreve, 1991, Chapter 5, Section 1), the dynamics of 𝒻(𝑋) 
follows a Fokker-Planck equation, also known as Kolmogorov forward equation of the process 𝑋,  
∀ X ∈ [X,  ∞] \{X0}, 
𝑑𝒻(𝑋)
𝑑𝑡
= −
𝑑
𝑑𝑋
[𝜇𝑋𝒻(𝑋)] +
1
2
𝑑2
𝑑𝑋2
[𝜎2𝑋2𝒻(𝑋)] − 𝑠𝒻(𝑋) (1.35) 
Let 𝒻(𝑋) denote the stationary 𝒻(𝑋), I have the following boundary value problems governing 
𝒻(𝑋): 
−
𝑑
𝑑𝑋
[𝜇𝑋𝒻(𝑋)] +
1
2
𝑑2
𝑑𝑋2
[𝜎2𝑋2𝒻(𝑋)] − 𝑠𝒻(𝑋) = 0 (1.36) 
with boundary conditions27: 
𝒻(𝑋 +) = 0 (1.37) 
1
2
𝜎2𝑋0
2[𝒻′(𝑋0 −) − 𝒻
′(𝑋0 +)] = 𝑠∫ 𝒻(𝑋)𝑑𝑋 +
1
2
𝜎2𝑋2𝒻′(𝑋 +)
∞
𝑋
(1.38) 
𝑔 [1 − ∫ 𝒻(𝑋)𝑑𝑋
∞
𝑋
] = 𝑠∫ 𝒻(𝑋)𝑑𝑋 +
1
2
𝜎2𝑋2𝒻′(𝑋 +)
∞
𝑋
(1.39) 
The boundary conditions, despite their complexities, are intuitive under scrutiny. First, 
once the post-match performance is poor and the cash flow state 𝑋 reaches the equilibrium 
endogenous default threshold, 𝑋, separation occurs immediately. In other words, 𝑋 spends no time 
at 𝑋28.  Mathematically, this requires 
1
2
𝜎2𝑋2𝒻(𝑋 +) = 0 , since 
1
2
𝜎2𝑋2 ≠ 0 , I have (1.37). 
                                                        
25 For the application of power laws to city and population growth, refer to Gabaix (2009). 
26 For the definition of Kolmogorov-Feller diffusion process, please consult to Karatzas and Shreve (1991), Chapter 
5, Definition 1.1.1. 
27 𝑋+∶= lim
𝑋′↓𝑋
𝑋′ and 𝑋−∶= lim
𝑋′↑𝑋
𝑋′ 
28 Mathematically, 𝑋  is an attainable boundary that can be hit by the process in finite time period with positive 
probability. Moreover, attainable boundaries are either absorbing or reflecting. In my case, it is absorbing. 
24 
 
Secondly, (1.38) has an economic meaning as follows: at steady state, the total flows into the 
employment must commensurate the total flows out of the employment. The left hand side is the 
total flows into the employment. The density 𝒻(𝑋) is not differentiable at 𝑋0, corresponding to the 
inflow of workers to the employment and all new matches starting at 𝑋0. The right hand side is the 
total flows out of the employment. The first term is intuitive. For the last term, the flow of matching 
separation at 𝑋 is given by 
1
2
𝜎2𝑋2𝒻′(𝑋 +). Intuitively, over a small enough interval of time Δ, the 
diffusion term in 𝑑𝑋𝑡 = 𝜇𝑋𝑡𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑋𝑡𝑑𝑍𝑡  dominates, and half of the measure
29  of 𝒻(𝑋 +
𝜎𝑋√Δ) × 𝜎𝑋√Δ matched firm-worker pairs near the boundary 𝑋 will exit the production. Finally, 
(1.39) is the standard restriction in labor market search models (e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides, 
1994), which yields the Beveridge curve. The left hand side is the outflow from the unemployment 
population, and the right hand is the inflow to the unemployment population, which, by definition, 
is also the outflow from the employment population.  
The solution technique of the boundary problem (1.36) subject to (1.37) — (1. 39) is similar 
to those continuous time cases in the power law literature (e.g., Gabaix, 2009; Achdou, Han, Lasry, 
Lions and Moll, 2015). For 𝑋 ∈ [𝑋,∞] \{𝑋0} , the following proposition characterizes the 
stationary cross-sectional distribution density function of 𝑋, in the equilibrium:  
Proposition 1.4 (Stationary cross-sectional distribution of 𝑋), Given 𝑈, 𝑔 and 𝑐, for 𝑋 ∈
[𝑋,  ∞] \{𝑋0}, the stationary cross-sectional distribution density function of 𝑋 in equilibrium is: 
𝒻(𝑋) = {
𝜁𝑋−𝑚1−1                               ,         𝑋 > 𝑋0
𝜁𝑋−𝑚0−1 [1 − (
𝑋
𝑋
)
𝑚1−𝑚0
],         𝑋 ≤ 𝑋 < 𝑋0
(1.40) 
where 𝑚0 = (
1
2
−
𝜇
𝜎2
) − √(
1
2
−
𝜇
𝜎2
)
2
+
2𝑠
𝜎2
 and 𝑚1 = (
1
2
−
𝜇
𝜎2
) + √(
1
2
−
𝜇
𝜎2
)
2
+
2𝑠
𝜎2
; 𝜁  and 𝜁  are 
positive and uniquely determined by boundary conditions (1.38) and (1.39). 
Proof: Appendix A. 
                                                        
29 This expression is derived by using Taylor expansion at 𝑋 = 𝑋. 
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The expression of the stationary cross-sectional distribution density function 𝒻(𝑋) of cash 
flow state 𝑋 takes the form of Double-Pareto distribution density, as repeatedly shown in the 
stochastic growth literature (e.g., Gabaix, 2009; Achdou, Han, Lasry, Lions and Moll, 2015).  
We thus complete the solution of a Competitive Search Rational Expectation Equilibrium 
defined in Definition 1.2. The solutions for optimal coupon rate 𝑐, unemployment value 𝑈, and 
labor market tightness 𝜖 , are characterized by a system algebraic equations. The separation 
threshold 𝑋 and the labor market aggregates: the wage function 𝑤, expected job tenure 𝑇, and the 
stationary cross-sectional distribution of cash flow state in the economy 𝒻, are all in analytical 
forms.  
1.3.6 Labor force participation rate 
The labor force participation rate (LFPR hereafter) is counter-cyclical. The empirical 
consensus is that the transition from out of labor force to unemployment goes up when the 
economy is sliding into recession (Elsby, Hobijn and Sahin, 2015; Krueger, 2016). In this 
subsection, I try to extend the model to allow for workers’ job searching intensity decisions. Higher 
job searching intensity indicates more active labor force participation. 
Theoretically, a rigorous treatment of labor force participation decisions requires three 
states of workers— unemployed, employed and out of the labor force, and three value functions 
for workers, one for each state. However, my model only offers two-state value functions for 
workers. I bypass the modeling difficulties by incorporating an endogenous job searching effort 
variable to my baseline model, and shed some light on the role of capital structure choice in 
affecting the worker’s labor force participation choice, which is the job searching effort he/she 
optimally expends.  
Specifically, let 𝑒𝑗 denote the job searching effort an unemployed worker 𝑗 exerts in the 
labor market. Without loss of generality, I restrict 𝑒𝑗 ∈ [0, ?̅?], ?̅? < ∞. Higher 𝑒𝑗 denotes for more 
active labor force participation, with 𝑒𝑗 = ?̅? standing for full labor force participation. The cost of 
labor searching effort is 𝑙(𝑒𝑗), with the usual convex assumptions: 𝑙
′(𝑒𝑗) > 0 and 𝑙
″(𝑒𝑗) > 0.  
26 
 
The matching rate for searching worker 𝑗 is  𝑔(𝑒𝑗, 𝜖) ≔
𝑚(𝑒𝑗𝑢,𝜈)
𝑢
= 𝑚(𝑒𝑗, 𝜖). Again, 𝑢, 𝜈 and 𝜖 
denotes the unemployment rate, vacancy rate and labor market tightness in the economy, 
respectively. Similarly, the matching rate for the firm is 
∫ 𝑚(𝑒𝑗,𝜖)𝑑𝑗
𝑢
0
𝜈
.  
The value function of an unemployed worker becomes30 
𝑟𝑈(𝑒𝑗) = 𝑏 + 𝑔(𝑒𝑗 , 𝜖)𝛽𝑆
0 − 𝑙(𝑒𝑗) (1.41) 
and the first order condition for the optimal effort 𝑒𝑗 is
31 
𝑔(𝑒𝑗)(𝑒𝑗, 𝜖)𝛽𝑆
0 − 𝑙′(𝑒𝑗) = 0 (1.42) 
In the equilibrium, since workers are ex-ante identical, they face the same job searching effort 
optimization problem and choose the same optimal amount of effort, denoted as 𝑒, and they obtain 
the same value of being unemployed. I omit the subscripts of worker indices. (1.41) and (1.42) 
become: 
𝑟𝑈 = 𝑏 + 𝑔(𝑒, 𝜖)𝛽𝑆0 − 𝑙(𝑒) (1.43) 
and  
𝑔(𝑒)(𝑒, 𝜖)𝛽𝑆0 − 𝑙′(𝑒) = 0 (1.44) 
The value function for an idle vacancy is: 
𝑟𝑉 = −𝜅 + ℎ(𝑒, 𝑔)[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0 + 𝐷0] (1.45) 
which is similar to (1.29), except that the matching rate ℎ now depends on the job searching effort 
in the economy, 𝑒, in addition to the labor market tightness. 
The first order condition for optimal coupon rate 𝑐  is similar to (1.30), except that 
ℎ(𝑐)(𝑒, 𝑔) = ℎ(𝑒)𝑒(𝑐) + ℎ(𝑔)𝑔(𝑐), in the Appendix A, I show the explicit expressions of 𝑒(𝑐) and 
𝑔(𝑐) . The following proposition characterizes the optimal coupon rate 𝑐  in the presence of 
endogenous searching effort. 
                                                        
30 Note that as in the baseline case, a searching worker 𝑗’s 𝑈 does not depend on the individual coupon choice. 
Meanwhile, 𝑈 does depend on the individual 𝑗’s searching effort. 
31 Note that the internal solution always exists because (1.41) is concave in 𝑒. 
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Proposition 1.5 (Optimal coupon rate 𝑐  in the presence of job searching effort 𝑒 ) In 
equilibrium with optimal searching effort 𝑒, the optimal coupon rate 𝑐 satisfies the following first 
order condition: 
ℎ(𝑒(𝑈, 𝑐), 𝑔(𝑈, 𝑐)) [
𝛽
𝛿
+
1
𝛿
(𝛼𝜈
𝑐
𝛿𝐹 + 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
− 𝛽)(
𝑋0
𝑋
)
𝜈
] +
ℎ(𝑐)(𝑒(𝑈, 𝑐), 𝑔(𝑈, 𝑐))
{
 
 
 
 (1 − 𝛽) [𝜃𝛱(𝑋0) − 𝐹 −
𝑟𝑈
𝛿
] + 𝛽
𝑐
𝛿
+(
𝛼 − 𝛽
1 − 𝜈
𝛿𝐹 + 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
𝛿
−
𝛼𝑐
𝛿
) (
𝑋0
𝑋
)
𝜈
}
 
 
 
 
= 0 (1.46)
 
where ℎ(𝑐)(𝑒(𝑈, 𝑐), 𝑔(𝑈, 𝑐)) = ℎ
(𝑒)𝑒(𝑐)+ ℎ
(𝑔)𝑔(𝑐) . 𝑔(𝑐)  and 𝑒(𝑐)  is defined in (A.35) and (A.36), 
respectively. A sufficient condition for optimal 𝑐 defined by (1. 46) is the solution of constrained 
optimization problem defined by (1.45) is  ℎ(𝑐𝑐)(𝑒, 𝑔) < 0. 
Proof: Appendix A. 
The solutions of expected duration of a matching relationship in the economy and 
stationary cross-sectional distribution of the cash flow states 𝑋 are similar to the baseline case, 
which I omit here. 
1.3.7 A numerical example 
In this section, I demonstrate the model implications for joint relationship between optimal 
leverage choices and labor market dynamics for different model parameters. Specifically, I focus 
on three sets of model parameters: the workers’ bargaining power, 𝛽, the matching efficiency, 𝐴, 
and indicators of economic downturns, 𝛼  and 𝜎 . Consistent with the empirical findings on 
functional form of the labor market matching technology, I use a constant-return-to-scale, Cobb-
Douglas matching function 32  𝑚(𝑢, 𝜈) = 𝐴𝑢𝜄𝜈1−𝜄  (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). The 
benchmark parameter values are presented in Table 1.1 and are in line with extant research on 
aggregate labor market dynamics. 
1.3.7.1 Optimal leverage 
                                                        
32 In the presence of job searching effort, the matching function becomes: 𝑚(𝑒𝑢, 𝜈) = 𝐴(𝑒𝑢)𝜄𝜈1−𝜄 , in which 𝑒 is 
searching worker’s job searching effort. 
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In this subsection, I examine the impacts of model parameters on firms’ optimal leverage 
choices. The results are illustrated in Figure 1.1. Several robust patterns are revealed. First of all, 
debt level 𝑐 is increasing in workers’ bargaining power, 𝛽, as illustrated in Figure 1.1. This is 
consistent with recent empirical and theoretical findings that firms utilize higher leverage to 
discourage the workers’ stronger wage demand (e.g., Matsa, 2010; Monacelli, Quadrini and Trigari, 
2011). More interesting facts about the leverage choice is that it increases with the labor market 
search efficiency parameter, 𝐴, for an empirical plausible range of estimates33. The underlying 
logic is as follows: on one hand, the marginal benefit of a higher leverage on post-match 
shareholder value scales up with the labor market search efficiency. On the other hand, recall that 
the marginal cost of posting a larger 𝑐  for the firm is lowering the labor market matching 
probability. As labor market search becomes more efficient, this marginal cost of 𝑐 is decreasing. 
The two forces induce the firm to lever up34 as labor market search efficiency improves. This 
relationship is supported by recent empirical literature, which finds that firms choose lower 
leverage when their workers face greater unemployment risk (e.g., Agrawal and Matsa, 2013; 
Chemmanur, Cheng and Zhang, 2013). Another interesting fact is that the leverage increases as 
economic volatility mounts up. This is consistent with findings from other research on the 
relationship between leverage and aggregate volatility (e.g., Johnson, 2016). However, the 
underlying mechanism is different. Johnson (2016) resorts to a deposit insurance mechanism. I 
provide an alternative mechanism originated from labor market search frictions. I further 
decompose the marginal benefits and marginal cost to various levels of 𝑐, at high and low volatility 
levels. The result confirms that marginal cost of choosing a higher coupon rate 𝑐 decreases rapidly 
with the volatility. Notice that the productivity does not change in the core model. Therefore, as 
volatility increases, the value of a match deteriorates35. Consequently, the marginal cost of a higher 
leverage 𝑐 decreases. This is because as the value of a successful match to the firm is lower, 
                                                        
33 Most of the labor economics papers estimate 𝐴 between 4 and 5. 
34 The relationship between 𝑐 and 𝐴 is not monotonic. A further examination reveals that as 𝐴 becomes very large, the 
optimal leverage jumps down to zero. Notice that the labor market matching process becomes almost frictionless as 
𝐴  becomes very large. The labor market is analogues to a retail market, in which firms provide homogeneous 
product—job vacancies to workers, and workers always go to the highest valued vacancies, i.e., vacancies with zero 
leverage. The searching workers’ choices arise from the fact that as 𝐴  becomes very large, the firms can 
instantaneously fulfill any amounts of searching workers’ job demands. 
35 This is because bankruptcy is costly and the matching relationship has higher chance to hit the bankruptcy boundary. 
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increasing matching probability through lower 𝑐 becomes less desirable36. Therefore, the firm 
responds to a higher economic volatility by employing a higher leverage policy. To my best 
knowledge, this is the first theoretical research that tackles the positive leverage-volatility co-
movement puzzle from a frictional labor market perspective. Lastly, as seen from Figure 1.1, the 
optimal coupon rate decreases with the cost of bankruptcy 𝛼. This finding is consistent with most 
of the extant corporate finance research (e.g., Leland, 1994). 
1.3.7.2 Expected tenure 
Notice that from (34) of Proposition 1.3, the expected matching duration decreases with 
the separation threshold, which in turn, increases with the optimal debt usage by the firm. 
Consistent with findings regarding the comparative statics of optimal leverage in Figure 1.1, the 
expected job tenure in the economy is decreasing in the worker’s bargaining power, the labor 
market search efficiency and the cash flow volatility. It increases with the bankruptcy cost 
parameter. 
1.3.7.3 Stationary cross-sectional density function of 𝑋 
I compare the stationary cross-sectional density function of the cash flow state 𝑋, between 
high and low values of workers’ bargaining power, and high and low values of labor market search 
efficiency. As shown in Figure 1.3, lower value of workers’ bargaining power generates a fatter 
left tail of stationary cash flow distribution among matches, so does a lower value of search 
efficiency parameter. These results are intuitive. Since the separation threshold increases with the 
worker’s bargaining power and the search efficiency37, matches are endogenously destroyed at 
higher cash flow level. Therefore, the stationary cross-sectional cash flow distributions in the 
economy with lower workers’ bargaining power and lower matching efficiency are more dispersed, 
compared with an otherwise identical economy characterized by higher workers’ bargaining power 
and higher search efficiency. Since wage is a linear function of cash flow state 𝑋, as shown in 
                                                        
36 Volatility also affects the marginal benefit of 𝑐. Notice that as volatility increases, the firm has higher chance to 
generate large cash flow. By Nash bargaining, the worker will take a larger share of the cash flow under this high 
profitability scenario. Therefore, the firm has more incentive to use debt to reduce the worker’s wage demand.  
37 Two forces contribute to this. First of all, the optimal leverage increases with worker’s bargaining power and 
matching efficiency, which elevates the separation threshold. A second and subtler force is as follows: increases in 
worker’s bargaining power and search efficiency elevate the expected value of a searching worker, thereby raising the 
required cash flow threshold to keep the matching relationship valuable to both parties. 
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(1.19) of Lemma 1.1, the wage distribution in the former economy also has a fatter left tail, 
compared with that of the latter economy. As far as I am concerned, this is the first research relating 
the wage bargaining and labor market search efficiency to the dispersion of the wage and cash 
flows in the economy, through an endogenous capital structure choice channel on the employer 
side. 
1.3.7.4 Unemployment rate 𝑢 
In this subsection, I examine how the wage bargaining, the labor market search efficiency 
and the economy-wide volatility affect the steady-state unemployment rate 𝑢. This practice differs 
from traditional labor market search models because an important underlying channel is the 
optimal capital structure choice by the employers in the economy. First of all, as shown in Figure 
1.4, the unemployment rate increases with the workers’ bargaining power. Intuitively, a higher 
bargaining power induces the termination of the matching relationship at a higher cash flow level, 
as firms employ higher leverages to prevent workers from scooping large share of matching 
surplus. As a result, more workers go back to unemployment pool during each time period.  
Regarding the labor market search efficiency, despite higher leverage choice as a response to a 
higher search efficiency, the unemployment rate drops as the search efficiency improves, as shown 
in Figure 1.4. Regarding the effect of bankruptcy cost, a higher bankruptcy cost constrains the 
firm’s ability to grab a larger share of matching surplus by levering up, thereby reducing its 
incentive to post a vacancy. Moreover, the more conservative leverage policy as a response to a 
higher bankruptcy cost elicits more job applicants, thereby further reducing the matching 
probability of the individual worker. The two effects collectively drive up the unemployment rate. 
This is consistent with the empirical findings that unemployment rate is higher during collateral 
crisis. One counterintuitive result is the negative relationship between economic volatility and 
unemployment rate. Unemployment rate is well known as a countercyclical variable while higher 
economic volatility is often accompanied by an economic recession. However, one equally widely 
known fact about unemployment rate is that unemployment rate is less volatile than the gross 
domestic product, so called “Okun’s law”. A common explanation is that a large component of 
unemployment rate is unrelated with business cycles (Hall, 2005; Hall, 2016). My model sheds 
new light to this old conundrum. In my economy, the productivity is constant over time. Therefore, 
I could isolate the effect of volatility change on unemployment rate from the overall business cycle 
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effect. The result highlights one silver lining of higher leverage choice during more volatile times: 
Higher leverage choices reduce the “congestion effect” among the searching workers. In other 
words, the higher leverage policy unintendedly creates a positive externality on the workers’ job 
searching process. This “congestion reduction” effect dominates “surplus reduction” effect during 
turbulent times, thereby leading to a negative relationship between economic volatility and 
unemployment rate38. This positive externality of high leverage choice in reducing the “congestion” 
on workers’ job searching is overlooked by the previous literature. 
1.3.7.5 Initial wage 𝑤0 
In this subsection, I fix the cash flow state at 𝑋0, and examine how the wage bargaining, 
the labor market search efficiency, and the economy-wide volatility affect the initial wage 𝑤0. 
Several patterns emerge. First and foremost, as seen from Figure 1.5, labor market search 
efficiency affects the wage of the new hires in a modest and non-monotonic way. From un-
tabulated analyses, for very inefficient matching technology, an increase in search efficiency 
rapidly boosts the expected value of an unemployed worker, thereby elevating the wage for the 
new hires. However, as the search efficiency continue to improve, the positive effect of search 
efficiency on unemployment value dwindles. The firm’s higher optimal leverage policy as a 
response of improved search efficiency dominates and wears down the starting wage of a matching 
relationship. This contrasts to traditional labor market search models without consideration of 
employers’ leverage choices, in which the wage of new hires monotonically increases with the 
search efficiency for obvious reasons: higher search efficiency increases the workers’ expected 
value of searching, thereby increasing the required surplus they demand from a matching 
relationship. Moreover, this non-monotonic and modest relationship between search efficiency and 
wage dynamics calls for a thorough cost-benefit analysis of government policies aimed at 
promoting labor market search efficiency. For example, battling against the recent financial crisis, 
many countries from Europe, to name a few, UK, Germany and Ireland, expand current vocational 
training program and initiate new programs to reduce the labor market mismatches (Heyes, 2012). 
These active labor market programs that improve the labor market search efficiency are argued to 
swiftly increase the national welfare in the short run (Brown and Koettl, 2015). However, one 
                                                        
38 Of course, allowing for a multi-state Markov process of productivity 𝜃 will reduce both the debt and the surplus 
values of the matching, which, in turn, overturns the positive relationship between economic volatility and leverage. 
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subtlety is that employers might take advantage of these job creation programs by adjusting 
upward their leverage ratios. As a result, the new employments might arise at a cost of lower wages. 
A complete welfare implication of these programs might yield more complex results than the 
original expectations. Lastly, as seen from Figure 1.5, the optimal capital structure choice as 
responses to the worker’s bargaining power and macroeconomic condition plays a dominant role 
in determining the initial wages of a matching relationship. Specifically, higher bargaining power 
on the worker side and more volatile economy elicit higher leverage choices by the firms, which 
in turn cuts back the initial wages. An opposite effect of higher bankruptcy cost on wage holds 
analogously. An important empirical implication drawn from Figure 1.5 is that collateral crisis and 
volatility spikes might alter wages in opposite directions, even if they are often concomitant with 
each other during economic recessions.  
1.3.7.6 Labor force participation 𝑒 
As shown in Subsection 1.3.6, I interpret workers’ labor force participation rate as workers’ 
job search intensity. Two model parameters come into play when I examine the comparative statics 
of LFPR. First of all, as shown in Figure 1.6, a more efficient matching technology induces the 
workers to exert more job searching effort, in order to capitalize a more “productive” matching 
process. It is intuitive because by the matching function specified in Subsection 1.3.6, an additional 
searching effort yields a larger increase in matching probability when search efficiency is higher. 
Another important model parameter is the economic volatility. A higher economic volatility elicits 
more job searching effort by the workers. This is because the positive externality of higher leverage 
in reducing the congestion among searching workers. As a result, workers have higher incentives 
to participate in the labor market, because the return of such effort, in terms of job matching 
probability, is higher. This finding is in line with the empirical regularities that the transition rate 
from out-of-labor-force to the unemployment pool is countercyclical, ramping up during the 
recessions (e.g., Elsby, Hobijn and Sahin, 2015; Krueger, 2016). Although the economic 
recessions are characterized by both lower productivity and higher uncertainty, I have shown that 
the volatility certainly contributes to the observed counter-cyclical behavior of labor force 
participation, which is, to my best knowledge, novel to the literature. 
1.4 Learning the random 𝝁 
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In this section, I relax the model assumption about the deterministic and publicly 
observable match-specific quality. I assume that the match-specific productivity can be either high 
or low and is unobservable to both parties of the match. Such a setting meets with great empirical 
success 39 . I begin this section by specifying the modified environment of the model. The 
characterization of the competitive search rational expectation equilibrium is very similar to that 
derived in Section 1.3. Therefore, I delegate the details to Appendix B. 
1.4.1 Searching and learning environment 
The environment is the same as Section 1.2, except for the following changes. I change the 
cash flow specification to maintain the model’s tractability. Specifically, the match-specific 
cumulative cash flow process evolves according to a standard Brownian motion with unknown 
drifts. For a match 𝑖,  
𝑑𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑑𝑍𝑖𝑡 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜇𝑖 = {
𝜇𝐻 ,        𝑝0
𝜇𝐿 , 1 − 𝑝0
(1.47)                                       
𝜇 is a match-specific quality measure, and 𝑝0 represents the common prior belief that the matching 
quality is high. I assume that all the agents have the same prior beliefs regarding the matching 
quality. Furthermore, I also assume that 𝑏 ∈ [𝜇𝐿 , 𝑝0𝜇𝐻 + (1 − 𝑝0)𝜇𝐿]. In other words, learning is 
nontrivial in my economy. It is socially inefficient to keep a match with productivity 𝜇𝐿. 
According to classic treatment on optimal nonlinear filtering (e.g., Liptser and Shiryaev, 
2001, Chapter 9), the steady-state posterior 𝑝𝑡 about the matching quality evolves according to: 
𝑑𝑝𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡(1 − 𝑝𝑡)𝜙𝑑?̅?𝑡 (1.48)                           
𝜙 ≔
𝜇𝐻−𝜇𝐿
𝜎
 is the signal-to-noise ratio, which measures the informativeness of the cumulative cash 
flow process regarding the unobserved matching quality. 𝑑?̅?𝑡 =
1
 𝜎
 [𝑑𝑋𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡𝜇𝐻𝑑𝑡 − (1 −
𝑝𝑡)𝜇𝐿𝑑𝑡] is a Brownian motion process with respect to the filtration {ℱ𝑡
𝑋}. Intuitively, 𝑑?̅?𝑡 is an 
innovation process from the perspectives of both parties of a match. In Appendix B, I follow the 
same procedure as Section 1.3, to characterize the asset values, optimal separation threshold and 
                                                        
39 Inspired by the influential work by Jovanovic (1979), micro-labor economics models treat the firm-worker match 
as an experienced good, whose quality is initially unknown and is gradually revealed through a noisy cash flow process. 
For details, please refer to an excellent survey by Lazear and Oyer (2009). 
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coupon rate, in terms of 𝑝𝑡. The stationary cross-sectional distribution of posterior belief 𝑝𝑡 again 
takes the Double-Pareto form. 
1.5 No coupon-posting 
In this section, I relax two important assumptions of the baseline model in Section 1.3. 
First, I relax the assumption of credible capital structure posting. There is no reliable way that 
firms could credibly signal their intentional capital structure choice to potential job applicants40. 
Furthermore, I introduce heterogeneity in job productivity types. More specifically, there are two 
large measures of firms, different in the productivities of the job vacancies they post. Each measure 
is determined endogenously through free-entry conditions for both types of the firms. Workers are 
agnostic about the employers’ productivity types during job search. The above model 
environments are consistent with real-world labor market observations. For majority of non-
publicly listed firms, it is generally impossible to find out reliable information about their capital 
structure choices. Empiricists have shown that there exist considerable productivity discrepancies 
across firms within the same industry, and across industries 41 . I begin this section with a 
formalization of the aforementioned two relaxations. Then I consider two cases regarding the 
information structure about firm-specific productivity: the case in which the worker, the firm and 
the capital provider know the firm-specific productivity after the match is formed, and the other 
case in which only the firm is savvy about its own productivity after the match is formed. 
1.5.1 Model environment 
The cash flow process and flow operating cost are the same as in Section 1.3, except that 
𝜃 ∈ {𝜃𝐻 , 𝜃𝐿}. The financial contract space is the same as in Section 1.3. A Firm chooses its capital 
structure by issuing perpetual debt after the match is formed, but before the wage negotiation 
begins. Proceeds of debt issuance are distributed to shareholders immediately. Let 𝑝 denote the 
common prior belief that productivity of the job vacancy is high, which is endogenously 
determined in equilibrium. Furthermore, I assume that job vacancies of both productivity levels 
are accepted by the workers. This occurs if the difference between 𝜃𝐻 and 𝜃𝐿 is not large, or the 
                                                        
40 I could equivalently keep the credible capital structure posting assumption, but instead assume that the firm is always 
attempted to deviate from the pre-committed capital structure to an ex-post optimal one after a match is formed. 
41 For a survey regarding the determinants and cross-sectional distributions of firm productivity in U.S. economy, 
please refer to Syverson (2011). 
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“efficiency” of labor market matching function 𝑚(𝑢, 𝑣) is sufficiently low42. Throughout the 
section, I use subscript 𝑘 ∈ {𝐻, 𝐿} to denote respective quantities for firms of a certain type, either 
high or low productivity. 
1.5.2 Full information about 𝜃 
On one hand, the HJB equations and boundary conditions for 𝐷𝑘(𝑋) and 𝑆𝑘(𝑋) remain the 
same as corresponding equations in Section 1.3, expect one expression for each type. Therefore, 
the expressions for debt value 𝐷𝑘(𝑋), match surplus 𝑆𝑘(𝑋), and optimal separation threshold 𝑋𝑘 
are analogous to the respective asset value equations in Section 1.343. On the other hand, the 
unemployment value satisfies the following HJB equation:  
𝑟𝑈 = 𝑏 + 𝑔(𝜖)[𝑝𝑊𝐻
0 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑊𝐿
0] = 𝑏 + 𝑔(𝜖)𝛽[𝑝𝑆𝐻
0 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑆𝐿
0] (1.49) 
Under the case that firms choose debt issuance only after the matches are formed. The 
optimal coupon 𝑐𝑘 solves the optimization problem: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑐𝑘
′
(1 − 𝛽)𝑆𝑘
0 + 𝐷𝑘
0 (1.50)  
The first order condition for 𝑐𝑘 is: 
𝛽
𝛿
−
𝛽 − 𝛼𝜈
𝛿
 (
𝑋0
𝑋𝑘
)
𝜈
= 0 
After simplifying, the optimal coupon 𝑐𝑘 for the firms with productivity type 𝜃𝑘 under symmetric 
information is  
𝑐𝑘 = 𝛿 [
1 − 𝜈
−𝜈
 (
𝛽
𝛽 − 𝛼𝜈
)
−
1
𝜈
𝜃𝑘𝛱(𝑋0) − 𝐹] − 𝑟𝑈 (1.51) 
Bringing (1.51) to (1.28), the optimal separation threshold 𝑋𝑘 is 
𝑋𝑘 = (
𝛽
𝛽 − 𝛼𝜈
)
−
1
𝜈
𝑋0 (1.52)
 
                                                        
42 For example, if 𝑚(𝑢, 𝑣): = 𝐴𝑢𝜄𝑣1−𝜄, then 𝐴 is sufficiently small. 
43 I modify the default value of the firm to 𝐷(𝑋) = 𝐷𝐵 = (1 − 𝛼)𝜃𝛱(𝑋) − 𝐹 − 𝑟𝑈
𝛿
  to make the calculation less cumbersome. 
It is not crucial and does not change any model predictions in the section.  
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Notice that the optimal separation threshold is independent of the productivity parameter 
𝜃𝑘. On one hand, ceteris paribus, both parties of a match are willing to separate at a later time 
when the productivity of the match is higher; on the other hand, more productive firms optimally 
choose larger coupon rate 𝑐𝑘, which leads to earlier defaults. In equilibrium, the two effects exactly 
offset each other.  
Equipped with the optimal coupon rate 𝑐𝑘 and optimal default threshold 𝑋𝑘, I am ready to 
simplify the debt value and matching surplus, 𝐷𝑘(𝑋) and 𝑆𝑘(𝑋). Similar to steps in Section 1.3, I 
have: 
𝑆𝑘(𝑋) = 𝜃𝑘𝛱(𝑋) + (
𝛽
𝛽 − 𝛼𝜈
)
−
1
𝜈
𝜃𝑘𝛱(𝑋0) [
1 − 𝜈
𝜈
−
1
𝜈
𝛽
𝛽 − 𝛼𝜈
(
𝑋
𝑋0
)
𝜈
] (1.53) 
At the start of the match, 𝑋 = 𝑋0, 
𝑆𝑘(𝑋0) = 𝜃𝑘𝛱(𝑋0) + (
𝛽
𝛽 − 𝛼𝜈
)
−
1
𝜈
𝜃𝑘𝛱(𝑋0) (
1 − 𝜈
𝜈
−
1
𝜈
𝛽
𝛽 − 𝛼𝜈
) (1.54) 
The debt value is 
𝐷𝑘(𝑋) =
1 − 𝜈
−𝜈
 (
𝛽
𝛽 − 𝛼𝜈
)
−
1
𝜈
𝜃𝑘𝛱(𝑋0) [1 − (1 + (1 − 𝛼)
𝜈
1 − 𝜈
)
𝛽
𝛽 − 𝛼𝜈
(
𝑋
𝑋0
)
𝜈
] − 𝐹 −
𝑟𝑈
𝛿
(1.55) 
At the start of the match, 𝑋 = 𝑋0, 
𝐷𝑘(𝑋0) =
1 − 𝜈
−𝜈
 (
𝛽
𝛽 − 𝛼𝜈
)
−
1
𝜈
𝜃𝑘𝛱(𝑋0) [1 − (1 + (1 − 𝛼)
𝜈
1 − 𝜈
)
𝛽
𝛽 − 𝛼𝜈
] − 𝐹 −
𝑟𝑈
𝛿
(1.56) 
Since the matches of high and low productivities have the same separation threshold, the stationary 
cross-sectional distribution density function 𝒻(𝑋) is defined similarly to Proposition 1.4. 
1.5.3 Asymmetric information about 𝜃 
In this subsection, I consider the cases in which the productivity 𝜃 is only observable by 
the firm. To make it more interesting, I assume that the firm cares about market value of its 
securities, as well as the intrinsic values. Specifically, I define that a firm’s objective function after 
the match is formed as: 
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𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑐
𝜔[𝑀0(𝑐; 𝜃𝑚)] + (1 − 𝜔)[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆
0(𝑐; 𝜃𝑘) + 𝐷
0(𝑐; 𝜃𝑘)] (1.57) 
where𝑀0(𝑐; 𝜃𝑚) = ∑ 𝑝𝑘[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆
0(𝑐; 𝜃𝑘) + 𝐷
0(𝑐; 𝜃𝑘)]𝑘=𝐿,𝐻 , where 𝑝𝑘 ≔ Pr[𝜃 = 𝜃𝑘]  for 𝑘 ∈
{𝐿, 𝐻}. In other words, 𝑀0(𝑐; 𝜃𝑚) is the market valuation of the firm’s financial claims, including 
debt and equity, when the current cash flow state is 𝑋0, the coupon rate is 𝑐, and the market belief 
about the firm’s productivity type is 𝜃𝑚. 
The specification of (1.57) is consistent with the “capital-market driven” corporate finance 
models (e.g., Baker, 2009; Baker and Wurgler, 2011), in which the firm cares about the intrinsic 
value of its marketable securities, but at the same time is well aware of any misvaluation. The 
objective function is also consistent with the fact that a firm has to sell financial claims against 
future cash flows to investors, and become a sole custodian of the firm’s productive assets44. 
Informed capital providers are often capital-constrained. Therefore, the firm is forced to go to 
arm’s-length capital market agnostic as to the firm’s type. 𝜃𝑚 is the market belief about the firm’s 
productivity type, and 𝜃𝑘 is the firm’s true type. 𝜔 measures the firm’s dependence to arm’s-length 
capital market. If the firms of both productivity types in the arm’s-length market issue the same 
amount of debt, then the market’s belief about 𝜃 is simply 𝑝𝑘 = 𝑝, where 𝑝 is the common prior 
belief that the productivity of the job vacancy is high. In this case, a firm of high productivity 
suffers from undervaluation in capital market while a firm of low productivity enjoy 
overvaluation45. Therefore, I face a situation of capital market signaling through debt issuance46. 
To make the model recursively stable, I assume that the amount and valuation of security issuance, 
as well as the wage bargaining are private information among the firm, the current employed 
worker and the current capital provider. I also assume that capital market is atomless so that it is 
impossible for the firm to meet the same capital provider more than once. I begin by considering 
the separating equilibrium, followed by two categories of pooling equilibria. 
                                                        
44 There are numerous reasons for the selling of securities, for example, liquidity reasons (e.g., DeMarzo and Duffie, 
1999). 
45 It is straightforward from (1.54) and (1.56) that both debt and equity value increase in 𝜃. 
46 There is a notable uniqueness in my setting. The asymmetric information between the firm and the worker renders 
the generalized Nash bargaining solution inappropriate. However, since wage bargaining occurs after the security 
issuance and the issuing amount is observable to the matched worker by assumption. The worker is able to infer the 
firm quality from its security issuance outcome, and make her wage demand accordingly. As I show later, worker’s 
inference gives rise to two types of pooling equilibria. 
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1.5.3.1 Separating equilibrium 
In this section, I first prove the existence of a separating equilibrium, in which the more 
productive firm deviates from its full-information optimal coupon choice, in order to differentiate 
itself from the less productive firm, who always chooses its full-information optimal coupon rate. 
Having observed the debt issuance, the matched worker can perfectly infer the employer’s 
productivity type from its debt issuance choice. The ensued wage bargaining outcome is the same 
as full-information case and is dictated by the generalized Nash bargaining solution.  
First, I show a sufficient condition for the existence of a separating equilibrium47. As 
repeatedly shown in the signaling game literature, a sufficient condition for the existence of a 
separating equilibrium in a two-player signaling game is the “single-crossing” condition (e.g., 
Sobel, 2007). Specifically, I have the following proposition. 
Proposition 1.6 (Single-crossing condition) 
𝜕
𝜕𝜃𝑘
(
𝜕𝑀
𝜕𝑐
) < 0 (1.58) 
Thus a separating equilibrium always exists. 
Proof: Appendix C.             
Intuitively, signaling through excessive debt issuance is costly, which requires additional 
reward from capital providers by assigning higher valuations of the firm’s financial securities, in 
order for the firm to remain on the same indifference curve. However, the high-type firm requires 
less increase in capital market valuation than the low-type firm to stay on the same indifference 
curve. Therefore, there always exists a debt level that the low-type firm would rather issue its full-
information debt amount and enjoy a utility level corresponding to its full-information first best 
level. 
                                                        
47 Throughout this section, I focus on the case that high-type firms signal their qualities via additional debt issuance 
compared with their full-information first-best levels. This assumption greatly simplifies my analysis on the existence 
and characteristics of the separating equilibrium, and is consistent with capital market signaling and security design 
literature (e.g., Noe, 1988; Nachman and Noe, 1994; DeMarzo and Duffie, 1999). 
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I am ready to characterize the separating equilibrium. First, I present the incentive 
compatibility for the low-productivity firm. Let 𝑐𝑠 be the debt level chosen by high-productivity 
firm in the separating equilibrium, then 𝑐𝑠 must satisfies: 
(𝐼𝐶. 𝐿) 𝜔[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0(𝑐𝑠; 𝜃𝐻) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑠; 𝜃𝐻)] + (1 − 𝜔)[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆
0(𝑐𝑠; 𝜃𝐿) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑠; 𝜃𝐿)] ≤
                (1 − 𝛽)𝑆0(𝑐𝐿; 𝜃𝐿) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝐿; 𝜃𝐿)                                                                                         (1.59)
 
Intuitively, the (IC.L) (1.59) requires that the utility for the low-type firm from mimicking 
the coupon choice of the high-type firm is lower than that for the low-type firm from sticking with 
its full-information first best coupon choice. Let 𝑐𝑠∗ the coupon rate such that the left hand side of 
(1.59) is equal to the right hand side. In the Appendix C, I show that such 𝑐𝑠∗ always exists. Let 𝑐̅ 
be some large but finite coupon rate that is never optimal for both type of the firms48. Then any 
value of 𝑐𝑠 ∈ [𝑐𝑠∗, 𝑐̅] satisfies the incentive compatibility condition for the low-type firm (1. 59). 
I have the following lemma. 
Lemma 1.2 (Incentive compatibility for low-productivity firms) There always exists a 
finite 𝑐𝑠∗  such that (1.59) holds with identity. any value of 𝑐𝑠 ∈ [𝑐𝑠∗, 𝑐̅] satisfies the incentive 
compatibility for the low-productivity firm, (1. 59). 
Proof: Appendix C. 
Next, I characterize the incentive compatibility constraints for the high-type firm, which is:  
  
(𝐼𝐶. 𝐻) (1 − 𝛽)𝑆0(𝑐𝑠; 𝜃𝐻) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑠; 𝜃𝐻)  ≥
𝜔[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0(𝑐𝐿; 𝜃𝐿) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝐿; 𝜃𝐿)] + (1 − 𝜔)[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆
0(𝑐𝐿; 𝜃𝐻) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝐿; 𝜃𝐻)] (1.60)
 
Intuitively, in order for a separating equilibrium to exist, the utility for the high-type firm 
from signaling its type must be higher than the utility for the high-type firm from pooling with the 
low-type firm in its coupon choice. Let 𝑐𝑠∗∗ be the coupon rate such that the left hand side of (1.60) 
is equal to the right hand side. In the Appendix C, I show that such 𝑐𝑠∗∗ always exists and 𝑐𝑠∗∗ >
𝑐𝑠∗. In sum, I have the following lemma. 
                                                        
48 One candidate 𝑐̅ = 𝛿 [
1−𝜈
−𝜈
𝜃𝐻Π(𝑋0) − 𝐹] − 𝑟𝑈 ,i.e., 𝑋𝐻 = 𝑋0. Immediate default occurs. I assume that default cost 
is such that (1 − 𝛼)𝜃𝐻 < 𝜃𝐿. Under such assumption, the left hand side of (1.59) is strictly smaller than the right hand 
side. 
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Lemma 1.3 (Incentive compatibility for high-productivity firms) There always exists a 
finite 𝑐𝑠∗∗ such that (1.60) holds with identity. Any value of 𝑐𝑠 ∈ [𝑐𝐻, 𝑐
𝑠∗∗] satisfies the incentive 
compatibility condition for the high-productivity firm. 
Proof: Appendix C. 
Therefore, I have the following proposition regarding the characterization of 𝑐𝑠  that 
enforces a separating equilibrium. 
Proposition 1.7 (𝑐𝑠in separating equilibrium) Any 𝑐𝑠 ∈ [𝑐𝑠∗, 𝑐𝑠∗∗] enforces a separating 
equilibrium.  
Proof: from Lemma 1.2 and Lemma 1.3. 
In equilibrium, whenever 𝑐𝑠∗ > 𝑐𝐻, the values accrued to the high-productivity firms upon 
matches are smaller compared with the full-information first best case, because the high-
productivity firms have to issue additional debt to signal their types. As a consequence, the high-
productivity firms post fewer job vacancies and the economy suffers from lower employment 
compared with the full-information case. The stationary cross-sectional distribution density 
function 𝒻(𝑋) can be derived similarly to Proposition 1.4, and is omitted here. 
1.5.3.2. Pooling equilibrium 
Under pooling equilibrium, firms of high and low productivities issue the same amount of 
debt in the arm’s length capital market. Matched worker cannot infer his/her employer’s 
productivity type from its capital structure choice. Like any other signaling games, the equilibrium 
suffers from multiplicity. By assuming that all firms use one particular coupon rate regardless of 
their productivity levels, and that the capital market punishes all other coupon choices with the 
least attractive valuation upon observing deviating coupon choices, I could have infinite number 
of pooling equilibria. However, according to the equilibrium refinement in Maskin and Tirole 
(1992), in the game in which an informed principal (the firm in my case) offers contracts to outside 
agents (arm’s length capital market in my case), the pooling equilibria that survives from the 
refinement are those at least weakly Pareto-dominate the least-cost separating equilibrium, which 
corresponds to the equilibrium characterized by the coupon choice (𝑐𝑠,𝐿𝐶 , 𝑐𝐿) in my capital-raising 
game, where 𝑐𝑠,𝐿𝐶 = max (𝑐𝑠∗, 𝑐𝐻). Meanwhile, a unique feature of my signaling game is that 
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under asymmetric information about matching surplus, I cannot apply generalized Nash bargaining 
solution to characterize the wage negotiation outcome 49 . Fortunately, Myerson (1984) has 
characterized the so-called neutral bargaining solutions for two-person bargaining game that can 
be applied to the cases in which the bargaining parties have incomplete information about value-
relevant parameters. This bargaining solution can be implemented by a random-dictator 
mechanism50. In my case, the wage bargaining takes place at the beginning of the match, after the 
firm’s capital raising, but before the production begins. With probability 𝛽, the worker makes a 
wage demand, and firm could choose to accept the demand and starts the production, or could 
choose to reject it and dissolves the match. In case that the match is dissolved, both parties return 
to search. With probability 1 − 𝛽, the firm makes a wage offer, and if the worker accepts, the 
production begins; if she/he rejects it, the match dissolves and both parties return to search. 
Obviously, if it is the firm’s turn to make wage offers, regardless of its productivity type, it will 
offer the worker a compensation package with expected value equal to the worker’s outside option, 
i.e., the value of being unemployed, 𝑈. Meanwhile, if the worker gets the chance to make a wage 
demand, she/he has two choices: Firstly, the worker could demand a compensation with expected 
value equal to the high productivity matching surplus, which I term as “screening demand”, 
exposing herself/himself to the risk of matching dissolution from the rejection by the low-
productivity firms. The probability of the match continuation is equal to the proportion of highly 
productive job vacancies in the economy. Meanwhile, the worker could demand a compensation 
with expected value equal to the low productivity matching surplus, which I term as “pooling 
demand”, leaving the high-productivity firm an information rent with the amount equal to the 
difference in expected matching surplus value between the high and low productivity firms. I 
examine the two types of wage demands in turn in the next two subsections51,52. 
1.5.3.2.1 “Screening demand”  
                                                        
49 The three axioms that generalized Nash bargaining solution satisfies are silent about the bargaining outcomes under 
the scenario in which there exists asymmetric information between bargaining parties about the surplus value. 
50 Kennan (2010) applies neutral bargaining solution in a classic DMP labor market match model. However, that paper 
only focuses on the pooling wage demand by the worker, without considering the screening wage demand by the 
worker. 
51  Notice that under “screening demand” case, the neutral bargaining solution coincides with generalized Nash 
bargaining solution. 
52 A complete characterization of the conditions for the existence of each type of pooling equilibrium is analytically 
impossible. They can only be full characterized via numerical methods, which I leave for future research. 
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This case arises if the expected value to the worker from making a screening wage demand 
is higher than that from making a pooling wage demand, i.e., 𝑝𝑆0(𝑐𝑝, 𝜃𝐻) > 𝑆
0(𝑐𝑝, 𝜃𝐿), where 𝑐
𝑝 
denotes the coupon rate in the pooling equilibrium. In the Appendix C, I demonstrate the incentive 
compatibility conditions for both types of firms to pool their capital structure choices in the capital 
market, and show that the pooling equilibrium exists under certain parameter restrictions. 
Moreover, let 𝑐1
𝑝∗
 be the optimal pooling coupon rate for high-type firms under “screening 
demand”. Then 𝑐1
𝑝∗ < 𝑐𝐻, where 𝑐𝐻 is the full-information first best coupon choice for the high-
productivity firm. 
1.5.3.2.2 “Pooling demand”  
This case arises if the expected value to the worker from making a screening wage demand 
is lower than that from making a pooling wage demand, i.e., 𝑝𝑆0(𝑐𝑝, 𝜃𝐻) < 𝑆
0(𝑐𝑝, 𝜃𝐿), where 𝑐
𝑝 
denotes the coupon rate in the pooling equilibrium. In the Appendix C, I demonstrate the incentive 
compatibility conditions for both types of firms to pool their capital structure choices in the capital 
market, and show that the pooling equilibrium exists under certain parameter restrictions. 
Moreover, let 𝑐2
𝑝∗
 be the optimal pooling coupon rate for high-type firm under “pooling demand”, 
I have 𝑐𝐿 < 𝑐2
𝑝∗ < 𝑐𝐻 , between the full-information first best coupon choices for the low-
productivity and high-productivity firms. 
1.6 Conclusion 
This paper outlines a highly tractable labor market search model, which encompasses the 
capital structure choice on the firm side ?̀? 𝑙𝑎 Leland (1994). Novel to the literature, this paper has 
shown that under competitive search rational expectation equilibrium, individual firms optimally 
choose their capital structures that equalize the absolute value of the elasticity of expected post-
match shareholder value with respect to capital structure choice, to the absolute value of the 
elasticity of ex-ante hiring rate with respect to the capital structure choice. Aggregate outcomes in 
labor markets can be conveniently expressed as functions of firms’ optimal capital structure 
choices. A simple numerical illustration of the baseline model generates rich and empirically 
testable predictions regarding the impact of labor market search frictions, workers’ bargaining 
power, and aggregate economic performance on firms’ optimal capital structure choices and labor 
market outcomes, such as wage dispersions and unemployment rate. It calls for a thorough welfare 
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analysis on the government policies aimed to reduce the labor market frictions. Specifically, any 
careful cost-benefit analysis of these programs should take into consideration the employers’ 
optimal capital structure adjustments in response to the changes in labor market conditions. The 
equilibrium solution is similar to those from the burgeoning continuous time macroeconomic 
models on heterogeneous agents (e.g., Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014; Achdou, Han, Lasry, 
Lions and Moll, 2015). The continuous time approach delivers a more tractable framework 
compared with discrete time modelling choice.  
To keep the tractability, the paper overlooks some potentially interesting modelling choice. 
Firstly, this paper assumes that in a given match, the firm only has one opportunity to choose its 
capital structure, at the beginning of the matching relationship. Starting from Goldstein, Ju and 
Leland (2001), and recently addressed in Hugonnier, Malamund and Morellec (2015), allowing 
the firm to repeatedly tap capital market greatly alters its capital structure choice. A direct 
extension would be to examine how the model fares if the employer is allowed to adjust the capital 
structure over the course of matching relationship. Moreover, a drastic assumption in this paper is 
that the searching worker has perfect information about the capital structure associated with every 
posted job vacancy. A more realistic assumption would be that a firm’s past capital structure 
choices have a reputational effect on the worker’s perception about the firm’s future capital 
structure choice. With the continuous-time approach on reputation game (e.g., Faingold and 
Sannikov, 2011) at my toolbox, I could incorporate reputational effects in my model. I leave the 
aforementioned and other interesting extensions for the future research. 
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CHAPTER 2: HORSE PICKER OR RIGHT JOCKEY? AN EXAMINATION OF 
PRIVATE EQUITY VALUE CREATION THROUGH THE LENS OF WITHDRAWN 
LEVERAGED BUYOUTS 
2.1 Introduction  
The last 30 years have revealed exponential growth in the private equity industry despite 
some cyclical setbacks53. The prominence of private equity industry in capital markets is justified 
by its track record of strong performance. Recent studies have found that private equity funds 
outperform their public equity counterparts, even after accounting for fees and other expenses (see, 
e.g., Higson and Strucke, 2012; Harris, Jenkinson and Kaplan, 2014; Robinson and Sensoy, 
2013)54.  
The superior performance of the private equity industry raises a natural and important 
question: What is the propelling force behind such strong performance? One view, referred to as 
“cherry-picking channel”, is that private equity funds consist of savvy investors that “cherry-pick” 
undervalued target firms, load them with high debt level, and sell them for capital gains, either 
through secondary buyout or through public offering (DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Rice, 1984; 
Kaplan Stromberg, 2009; Dittmar, Li and Nain, 2012). A second view, which has been confirmed 
by the literature, is that private equity firms create economic value by improving operating 
performance of target firms. This can be achieved by operational engineering, in which private 
equity funds help the firm cut operating costs (Kaplan, 1989b), and allocate labor and capital to 
more efficiently (Smith, 1990; Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, Lerner and Miranda, 2014).   
Differentiating between private equity investors’ ability to identify undervalued target 
firms from the private equity investors’ capabilities in improving the target firms’ performance is 
an empirically challenging task. For example, the market reaction to a private equity buyout could 
reflect both the undervaluation as well as the expected economic value of the target firm created 
                                                          
53 As of 2012, the global private equity industry has grown to reveal influential financial clout, with 4,800 active 
private equity firms with 1 trillion dollar dry powders in the pockets. Source: Bain and Company global private equity 
report, 2013. 
54 Specifically, Harris, Jenkinson and Kaplan (2014) document a sizable outperformance of 20% to 27% in higher 
returns as compared to the S&P 500 Index stocks through a fund’s life, or more than 3% annually. On the deal level, 
Guo, Hotchkiss and Song (2011) document a hefty increase in firm value from pre-buyout level to the exit of the 
private equity firm.   
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by the private equity investor if the deal goes through. Even a simple examination of the stock 
returns of target firms during the period the deal is in play for unsuccessful buyouts may present 
problems in correct interpretation, in that the reason for the withdrawal of the deal in itself could 
contain information that could simultaneously affect the fundamentals of the target firms. On the 
other hand, uncovering the change in operating performance and corporate governance practices 
depends crucially on the control group for comparison purposes, since a recent study has shown 
that the target firms of financial acquirers are different from those of other firms (Gorbenko 
Malenko, 2014).  
This paper overcomes the above-mentioned empirical difficulties by collecting a sample 
of unsuccessful LBO transactions sponsored by private equity investors and by using the sample 
to examine the cherry-picking hypothesis.  The sample is also used as a baseline to check whether 
the firms that go through LBOs enjoy operating performance improvements compared to firms 
that failed in the LBO process. One drawback of this approach, seen in previous studies as well, is 
that the reason for the failure in the deal going through could simultaneously depress the stock 
price and undermine the future operating performance of the target. For example, new negative 
information about the target firm’s prospects could be uncovered during the due diligence process. 
Moreover, firm performance could fall below the private equity forecast on which the bid valuation 
is based. I use two empirical strategies to show that private equity bids for target firms result in 
increases in the value of their stock as well as improvements in their operation. In the first approach, 
I search through LexisNexis for the reasons behind each unsuccessful LBO and create an 
“exogenously withdrawn” sample by carefully excluding cases in which the failure of the deal is 
due to disagreement over the bid price; to new information uncovered regarding firm fundamentals; 
or to the evolution in the conditions of the firm, all of which could affect target firm value55. To 
reduce subjectivity in this process, and to address the concern that some targets or acquirers might 
lie about the reason that the deal failed56, I use an objective measure that classifies an unsuccessful 
LBO as a “LBO failure due to unfavorable credit market movement” if the change in high-yield 
bond market index since the deal announcement falls within the bottom quarter of that of all the 
leveraged buyouts announced during the same year.  
                                                          
55 I also exclude cases in which the private equity investors withdraw from the deal because another acquirer offered 
a higher bid. As in these cases, the stock price also incorporates the value premium of the competing bid. 
56 I thank Joshua Pollet for pointing out this possibility. 
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Overall, I find that, on average, the target stock experiences an 11.9% market-adjusted buy-
and-hold return, and a 10.6% buy-and-hold abnormal return against a benchmark portfolio 
matching on Fama-French industry, capitalization and book-to-market ratio, from a period starting 
from 25 trading days before the deal announcement to 25 trading days after the deal withdrawal 
(“deal active period”). Similar buy-and-hold abnormal returns are present for the “exogenously 
withdrawn” sample and for “LBO failures due to unfavorable credit market movement”. For 
example, during the same holding period as the full sample, the target firms, on average, yield a 
13.4% cumulative abnormal return against market portfolio and a 16.5% cumulative abnormal 
return against the matching portfolio for the “exogenously withdrawn” sample. Since each deal 
has a different length of time from announcement to failure, I also report an average standardized 
daily buy-and-hold abnormal return to gauge the economic significance of the abnormal returns. 
The resulting daily buy-and-hold abnormal return is economically significant. For example, for 
deals that fail due to unfavorable credit market movements, the target stock, on average, generates 
a 15 basis points daily buy-and-hold return against the market portfolio, and a 16 basis points daily 
buy-and-hold abnormal return compared to the matching portfolio. Similar results hold for all the 
withdrawn deals, whether or not they are withdrawn for reasons unrelated to target stock price. 
Overall, the evidence so far suggests that private equity funds are capable of identifying 
undervalued companies, and that the stock market recognizes their abilities. As a result, even if 
the leveraged transaction does not eventually go through, the stock price is still higher than at the 
pre-announcement level, reflecting a market revaluation of target firms.  
A natural follow-up question would be: What makes private equity firms savvy about 
valuation? To explore potential channels through which private equity firms identify the 
undervalued targets, first I split the sample into two halves according to the information asymmetry. 
Using three measures for information asymmetry common in the literature—number of analysts 
that cover the firm, analyst forecast dispersion, and analyst forecast accuracy—I found that the 
abnormal returns during the period when the deal was in play was concentrated within target firms 
suffering from greater information asymmetry, both statistically and economically. This is 
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consistent with the hypothesis that private equity firms have more and better information than 
average investors, information they rely on to help cherry-pick the targets57,58.  
In what follows, I examine the second view regarding the value created by private equity 
investors—that is, whether they improve the operating performance by overhauling the investment 
as well as the financial policies of the firms in their portfolio. The empirical results confirm the 
positive effect of private equity buyouts on the operating performance of the target firms after the 
LBO transactions. For example, firms that fail LBOs do not display any improvement in earnings 
and operating cash flow, while firms that are successfully bought by private equity firms through 
LBO transactions enjoy increases in both earnings and operating cash flow by 0.031 and 0.035 of 
the value of their assets, respectively.  
Moreover, I use two empirical strategies to address the concern that the withdrawal of the 
deal might be associated with information that are detrimental to the performance of the target 
firms after the LBO transaction. First, I compare the evolution of the operating performance of the 
target firms following both successful and unsuccessful LBO transactions due to reasons 
exogenous to target fundamentals. Again, I found similar results. While the successful LBOs 
always enjoy improvements in earnings and operating cash flow—measured against their assets—
by an economically significant amount of 0.031 and 0.035, respectively. The target firms in failed 
LBO samples, on the other hand, do not show any meaningful change in their operating measures. 
In the following analysis, instead of using actual failed LBO transactions, I use, as explanatory 
variable, a predicted withdrawn probability for each LBO transaction from a linear probability 
regression that forecasts deal withdrawal probability based on deal characteristics, target pre-
announcement financial conditions, as well as the change in high yield bond market index since 
announcement 59 . This empirical strategy yields similar results as mentioned above: After 
                                                          
57 However, in un-tabulated analysis, for the period the deal was in play, I failed to find any difference in abnormal 
returns between unsuccessful LBO transactions with management participation and unsuccessful LBO transactions 
without management participation. Moreover, I failed to find any robust difference in abnormal returns between failed 
deals that occurred before and after the enactment of “Regulation FD”. All these pieces of evidence point to the fact 
that the information advantage possessed by private equity firms does not mainly come from target management 
insiders or the board of directors of the target firms. 
58 Recent anecdotal evidence shows that top private equity firms now hire former industry professionals, in addition 
to dealmakers with financial background. For example, former GE CEO Jack Welch joined Clayton, Dubilier & Rice 
and Lou Gerstner, once at the helm of RJR Nabisco and IBM, is affiliated with Carlyle (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009). 
It would be interesting to see if those industry professionals help private equity firms choose the right targets. 
59 The results are similar if I use Probit model instead of the linear probability model. 
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controlling for deal characteristics, pre-deal financial conditions, and the industry fixed effects, the 
target firms with higher probability of LBO success display higher earnings following the closure 
of the transaction.  
Overall, I was able to confirm that private equity firms are not just financial alchemists but 
also operational experts, in that they create economic value for the target firms by improving their 
operating performance. A further analysis reveals that the improvement in operating performance 
is not due to cuts in investment spending after the LBO transaction, since both completed and 
withdrawn LBO targets exhibit similar changes in capital expenditures after the LBO transactions. 
Lastly, I examine the change in capital structure following the LBO transactions. As expected, the 
results hold for all different samples of withdrawn transaction in my study: Successful LBO targets 
show higher levels of debt in their balance sheets. More interestingly, the unsuccessful targets also 
indicate an increase in leverage ratio of 8% to 15% after the LBO attempts. 
The last two parts of the paper explore other ways that private equity firm could create 
value for the firms in their portfolios. Extant research state that the economic value creation 
through private equity LBOs can also be achieved by increasing tax benefits of interest expense 
(Kaplan, 1989a), and reforming corporate governance practices by offering, for example, more 
powerful managerial incentives and enhanced board monitoring (Acharya, Gottschalg, Hahn and 
Kohoe, 2013)60.  Correspondingly, the next part of this paper examines whether the private equity 
firms adjust the capital structure of their target firms in a way that increases tax benefit of interest 
expense. In particular, I compare the change in probability that a firm’s marginal tax rate (MTR) 
after interest expense lies on the downward sloping part of interest deduction-MTR graph 
(“Graham’s Kink”, Graham, 2000), between completed LBO target firms and withdrawn LBO 
target firms. If private equity investors exploit tax deductions in interest, I should be able to observe 
interest expenses of more successful LBO target firms exceed those inferred by “Graham’s Kink” 
after the LBO transaction, compared to that of unsuccessful LBO targets. The empirical results 
confirm my hypothesis and are economically significant. For instance, in the three-year period 
after the completion of the LBO transaction, 23% more target firms maintain their leverage ratios, 
to the point where the MTR after interest expense starts to decrease. At the same time, for the 
                                                          
60 A recent study on private equity investments in the restaurant industry reveals that private equity firms create value 
through instituting better management practices, such as better food quality, more sanitary environment, and more 
reasonable menu prices (Bernstein and Sheen, 2013). However, this channel is beyond the scope of this study. 
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unsuccessful LBO target firms, the probabilities do not show any meaningful statistical or 
economic change. In general, the results of the paper confirm that tax benefits associated with 
optimized capital structure is one way that private equity investors create value through LBO 
transactions. 
The last part of the analysis examines the change in corporate governance following LBO 
transactions. In particular, I focus on one important channel that is well documented in the 
corporate governance literature: the probability of CEO replacements following LBO transactions. 
Previous literature documents an increase in CEO turnovers following successful LBOs by private 
equity investors (e.g., Acharya, Gottschalg, Hahn and Kehoe, 2013). Consistent with extant studies, 
I find that, compared to unsuccessful LBO targets, the target firms that actually go through the 
LBO transactions have a 18% to 30% higher probability of replacing their CEOs during the one-
year period after the completion of the deal. This result holds when I use the change in the high 
yield bond market index to instrument the potentially endogenous LBO withdrawal decision and 
conduct a two-stage least square regression. Interestingly, the unsuccessful LBO targets exhibit 
stronger turnover-performance sensitivity compared to successful LBO targets, which is consistent 
with recent literature that show that private equity firms use private information to evaluate the 
CEO performance of target firms over a longer period of time relative to their publically traded 
counterparts (Cornelli and Karakas, 2013). 
Overall, I find that private equity firms are savvy investors in stock market, in that they are 
able to identify undervalued target firms (“horse picker”). At the same time, the findings in this 
paper challenge accusations in the literature that claim that private equity firms adhere to a “buy-
strip-flip” strategy and privilege short-term profits over long-term value61. Under the management 
of private equity firms, the target firms—as compared to those that failed the LBO processes 
(“right jockey”)—exhibit improvements in operations, optimization in capital structure, and 
positive organizational changes. 
This paper contributes to several strands of the literature in the field. First of all, the 
empirical findings of this paper confirm the superior performance of private equity industry 
documented in the literature (e.g., Higson and Strucke, 2012; Harris, Jenkinson and Kaplan, 2014; 
                                                          
61 For example, Buy it, Strip it then Flip it. Bloomberg BusinessWeek Magazine, August 6, 2006.  
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Robinson and Sensoy, 2013). Specifically, by comparing the LBO target firms against carefully 
designed control firms—i.e., target firms that failed LBO transactions for exogenous reasons—
this paper provides clean empirical evidence that private equity managers create value for their 
limited partners by carefully picking undervalued target firms, and reengineering them through 
operational, tax, and organizational lenses. Extant evidence in the literature on private equity firms’ 
cherry-picking abilities is limited and indirect. For example, Dittmar, Li and Nain (2002) find that 
strategic acquirers purchasing target firms by competing with financial buyers earn an 8.80% 
higher CAR during -20 to +180 window compared with corporate buyers competing against other 
corporate buyers. The authors conclude that financial buyers are able to identify target firms with 
higher potential for value improvement that are also valuable to other acquirers.  This paper 
employs a different empirical strategy and confirms the cherry-picking ability of private equity 
investors through stock market reaction during the period in which the deal is in play of 
unsuccessful LBOs. Moreover, I further document the operational engineering of private equity 
firms, which they do through a turnaround in the operating performance of target firms. I document 
as well not only the financial engineering conducted by private equity firms through capital 
structure optimization, but also the governance engineering performed by reshuffling the corporate 
management of target firms. 
Moreover, this paper contributes to the literature on the driving forces behind value 
improvement in target firms following buyout transactions in general.  There are two hypotheses 
that can explain the observed improvement in operating performance after LBO transactions. The 
first—the organizational change hypothesis—states that organizational changes following buyouts 
enhance operating performance of target firms. These changes include providing more incentives 
to management, promoting better monitoring by corporate boards, as well as mitigating agency 
cost of free cash flows via high leverage and more interest expenses (Jensen, 1989). The other 
popular hypothesis is private information hypothesis, which states that buyout acquirers identify 
undervalued targets that have great economic potential. Thus the improvement in operating 
performance could occur even without the LBO transaction. Empirical evidence on the latter 
hypothesis focus on management buyouts of their own firms. Studies providing such evidence are 
generally based on small samples and offer mixed conclusions. DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Rice 
(1984) document that, for a sample of 20 unsuccessful private transactions, the target stock has, 
on average, a 25% market-adjusted abnormal return for the period from 40 trading days before the 
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announcement of the deal to 40 trading days after the withdrawal of the deal. Those studies 
acknowledge that without knowing the reason behind the failure of the deal, it is impossible to 
distinguish between target undervaluation and the future takeover probability that drive the 
observed returns. Marais, Schipper and Smith (1989) find a much smaller rate of return for a 
sample of 15 buyout transactions. Smith (1990) cites no change in operating performance 
following LBO proposals that were either rejected by target firms or withdrawn by the acquirers 
as evidence against private information hypothesis. However, as mentioned above, change in 
operating performance is not the only source of economic value creation. Moreover, reasons for 
withdrawal of LBOs are not specified for more than half of her sample deals. This confounds the 
causality since, more often than not, the reason behind the deal being withdrawn might contain 
useful information about firm fundamentals that simultaneously affects the future performance of 
the target firms. More recently, Lee (1992) and Ofek (1994) use a larger sample of management 
buyouts and find that for unsuccessful buyouts without subsequent takeover proposals, the stock 
prices of target firms fall back to pre-buyout level. They also fail to find any improvement in 
operating performance following failed management buyout attempts. The authors claim that the 
empirical findings reject the private information hypothesis. This paper uses a comprehensive 
sample of all LBO transactions sponsored by private equity firms from 1979 to 2012 and uses 
news sources as well as change in LBO funding environment to address the endogeneity problems 
that confound the conclusions of previous literature. I document a robust positive revaluation of 
target stocks following failed LBO attempts. Moreover, I also examine channels other than 
operational improvement, such as tax benefits and organizational change, as potential sources of 
economic value creation by private equity firms.  
Lastly, this paper also contributes to the empirical literature on the value implications of 
merger and acquisitions. For example, Malmendier, Opp and Saidi (2016) find that much of the 
market reaction to merger announcement are attributable to the revaluation of target firms if the 
acquisition is paid in cash. This paper adds to this strand of literature by showing that a part of 
value gains from private equity buyouts comes from the undervaluation of firms targeted by private 
equity firms.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section, Section 2.2, presents 
sample and data information. Section 2.3 expounds on the empirical results, which comprise of 
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three subsections. Subsection 2.3.1 focuses on the examination of the abilities of private equity 
firms to explore undervaluation in stock markets. Subsection 2.3.2 compares operating 
performance and policy changes of LBO target firms following successful LBOs against failed 
LBO attempts. Subsections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 test other channels that private equity investors employ 
in value creation, using failed LBO target firms as baseline. This includes tax benefits of higher 
leverage, as well as the reshuffling of management of the target firms. The paper concludes with 
directions for future research. 
2.2 Sample and Data 
2.2.1 Sample construction  
My starting point of sample collection is all the merger and acquisition transactions termed 
as “Leveraged buyouts” in SDC Platinum. SDC covers 10,042 leveraged buyout deals from 1979 
to 2012. Then I use the following criteria to screen the sample.  Firstly, I require the target firms 
have public equity outstanding before the announcement of the LBO transactions and will become 
privately owned firms if the deal goes through. Secondly, I require that the target firms do not 
receive any leveraged buyout bids during three-year period before the current transaction. Thirdly, 
I drop deals that are classified as “Rumors” or “Pending”. Moreover, I exclude transactions in 
which the acquiring parties acquire less than 50% of shares. Finally, I erase deals in which the 
acquiring parties acquire “remaining assets” of the target firms. This yield a LBO sample of 1,159 
deals. In the following step, I search for each deal in LexisNexis and SEC filings surrounding the 
deal announcement and ending dates to verify the acquirer identities, the eventual outcome of the 
deal, and the announcement as well as the ending dates 62 . Similar to Lerner, Sorenson and 
Stromberg (2011), I exclude buyouts that do not involve a financial sponsor (i.e., private equity 
firms). Those deals are typically buyout transactions by target managements using their own 
resources and bank debt, which are not the focus of this study63. The final sample consists of 610 
LBOs sponsored by private equities from 1979 to 2012, of which 126 deals fail, and 484 deals 
                                                          
62 I eliminate deals in which I could not verify the deal closing dates. 
63 Similar to Lerner, Sorenson and Stromberg (2011), I also erase the buyout transactions that are done by traditional 
early-stage venture capital funds. Those deals are typically venture capital investments and have much lower leverage 
in buyout capital structure. 
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eventually succeed. Table 2.1 present the distribution of deal cohorts according to their 
announcement years. 
2.2.2 Withdrawn reasons 
The main goal of this paper is to examine the four channels through which private equity 
funds could generate investment returns for their limited partners: undervaluation channel, 
operational engineering, tax engineering and governance engineering. The announcement of a 
leveraged buyout is concomitant with large market reaction64, which reflects market assessment 
of the undervaluation channel, the probability of deal success, as well as the target firm value 
enhancement via the three other channels, which are conditional on deal success. In order to 
disentangle the undervaluation channel from the other channels, I look at the stock market reaction 
during the period when the deal is in play, which is 25 trading days before the deal announcement 
and 25 trading days after the withdrawal of the deal. The choice of 25 trading days is consistent 
with previous findings concerning stock price run-up occurrences before deal announcements 
(Schwert, 1996; Malmendier, Opp and Saidi, 2016). The basic logic is as follows: since the deal 
does not eventually go through, the stock price after the deal withdrawal does not reflect 
operational engineering, tax engineering and governance engineering and all other value creation 
channels which are conditional on deal success. Any remaining abnormal returns reflect the 
undervaluation of targets before the private equity bids and the consequent market revaluation.  
I also examine the operating performance change for the sample of successful LBO targets 
using a sample of unsuccessful LBO targets as the control group. Previous studies show that 
mergers and acquisitions market is segmented and targets of financial acquirers are special. Thus, 
a comparison of operating performance and firm policies between successful and unsuccessful 
LBO firms will shed light on whether or not private equity funds add value to their portfolio firms 
through tax engineering, operational engineering, and governance engineering.  
Unfortunately, not all of the withdrawn samples are eligible for inclusion in this analysis. 
An essential criterion for a valid unconsummated LBO is that the reason for a LBO failure is not 
related to the target firm’s valuation as well as the target firm’s operating performance and policies 
                                                          
64 The average three-day announcement returns are 19% for both deals that eventually succeed and deals that are 
eventually snapped. 
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in the future. For example, if the private equity investors walk away due to material adverse 
changes in the target firms after the deal announcement, then the stock price of the target will 
plummet and the operating performance will deteriorate afterwards even if the proposed LBO 
transaction never occurs. This is by no means a theoretical possibility. In order to address the 
endogeneity problem mentioned above, I check the LexisNexis and target SEC filings surrounding 
the deal withdrawal date. This was done in order to determine the reasons behind each 
unconsummated deal. I carefully screen out all of the LBO transactions which are withdrawn for 
explicit reasons that have the potential to affect the target firm’s valuation and future operating 
performance, and the remainder is deemed to be an “exogenously withdrawn” sample65. Table 2.2 
presents the detailed withdrawal reasons for the sample LBOs in this study.  
In order to reduce subjectivity in the determination process of “exogenously withdrawn” 
samples, and to address the concern that some targets or acquirers might misrepresent the reasons 
why the deal is called off, I use another objective approach to analyze deals which are withdrawn 
for reasons other than fundamentals of target firms. Previous literature has documented that the 
junk bond market affect LBO pricing, capital structure and deal volume. For example, Axelson, 
Jenkinson, Stromberg, Weisbach (2013) document that “mezzanine debt” and “junior bonds” 
account for 19.2% capital of an average LBO deal, and that the high yield bond market conditions 
dominate target characteristics in determining buyout capital structure. Kaplan and Stein (1993) 
also find that “demand push” in the junk bond market leads to aggressive pricing of LBOs, higher 
leverage in LBO capital structures, and high LBO volume. Motivated by these studies, I use the 
change in the average logarithm Merrill-Lynch high yield bond market index between the quarter 
period before the deal announcement and the period from deal announcement to deal ending, as 
an instrument for the possibility of deal failure. The logic is that while an individual LBO 
transaction is unlikely to affect the change in the high yield bond market condition, the turbulences 
in the high yield bond market elevate the estimated financing costs of an individual LBO, thereby 
increasing the possibility that the private equity investors will walk away from the targets. I classify 
                                                          
65 Some people might be concerned because the announced withdrawal reasons are not the underlying reasons behind 
the deal failure. For example, a stated reason of “deal withdrawal because of the target management’s resistance” 
might cloud the underlying fact that the target management might possess some positive information about the 
prospects of target firms, which propels them to retain control. My assumption is that published news articles about 
the deal reflect all of the public information that is available regarding the deal. Therefore, any other private 
information is not incorporated into stock prices and does not confound my analysis in a systematic manner. 
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a withdrawn deal as a “LBO failure due to unfavorable credit market movement” if the difference 
in average logarithm Merrill-Lynch high yield bond market index between the quarterly period 
before the deal announcement and the period from the deal announcement to the deal ending falls 
within the bottom quarter of the universe of leverage buyout transactions66 announced during the 
same year.  
2.2.3 Detecting abnormal stock performance 
I use two benchmarks to detect abnormal stock performance. Firstly, I use a simple CRSP 
value-weighted market portfolio the same nature as Fama and French use to calculate market 
excess returns. Moreover, in a manner similar to Barber and Lyon (1997) and Savor and Lu (2009), 
I use a matching portfolio strategy. More specifically, I first identified all of the firms that operate 
in the same Fama-French 49 industry and have market values of equity between 50% and 150% 
of the market equity of the failed LBO target firm. I then pick the firm with the book-to-market 
ratio closest to the ratio of the failed LBO target. The selection processes are repeated 3 times in 
order to generate 3 control firms. The matching portfolio is an equally weighted portfolio 
consisting of these 3 control firms. If there are fewer than 3 matching firms for the LBO target in 
question (because there is an insufficient number of firms in the same industry that satisfy the size 
criterion), the matching portfolio contains fewer than 3 control firms. If one control firm disappears 
from CRSP before the end of the holding period, it is replaced by the next-best match67. The market 
value of equity is calculated as of the market close 30 trading days before the deal announcement. 
The book value of equity of the most recent fiscal year before the date used to calculate the market 
value of equity, which is defined following Cohen, Polk and Vuolteenaho (2003) and Savor and 
Lu (2009). The detailed procedure is outlined on page 613 of Cohen, Polk and Vuolteenaho (2003) 
and omitted here for the sake of brevity. Buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR), cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) and standardized daily buy-and-hold abnormal return (DBHAR) over the 
holding period t is defined as follows:  
 
                                                          
66 The universe of LBO transactions includes all of the leveraged buyout transactions of U.S. public firms, private 
firms and subsidiaries. 
67 My results are qualitatively similar if I use a matching portfolio consisting of 1 control firm or 5 control firms. 
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where 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑗 and 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑝,𝑗  denote firm i's stock return and the benchmark portfolio return at 
day j, respectively.  
2.2.4 Operating performance and firm policy 
Target firms in LBO transactions become private firms after the deals are consummated, 
and are often no longer required to file financial reports with the Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). I am thus only able to retrieve measures of operating performance and firm 
policies for successful LBO targets should those targets continue to file public reports with SEC. 
Those LBO targets typically have public debts outstanding, or have filed for public offerings again 
after the buyout, and must disclose accounting information for the three years prior to the public 
offering filing. I use COMPUSTAT and Capital IQ to retrieve accounting information concerning 
LBO targets whenever such are available. I employ two measures for operating performance: 
profitability and operating cash flow. Profitability is defined as earnings before interest, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over total assets, whereas operating cash flow is defined 
as the difference between EBITDA minus capital expenditures over total assets. Investment policy 
is measured as follows: capital expenditures over total assets. Financial leverage is measured as 
the sum of debts in current liabilities and long-term debt over total assets68. Marginal tax rates both 
                                                          
68 One problem is that the asset value of successful LBO targets inflates exponentially at the end of the fiscal year 
during which the LBO occurs and afterwards. This is the case because existing accounting rules require acquired 
assets and liabilities to be recorded in terms of fair market value, which is typically much higher than the book value 
recorded beforehand since target firms are bought using large premiums in LBO transactions (Custódio, 2014). 
Therefore, following Cohn, Mills and Towery (2014), I use total assets for the fiscal year during which the LBO is 
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before and after interest expenses are derived from Blouin, Core and Guay (2010). Those tax rates 
are based on forecasted 22 years’ taxable income and take into consideration the carryforwards 
and carrybacks. The tax rates measure the expected additional taxes a firm must pay during current 
years as well as future years as a result of one-dollar increase in taxable income69.  
2.2.5 Other control variables 
In this paper, I use the following variables to control for deal characteristics, financial 
conditions of target firms, and stock performance of target firms, in different sections of the 
analyses. The financial conditions of the target firms are obtained from COMPUSTAT annual 
tapes for the most recent fiscal year ending before the deal announcement. Target cash flow is 
defined as the sum of COMPUSTAT Item IB and Item DP over Item AT. Target financial leverage 
is defined as the sum of Item DLTT and Item DLC over Item AT. Target Q is defined as the market 
value of assets over the book value of assets, where the market value of the assets is equal to Item 
AT plus the market value of equity minus Item TXDB minus Item CEQ. The market value of 
equity is Item PRCC multiplied by Item CSHO. Target cash holdings is defined as Item CHE over 
Item AT. Target stock performance is defined as the abnormal buy-and-hold return against the 
market portfolio for a one-year period ending 11 days before the deal announcement. I obtain deal 
characteristics from SDC Platinum database. Log (deal value) is the logarithm of deal value. 
Hostile deal is equal to one if the LBO is classified as being hostile. LBO duration is the logarithm 
of the number of days between the deal announcement and the deal ending. LBO announcement 
return is defined as the three-day cumulative abnormal return surrounding the LBO announcement 
dates. Competing deals is equal to one if there are multiple bidders for the target. Table 2.3 reports 
the summary of the deal and the target characteristics of successful deals, withdrawn deals and 
“exogenously withdrawn” deals. Compared with successful deals, withdrawn deals are smaller, 
and are more likely to involve competing bidders.  
2.3 Empirical results 
This section presents the empirical results of this paper. Firstly, I answer the question of 
whether private equity investors are able to identify undervalued targets in the market by 
                                                          
completed as the scale factor for all of the years prior to the LBO completion year. This method accounts for any 
accounting adjustments that are related to the LBO transaction. 
69 I thank the authors for sharing the data via Wharton Research Data Services. 
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examining the stock returns during the deal active period for the unsuccessful LBO sample.  The 
following section examines whether private equity investors improve the operating performance 
of their portfolio firms using failed LBO targets as a control group. The last two parts of the 
analyses deal with the channels through which private equity investors ameliorate operating 
performance. More specifically, I investigate the tax benefits channel and corporate governance 
engineering. 
2.3.1 Does the private equity identify undervalued targets?  
This section examines the target stock performance of target firms during the deal active 
period, which is 25 trading days before the deal announcement up through 25 trading days after 
the deal withdrawal.  The logic behind this empirical strategy is as follows: Assuming the stock 
market is at least semi-efficient, then the stock price at the time of the announcement of LBO 
transactions should incorporate market revaluation of the previously undervalued target (if any), 
the probability of deal success, and the value enhancement of the target firm brought about by the 
private equity investors, which is conditional on the deal’s success. After the deal failure, the stock 
price should drop compared to the announcement level since the value creation associated with the 
transaction has not been realized. However, if the stock price remains above the pre-deal level, 
that indicates that the stock market has revalued the target stock’s value. The stock market 
revaluation thus provides evidence that the target was undervalued before, and the buyout proposal 
and the bid from private equity signals to the stock market what the target’s fair value actually is. 
Empirically speaking, any abnormal returns during the deal active period for withdrawn LBOs 
reflect the undervaluation of targets before the private equity bids and the consequent market 
revaluation. 
More specifically, I analyze the stock market reaction during the deal active period, which 
is 25 trading days before the deal announcement and 25 trading days after the deal withdrawal70. 
The choice of 25 trading days is consistent with previous findings concerning target stock price 
                                                          
70 The abnormal stock returns continue to hold for the “exogenously withdrawn” sample if I examine a longer period 
after a deal failure, say, 100 trading days after a deal withdrawal. The abnormal buy-and-hold return against market 
portfolio and matching portfolio for the “exogenously withdrawn deals” are economically and statistically significant, 
and are more than 9% and 11% on average, respectively. The abnormal stock buy-and-hold return against market 
portfolio and matching portfolio for the failed LBOs is due to unfavorable credit market movement continue 
economically large, 11% and 8%, respectively, but cease to be statistically significant due to explosive standard errors 
brought about by small sample size. 
59 
 
run-up starts from about one month before deal announcements (Schwert, 1996). Figure 2.1 
present some graphic evidence. I plot the cumulative abnormal return against the market portfolios 
for withdrawn LBO targets starting 25 days before the deal announcement through 25 days after 
the deal withdrawal. I standardize deal length in the same manner as Malmendier, Opp and Saidi 
(2016). There is a large jump in stock prices upon deal announcements. At the time of the deal 
withdrawal announcement, the stock price nosedives. However, the stock price remains higher 
than its pre-LBO level. Table 2.4 presents the empirical results. For each panel, I report the buy-
and-hold abnormal return, the cumulative abnormal return and the standardized daily abnormal 
return against market portfolios and the three-firm portfolio matched on industry, size and book-
to-market ratio. The first panel, from top to bottom, of Table 2.4 reports the stock returns for the 
full sample of withdrawn LBOs. During the deal active period, the target firms for withdrawn LBO 
transactions yield an average 11.9% buy-and-hold abnormal return against the CRSP value-
weighted market return, and a 10.6% buy-and-hold abnormal return against the matching portfolio. 
Both results are statistically significant below the 5% two-tail significance level. In order to gauge 
the economic significance of the buy-and-hold abnormal returns, I standardized the buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns for each deal according to equation (2.3). On average, the target firms involved 
in withdrawn LBO transactions generate 8 basis points of abnormal buy-and-hold returns per day 
against the matching portfolio, and there are similar results for returns against market portfolios. 
Both standardized daily abnormal buy-and-hold returns are statistically significant below the 1% 
significance level.  
One concern is that some LBOs are unconsummated for reasons that might simultaneously 
affect the targets’ stock returns. For example, about 30% of the withdrawn LBOs fail because the 
private equity acquirers are outbid by another strategic acquirer. In this case, the stock price after 
the deal is withdrawn by the private equity investors incorporates the future takeover and value 
premium associated with the new offer. In order to address these endogeneity issues, I include only 
deals that are “exogenously withdrawn”, i.e., deals that fail for reasons not directly related to target 
firm fundamentals. Detailed criteria for the construction the “exogenously withdrawn” sample are 
presented in Table 2.2. The results are tabulated in the second panel of Table 2.4. Again, the 
abnormal returns for target firms during the deal active period are both statistically and 
economically significant. For example, over the deal active period, the target firms of LBO 
transactions that are terminated exogenously generate on average abnormal buy-and-hold returns 
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of 9.9% and 13.4% against the market portfolio and matching portfolio, respectively, which is 
statistically significant below the 10% significance level. Similar results hold for standardized 
abnormal returns. 
It is inevitable that the construction of “exogenously withdrawn” samples depends on some 
form of subjective judgment. Moreover, targets and acquirers might misrepresent the identity of 
the culprit behind the deal failures. In order to address these issues, I use an objective criterion to 
construct a withdrawn sample for which the reasons are largely unrelated to an individual target’s 
or acquirer’s characteristics. More specifically, I use change in the average logarithm Merrill-
Lynch high yield bond market index between the quarter before the deal announcement and the 
period from the deal announcement to the deal ending, as an instrument for the possibility of deal 
failure. Previous research shows that high-yield bond market conditions play vital roles in buyout 
activities, e.g., capital structure (Axelson, Jenkinson, Stromberg and Weisbach, 2013) and deal 
pricing (Kaplan and Stein, 1993). An unsuccessful deal is classified as a “LBO failure due to 
unfavorable credit market movement” if the difference in the average logarithm Merrill-Lynch 
high yield bond market index between the quarter before the deal announcement and the period 
from the deal announcement to the deal ending falls within the bottom quarter of the universe of 
leverage buyout transactions announced during the same year. The argument is that if the high-
yield credit market index deteriorates, private equity investors become more likely to walk away 
from the targets due to the heightened financing costs. More importantly, those deals are 
withdrawn as a result of the systematic downturn in the credit market, which is unlikely to be 
affected by any individual LBO transaction. The third panel of Table 2.4 presents the results. Again, 
the results are both quantitatively and qualitatively similar to the results exhibited in the first panel 
and the second panel of Table 2.4. For example, in the case of deals that are withdrawn due to 
unfavorable credit market movements, the buy-and-hold abnormal return is 18% and 20.3% 
against the market portfolio and matching portfolio, respectively. Another challenge to the 
empirical findings so far is that the higher stock price compared with the pre-deal level might 
reflect a higher future takeover probability that the target may face. In order to rule out this 
possibility, I repeat the analyses using a set of unsuccessful LBO transactions in which the target 
firms do not receive takeover bids for a period of at least one year after the deal withdrawal. The 
results exhibited in the fourth panel of Table 2.4, are qualitatively similar to the unrestricted sample 
and the two “exogenously withdrawn samples”.  
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Overall, I find that private equity investors are savvy about undervaluation in the stock 
market. The stock market recognizes private equity investors’ “serendipity” and revalues firms 
targeted by private equity investors. Other information leakage during the deal active period and 
future takeover probability do not undermine my empirical findings. 
A natural follow-up question would concern the extent to which the information advantage 
possessed by private equity investors facilitates their ability to identify undervalued targets. In 
order to address this issue, I split the sample into halves according to the information asymmetry 
of target firms. I follow existing literature by using three measures of information asymmetry (e.g., 
Duchin, Matsusaka and Ozbas, 2010; He and Tian, 2013): the number of analyst who cover the 
firm, analyst forecast dispersion scaled by firm assets, and analyst forecast accuracy, which is 
measured by the absolute difference between the consensus forecasted EPS and actual EPS scaled 
by stock price. Table 2.5 presents the results. I find that the abnormal returns during the deal active 
period are concentrated in target firms suffering from greater information asymmetry, both 
statistically and economically. For example, exogenously withdrawn LBO targets with analyst 
forecast errors above the sample median display buy-and-hold abnormal returns of 20.5% and 16.4% 
against the market portfolio and matching portfolio, respectively. On the contrary, exogenously 
withdrawn LBO targets with analyst forecast errors below the sample median do not display any 
abnormal returns during the deal active periods. Similar results are found when using the other two 
measures of information asymmetry.  The empirical findings in Table 2.5 provide indirect evidence 
of the information advantage possessed by private equity investors. This information advantage is 
more noticeable when public equity investors of target firms suffer additional information 
asymmetry problems. However, in un-tabulated analysis, I fail to find differences in abnormal 
returns between LBO transactions with and without management participation. Moreover, I fail to 
find robust differences in abnormal returns between deals that occurred before and after the 
enactment of “Regulation FD”. All of these pieces of evidence point out that the information 
advantages possessed by private equity investors do not primarily come from target insiders. 
Target insiders are not the only potential source from which private equity investors could glean 
information that is typically not available to ordinary public equity investors. Recent anecdotal 
evidence shows that the top private equity firms now hire former industry professionals in addition 
to dealmakers with financial backgrounds. For example, former GE CEO Jack Welch joined 
Clayton, Dubilier & Rice, and Lou Gerstner, formerly the head of RJR Nabisco and IBM, is 
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affiliated with Carlyle (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009). It would be interesting to examine the 
relationship between the backgrounds of general partners and the ability of private equity funds to 
identify undervaluation, and determine whether the ability to identify undervalued firms is most 
pronounced in industries in which the investment personnel in private equity firms have substantial 
industrial experience. This is beyond the scope of this study due to the issue of data availability. 
2.3.2 Does LBO improve operating performance? 
This section examines whether private equity investors have operational engineering 
capacities. Given that the data on the day-to-day operations of private companies are limited, I 
gauge operational engineering by comparing changes in the operating performance of successful 
LBO targets against changes in respective measure of failed LBO targets, during the three years 
before and after LBOs end. Most of my sample of successful LBO targets cease public trading 
status after the transaction and no longer file financial reports with the SEC. Meanwhile, Table 2.2 
shows that about one third of my sample of unsuccessful transactions are unconsummated because 
the private equity firms are overbid and the targets are often bought out by another acquirer after 
the private equity investors pulled out from the deal.  As a result, only a subset of my LBO sample 
has at least one year of financial data during both the three-year periods before and after the LBO 
transaction. I end up with 115 completed LBOs, and 68 unconsummated LBOs, 25 of which are 
classified as LBOs withdrawn for “exogenous reasons”. I employ standard difference-in-difference 
analyses in Table 2.6 and Table 2.7, and multivariate regression analyses in Table 2.8. 
 
Table 2.6 presents the results using the full sample of withdrawn LBOs as the control group. 
The results show that successful LBO transactions drastically increase the profitability of target 
firms compared with firms that fail in LBO transactions. For example, the first panel and the third 
panel, from top to bottom, of Table 2.6 indicate that, firms which experienced failed LBOs do not 
exhibit any improvements in earnings and the operating cash flow, while the firms going through 
LBOs enjoy earnings and operating cash flow increases of 0.031 and 0.035 of their asset values, 
respectively. The differences in changes of operational earnings and cash flows between successful 
and unsuccessful LBO targets are significant below 1% significance level and are economically 
noticeable. Similar operation improvements are documented when I compare the respective 
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operating measure against the industry median, as indicated in the second panel and the fourth 
panel of Table 2.6.  Previous research has found that private equity investors increase the operating 
performance of target firms through cost cutting, streamlining capital expenditures and sales of 
assets (Kaplan, 1989; Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1990). Correspondingly, I examine capital 
expenditure changes in target firms after successful and failed LBO transactions. I do not find any 
evidence that private equity firms pump up short-term profits by disposing assets or slowing down 
capital expenditures. The fifth panel and the sixth panel of Table 2.6 show that both successful 
LBO targets and failed LBO targets do not exhibit economically and statistically differences in 
capital spending before and after LBO transactions. My results cast doubt on previous claims that 
private equity ownership is associated with asset disposals. the seventh panel and the eighth panel 
of Table 2.6 show that, as expected, successful LBO targets experience large hikes in their leverage 
ratios after deal completions, compared with those of unsuccessful LBO targets. Interestingly, the 
failed LBO targets also increase their leverage ratio by 0.077 after failed LBO transactions.  
One concern, similar to that raised in Section 2.3.1, is that deal withdrawals might be 
concomitant with changes in targets’ fundamentals that could affect target firms’ performance 
afterwards.  I again compare the evolution of operating performance following successful LBO 
transactions and unsuccessful LBO transactions for reasons exogenous to target quality. I find 
similar results which are exhibited in Table 2.7. Successful LBOs always enjoy improvements in 
earnings and operating cash flow scaled by assets, by economically significant amount of 0.031 
and 0.035, respectively. However, the targets in failed LBO samples do not exhibit any meaningful 
changes in their operating performance measures. The results are qualitatively similar to the results 
reported Table 2.6 for capital expenditure and leverages71. 
In the analysis below, instead of using actual deal failures, I use as an explanatory variable 
a predicted withdrawn probability from a linear probability regression which forecast the deal 
withdrawal probability using deal characteristics, target pre-announcement financial conditions, 
industry fixed effects, and changes in the high yield bond market index since deal announcement. 
Table 2.8 shows the results. Column (1) and Column (2) of second panel, from top to 
bottom, show that the change in the average logarithm Merrill-Lynch high yield bond market index 
                                                          
71 My results in Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 remain qualitatively similar if I use the same model specifications as those 
used in Table 2.8.  
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between the one quarter period before the deal announcement and the period from the deal 
announcement to the deal ending is negatively correlated with deal success probability. One 
standard deviation drops in the high-yield bond market index reduces the deal success rate by 2% 
and 3%, depending on which alternative estimation model is used. Moreover, using predicted 
withdrawal probabilities instead of actual withdrawal cases yields similar results for difference in 
the operational changes between successful and failed LBO targets before and after the LBO 
transactions. The target firms with higher deal success probabilities exhibit improvements in 
earnings after controlling for deal characteristics, pre-LBO target financial conditions, and the 
industry fixed effects. Similar results are found for firm investment policy and capital structure 
changes. Overall, the empirical results show that private equity investors are able to increase target 
firms’ operating performance. The improvements in operating performance are not driven by 
changes in the targets’ fundamentals, since exogenously failed LBO targets do not exhibit similar 
operational improvements. In addition, the improvements do not appear to be driven by cost 
cutting and asset disposals. Interestingly, the withdrawn LBO targets appear to emulate post-LBO 
capital structures by adding more debt on their balance sheets72. 
2.3.3 Does LBO transactions lower the target firms’ marginal tax rate? 
One debatable consequence of LBO transactions is that LBO transactions transfer 
government income to post-LBO equity owners and debt holders. For example, Kaplan (1989b) 
estimate that reduced tax payments increase firm value by 4% to 40% among target firms. The 
lower boundary assumes that LBO debt is paid off within eight years and personal taxes on interest 
income offset the corporate debt benefits from interest expenses. The upper boundary assumes that 
the debt is permanent and that there is no offset from personal debt. Empirically an accurate 
estimate of the tax benefit of LBO transactions is difficult (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009), given 
that marginal tax rates of one-dollar additional income depends on current income and forecasted 
future incomes, as well as carryforwards and carrybacks (Graham, 2000; Blouin, Core and Guay, 
2010).  This section does not attempt to estimate the value implications of tax reductions, instead 
                                                          
72 One concern is that because I only observe the operating performance of targets after the LBO transactions that 
have available SEC filings, and those firms might be of better quality since they have public debts outstanding, or 
return to public stock markets, my results for changes in operating performance of successful LBO targets might not 
represent the universe of LBO target firms. Unfortunately, I could not address this problem due to data availability 
problems. For more discussion on this issue, please refer to Cohn, Mills and Towery (2013). 
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I offer empirical evidence concerning whether the target firms are more inclined to efficiently 
adjust their capital structures from the tax benefits perspective.  
Table 2.9 reports the results. The dependent variable is equal to one if the target firm’s 
marginal tax rate after interest expenses is at least 50 basis points lower than the marginal tax rate 
before interest expenses, zero otherwise. The first panel of Table 2.9, from top to bottom, uses the 
entire withdrawn sample as the control group. After LBO transactions, target firms are 23.1% more 
likely to employ a capital structure that enables the marginal tax rate after interest expenses to be 
at least 50 basis points lower than the marginal tax rate before interest expenses, which indicates 
that private equity, after LBO transactions, is more likely to employ a capital structure that enables 
the target firm to aggressively exploit the tax benefits of debt. As regards the sample of withdrawn 
LBO targets, I do not observe a similar pattern. The second panel of Table 2.9 uses “exogenously 
withdrawn” LBOs as control group and yields similar conclusions. Overall, I find that private 
equity investors take more consideration of the tax benefits brought about by interest payments 
when designing the capital structures of their portfolio firms73.  
2.3.4 CEO turnovers after the LBO transaction 
Another potential effect brought about by private equity investors is that drastic changes in 
the ownership structures of target firms facilitates the reshuffling of management teams. However, 
recent evidence has shown that private equity investors tend to preserve the management teams of 
target firms, and CEO turnover is less sensitive to target performance (Cornelli and Karakas, 2013). 
In this part, I examine the CEO turnover rate of target firms during the one-year period after the 
LBO transaction, using failed LBO targets as a control group. The results are presented in Table 
2.10. In the first two columns, I use Probit model to link the CEO turnover probability with deal 
outcomes. Withdrawn LBO targets are 17.8% less likely to change their CEOs after deal 
withdrawals, compared with successful LBO targets. Using “exogenously withdrawn” LBOs as 
the control group, as shown in column (2), does not change the results. In the following two 
                                                          
73 One question would be whether or not the documented tax benefit results are concentrated in the initial year after 
the buyout completion when there is large LBO debt on the balance sheet. Over the time, the difference in tax benefits 
between completed and withdrawn LBO targets diminishes as the completed LBO targets pay down the buyout debt. 
I address this issue by comparing the probability that target firms’ marginal tax rates after interest expenses is at least 
50 basis points lower than the marginal tax rates before interest expenses during the third year after the buyout 
transactions and the three-year period before transactions, across successful and unconsummated LBO targets. I still 
find economically and statistically significant differences between completed and withdrawn LBO targets. 
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columns, I use a two-stage-least-square estimation approach, in which the first step uses the change 
in the average logarithm Merrill-Lynch high yield bond market index between the one quarter 
period before the deal announcement and the period from the deal announcement to the deal ending, 
as an instrument for deal withdrawal. The F-statistic in the first step is above 10, as shown in 
column (3), which indicates the strong power of the instrument. Again, the results are qualitatively 
similar. The effects of the other control variables are as expected. For example, target CEOs are 
more likely to step down if the target stock performance before the LBO announcement is worse 
and the LBO is hostile. The last column examines differences in CEO turnover sensitivity to firm 
performance by comparing successful and failed LBO targets. Consistent with recent literature 
(Cornelli and Karakas, 2013), the CEO turnover in target firms for successful LBOs is less 
sensitive to stock performance compared with unconsummated LBO transactions, as indicated by 
the negative coefficient on the interactive term between the deal withdrawal and the target firm 
performance, which is -0.353 and statistically significant below the 5% significance level. Overall, 
I find that LBO transactions facilitates the reshuffling of top management teams of target firms. 
Nevertheless, private equity firms rely more on private information over long horizon to evaluate 
the performance of target CEOs. 
2.4 Conclusion 
This paper examines the economic consequences of LBO transactions sponsored by private 
equity investors. Firstly, I find that the stock market revaluates target firms that have been 
subjected to unsuccessful LBOs by private equity firms. This result is not driven by new 
information releases or fundamental firm changes during LBO withdrawals, and are concentrated 
in target firms that suffer from greater information asymmetry problems. Overall, the empirical 
finding is consistent with the view that private equity firms are savvy investors in public equity 
markets that are able to identify undervalued companies.  Moreover, using withdrawn LBO targets 
as a benchmark group, this paper documents increases in profitability and the operating cash flow 
of firms that experienced successful LBO transactions. The operational improvements remain 
similar when using “exogenously withdrawn” LBO targets as the control group, and when using 
predicted withdrawn probability due to the adverse movements of the high yield bond market 
instead of the actual deal withdrawals. These tests rule out the possibility that the reasons behind 
deal failures drive the observed operational improvements. I further demonstrate that private equity 
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firms leverage up the target firms after the LBO transactions, compared with target firms that are 
not bought out by private equities. Private equities adjust the capital structures of targets in a 
manner consistent with the tax benefits of leverage, and ownership changes in target firms facilitate 
the reshuffling of management teams based on private information about mangers’ quality. As a 
result, the turnover sensitivity to performance decreases for successful LBO target firms, compared 
with unconsummated LBO target firms. 
The findings of this paper pave the way for further studies of the economic consequences 
of private equity investments. Firstly, detailed examinations of the channels through which the 
private equity identify undervalued targets would be beneficial. In un-tabulated results, I do not 
find the targets’ abnormal returns to be systematically different between deals with and without 
management participation. Moreover, the abnormal returns do not reflect any difference between 
deals announced before or after the enactment of Regulation FD.  Insider information does not 
appear to play a vital role in private equity investors’ target identification processes. Recent 
anecdotal evidence shows that top private equity firms now hire former industry professionals in 
addition to dealmakers with financial backgrounds. For example, former GE CEO Jack Welch 
joined Clayton, Dubilier & Rice and Lou Gerstner, once at the helm of RJR Nabisco and IBM, is 
affiliated with Carlyle (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009). 
One promising way to examine the target identification process used by private equity 
investors would be to link the general partners’ backgrounds with the investment choices and 
investment performance of private equity transactions. The paper offers some preliminary 
evidence that target firms from withdrawn LBOs emulate LBO capital structures by leverage-up 
themselves. A detailed examination of the financial and real policy changes following LBO 
failures would provide useful guidance for the top managements of corporate America. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE CONTRACT YEAR PHENOMENON IN THE CORNER OFFICE: 
AN ANALYSIS OF FIRM BEHAVIOR DURING CEO CONTRACT RENEWALS 
3.1 Introduction 
The modern firm can be characterized as a nexus of contracts (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976), and in reality, these contracts are typically incomplete. In a principal-agent framework, 
because it is either impossible or prohibitively costly to fully observe individual actions, the 
contractual agreements designed to guide appropriate actions from the agents are generally 
contracted upon imperfect information, thereby creating opportunities for the agents to “game 
the system” (Prendergast, 1999). The agents’ incentives to engage in strategic behavior to 
influence the evaluation process can be particularly strong during contract renewal, when their 
performance is being assessed and their contracts are being renegotiated and subject to 
termination. In professional sports such as the Major League Baseball (MLB) and the National 
Basketball Association (NBA), this behavior manifests itself in increased performance by the 
players in the final year of their current contracts (the “contract year”) in hopes of securing new 
contracts with lavish terms, and is well documented and commonly referred to as the contract 
year phenomenon. Like athletes in the MLB and NBA, many CEOs are employed under fixed-
term contracts, yet, by contrast, little is known about how CEOs respond to impending contract 
expirations and in turn influence the behaviors and outcomes of the firms under their control 
during contract renewal. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by examining CEO behavior and 
the resulting corporate financial policy changes in the final year of CEO employment contracts. 
Both theoretical and empirical work in the agency literature suggests that while under 
performance evaluation, agents may engage in “inefficient behavioral responses” that are 
designed to game the assessment system and influence the assessment outcome to their own 
benefit, but that are of less value to the organization than some other activity that they could 
carry out (Prendergast, 1999).74 Employment contract expiration creates an opportunity for a 
CEO to renegotiate and improve contract terms in the new agreement but at the same time 
exposes the CEO to the heightened risk of job termination.75 Consequently, the CEO, as the 
                                                          
74 See Prendergast (1999) for a comprehensive review of the literature on agents and incentives. 
75 Xu (2011) shows that CEO dismissal rates are the highest close to or at contract expiration.  
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agent of his firm, may have particularly strong incentives to engage in strategic behavior during 
contract renewal times to impress and influence the board of directors and shareholders in the 
performance evaluation process, in order to get his tenure renewed and contract terms improved 
in the new employment agreement. Such behavior can take two different forms.  
On the one hand, the CEO may be inclined to employ window-dressing strategies, such 
as managing up earnings or controlling negative firm news release, during the contract renewal 
period, especially if the board of directors put more weight on the recent performance in their 
evaluation of the CEO’s overall performance. Indeed, Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) argue that 
recent performance observations can be viewed by the firm as being more informative than older 
ones and thus serve as a more important factor in the performance evaluation of managers. This 
“information decay” forms a key building block for a theory of earnings management based on 
managers’ concern about keeping their positions (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995). The bias of 
favoring recent information in review processes is also related to the cognitive heuristic of 
representativeness (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), as the most recent performance of the CEO 
can be the most salient in the evaluation and thus get emphasized and extrapolated (Shleifer, 
2000). Moreover, even if corporate boards and investors are rational in the sense that they 
anticipate the short-term window-dressing behavior by the CEO during contract renegotiation, 
the opportunistic behavior could still exist as an equilibrium outcome (Stein, 1989). Stein (1989) 
models myopic corporate behavior as the Nash equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative game: 
in a situation analogous to the prisoner’s dilemma, managers faced with short-term pressure 
engage in myopic behavior to boost earnings up even though the market correctly conjectures 
myopia and the resulting earnings inflation and takes them into account in making its predictions. 
Overall, the CEO has strong incentives during contract renewal to employ window-dressing 
strategies to manipulate performance signals, such as earnings management and news release 
timing, if the CEO believes that superior recent performance can increase his bargaining power 
in the contract renegotiation process. 
On the other hand, the desire to show good performance and the job uncertainty created 
by the impending contract expiration can also have disciplinary effects on potential value-
destroying behaviors of the CEO. Existing research shows that corporate boards use possible 
turnovers as a threatening device to discipline self-serving managers (Weisbach, 1988; Morck, 
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Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) and that the probability of CEO dismissal is heightened at contract 
expiration (Xu, 2011). Therefore, the CEO whose contract is up for renewal may be particularly 
cautious in choosing projects during the contract renegotiation period so as to avoid making 
decisions that detract from his performance or are perceived as salient mistakes by the market. 
As a result, certain aspects of corporate performance and outcomes can be superior during CEO 
contract renewal times as compared to other periods.   
Using a new, hand-collected sample of fixed-term employment agreements for CEOs of 
the S&P 500 firms from 2001 to 2010, we find strong evidence of the contract year phenomenon 
exhibited by firms whose CEOs are in the final year of their current employment contracts. Our 
analysis shows that, compared to normal periods, CEOs manipulate earnings more aggressively 
when they are in the process of contract renegotiations. In the one-year period leading up to the 
contract ending, the average quarterly abnormal accruals (scaled by total assets) of a sample firm 
are 0.014 higher than those of the same firm during the one-year period before or after its CEO’s 
contract year. This difference is significant not only statistically but also economically, 
representing an almost three-fold increase in earnings management intensity in the contract year 
over the sample average abnormal accruals of 0.005. Correspondingly, during CEO contract 
renewal times, firms are more likely to report earnings that meet or narrowly beat analyst 
consensus forecasts. For example, the likelihood for firms to just beat (by one cent) analyst 
consensus earnings estimates is 7.8 percentage points higher in the four quarters during the 
contract year than in the four quarters before or after the contract year, which is a substantial 
increase given that the sample average propensity to just beat consensus estimates is 9.0%. In 
addition to manipulating earnings, CEOs also strategically control the amount of negative firm 
news disseminated during their contract year. We show that the average number of negative 
news pieces disclosed by a sample firm through SEC filings and press releases decreases sharply 
in its CEO’s contract year. For example, the amount of downsizing and layoff news drops by 
more than 40% compared to non-contract years. Overall, these results indicate that CEOs faced 
with the pressure from contract renewal actively engage in gaming strategies to manipulate both 
the quantitative (earnings) and the qualitative (news) signals that may benefit their performance 
evaluation. 
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At the same time, we also find support for the disciplinary effects of the impending 
contract renewal in the contract year. Our analysis focuses on CEOs’ acquisition decisions. 
Mergers and acquisitions are important corporate events that generally have substantial impacts 
on shareholder wealth, yet these transactions are often conducted for CEOs’ private benefit at the 
tremendous cost of shareholder value (e.g., Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990). As a result, 
CEOs’ performance evaluations typically place an emphasis on acquisition performance, and 
CEOs who conduct value-destroying deals are more likely to be dismissed (Lehn and Zhao, 
2006). Moreover, the market’s reaction to firms’ acquisition decisions is highly visible and 
immediately available upon deal announcement, providing a strong and timely signal on 
performance. Therefore, CEOs may be particularly cautious in their acquisition decisions in the 
contract year to ensure performance and avoid value destruction. Indeed, we find that 
acquisitions announced during a CEO’s contract year receive significantly better reactions from 
the market compared to acquisitions conducted by the same CEO in the year before or after his 
contract year. Everything else equal, the average three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
for acquisitions announced in the contract year is 1.3 percentage points higher, a difference that 
is significant both statistically and economically.  
Figure 3.1 summarizes and depicts our findings on the four aspects of firm behavior that 
we examine—earnings management, the propensity to just beat consensus earnings estimates, 
negative news release, and acquirer announcement return—contrasting the contract year against 
the surrounding years. Each date on a graph represents a quarter (year) relative to the contract 
ending quarter (year), which is denoted by 0. The contract year clearly stands out in its high 
earnings management intensity (the first panel, from top to bottom), high likelihood to just beat 
earnings estimates (the second panel), high acquirer CARs upon acquisition announcement (the 
fourth panel), and low number of negative news releases (the third panel). Together, these graphs 
illustrate a clear pattern of distinctly different firm behavior in a CEO’s contract year as 
compared to in non-contract renewal years.  
Our empirical methodology to identify the CEO contract year phenomenon relies on a 
comparison of firm behavior during a CEO’s contract ending year and during the surrounding 
years under the same CEO’s control. The identification is relatively clean because contract 
ending years are predetermined at the time when the contracts are signed, often several years 
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prior. Moreover, our tests in the full specification include firm-level fixed effects, which allow us 
to examine changes in financial policies within the same firm under the same CEO during 
contract renewal times while controlling for a full range of unobservable firm characteristics. In 
addition, we also study firm behavior under CEOs who are not subject to contract renewal 
pressure, including CEOs who are scheduled or expected to leave their posts upon contract 
expiration as well as a sample of CEOs who are matched to the main sample by industry, tenure, 
and year. CEOs who know that they will step down after their current employment contracts 
expire should not have as strong an incentive to engage in strategic behaviors during the contract 
ending year. Indeed, we observe no behavioral changes for such CEOs in the final year of their 
contracts: their firms do not intensify earnings manipulation and have similar propensity to meet 
or just beat analyst earnings estimates and similar acquisition performance as in non-contract 
ending years. Similarly, there is no significant change in any aspect of firm behavior around 
“pseudo” contract years for the sample of matching CEOs. Furthermore, a difference-in-
differences examination of corporate behavior changes around the (actual and pseudo) contract 
ending year indicates that CEOs whose contracts are under review for renewal change their 
behavior significantly in the contract year as compared to CEOs who are bound to leave office 
upon contract expiration and to matching CEOs in the pseudo contract year. These analyses 
further confirm that it is the upcoming contract renewal and the associated incentives to 
influence the evaluation process and renewal outcome, rather than the contract ending per se or 
other industry- or tenure-related factors, that drive CEOs’ behavior changes in the contract year. 
We complete our analysis by assessing the benefits accrued to CEOs from their 
manipulative behaviors during contract renewal. Using the incremental earnings management 
intensity in the contract year over the surrounding years as a proxy for the extent of CEOs’ 
opportunistic behavior, we find that CEOs who more actively engage in manipulation in the final 
year of their contracts obtain greater contract lengths, more generous severance packages, and 
higher salaries and bonuses in their new employment agreements. CEOs’ behavior change in the 
contract year is thus rationalized: their strategic behaviors during contract renewal are associated 
with overall more favorable employment terms in the new contracts. 
Taken together, our results indicate that job uncertainty created by expiring employment 
contracts induces incentives to game the evaluation procedure and influence the evaluation 
73 
 
outcome, resulting in changes in managerial behaviors that have significant impacts on firm 
financial activities and outcomes. These findings complement the classic literature on agency, 
incentives, and contracts. In particular, a set of theoretical work focuses on inefficient behavioral 
responses that arise in performance evaluation and contracting situations, such as multi-tasking 
(e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991) and rent-seeking (e.g., Milgrom, 1988; Tirole, 1992). 
These theories emphasize that incentive schemes and contracts often have unintended 
consequences caused by agents changing their activities to their benefit in attempts to influence 
the evaluation process and outcome. Focusing on corporate earnings, Stein (1989) and 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) model earnings management as an equilibrium response from 
managers who are concerned about keeping their position to manipulate signals used by the 
market and the firm in forecasts and evaluations. Despite the multiplicity of theoretical models, 
relevant empirical evidence is relatively limited due to data availability constraints and problems 
of identification.76 This paper presents a study of agents’ strategic behavioral responses in a 
relatively clean empirical setting and illustrates clear patterns of CEOs’ behavioral changes 
during their employment contract renewal that significantly impact firm financial policies. The 
paper also contributes to the small but burgeoning literature on CEO employment contracts 
(Gillan, Hartzell, and Parrino, 2009; Xu, 2011). By documenting the countervailing effects of job 
uncertainty created by the expiration of fixed-term contracts, this paper enriches the 
understanding of CEOs’ varying behavior and incentives at various points in the contract cycle 
as well as during contract renegotiation and provides useful insights for designing optimal 
managerial contracts.77  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and the 
construction of the variables. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis of the CEO contract year 
                                                          
76 For example, Healy (1985) shows that managers strategically report earnings when their compensation is a 
nonlinear function of earnings, i.e., they underreport when actual earnings are in a region where it is unlikely that 
they earn additional reward (e.g., when earnings are above the reward ceiling specified in the compensation scheme 
or far below the floor). Oyer (1998) studies how salespeople’s contracts based on performance over the fiscal year 
induce these agents to manipulate prices and influence the timing of customer purchases. Huther, Robinson, Sievers, 
and Hartmann-Wendels (2015) examine limited partnership agreements in the private equity industry and find that 
management contracts change general partners’ investment behavior. 
77 This paper is also broadly related to the literature that studies CEOs’ behavior at various points in their career. For 
example, Weisbach (1995) examines divestitures of recently acquired divisions by newly appointed CEOs; Xuan 
(2009) examines new CEO’s internal capital allocation decisions in multi-segment firms; Pan, Wang, and Weisbach 
(2015) examine corporate investment over the CEO cycle.  
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phenomenon, focusing on firm earnings management activities, propensity to meet or just beat 
analyst earnings estimates, release of negative news, and acquisition performance, as well as 
examining the behavior of CEOs who are not subject to contract renewal pressure and the 
benefits accrued to manipulative CEOs in their new employment contracts. Section 4 concludes. 
3.2 Data and variables 
This section describes the sample construction process and discusses the data sources as 
well as the variables used in the empirical analysis. The summary statistics for the variables are 
provided in Table 3.1.  
3.2.1 CEO employment contracts 
We start building our sample by hand-collecting employment contracts for the CEOs of 
all firms included in the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 index from 2001 to 2010. Our sample 
coverage reflects a balance between sample representativeness and a manageable workload of 
data collection. Information on CEO employment agreements is publicly available through 
corporate filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Regulation S-K 
specifies that CEO employment agreements are considered material contracts, which require 
public disclosure in Form 8-K (filed under Item 1.01, Entry into a Material Definitive 
Agreement) and Form 10-K or 10-Q (filed as Exhibit 10, Material Contracts).78 Therefore, we 
manually search through all relevant SEC filings to identify and retrieve CEO employment 
contracts.79 To be retained in our sample, a CEO’s employment agreement must be fixed-term, 
with an exact ending date. Furthermore, to compare firm policies during the CEO’s contract year 
with those in the years before and after the contract renewal, we require that the contract length 
be at least two years, that the CEO remain in office for at least two years after the contract is 
renewed, and that firm financial data be non-missing for the years surrounding the contract 
renewal (one year before and one year after). Our final sample of CEO contracts consists of 159 
                                                          
78 See http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/form8kfaq.htm and http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/ edgarguide.htm.    
79 The original contract in its entirety is normally included in one of the filings. Other filings may provide a brief 
description of the employment agreement and then reference the filing that contains the detailed information. For 
example, in Exhibit 10.ii of the 2002 Form 10-K filed on March 21, 2003, MEMC Electronic Materials Inc. 
indicates that the employment agreement for its CEO, Nabeel Gareeb, was first filed in Exhibit 10.ii of the firm’s 
Form 10-Q for the quarter ending on March 31, 2002. We then locate the Form 10-Q filed on August 14, 2002 for 
the quarter ending on March 31, 2002 to retrieve the CEO employment agreement.  
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employment agreements that cover 130 firms and 138 CEOs, with an average contract length of 
3.2 years.  
3.2.2 Earnings management 
We use Compustat quarterly data to compute the measure for earnings management. 
Following Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995), we estimate abnormal accruals as a proxy for 
the intensity of earnings management activities using the modified Jones model. The basic idea 
of the model is to purge non-discretionary accruals, which can occur in the normal course of 
business even in the absence of any earnings manipulation, from total accruals to arrive at an 
estimate for discretionary accruals, which reflect management choice and earnings quality. 
Specifically, for each quarter, we estimate the Jones (1991) accruals regressions for all firms in 
each two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry, in which the dependent variable 
is total accruals, defined as the difference between net income before extraordinary items and net 
cash flow from operating activities scaled by total assets, and the independent variables include 
the change in net sales, gross property, plant and equipment, and a constant term, all scaled by 
total assets.80 Estimates from these regressions are then used to generate fitted values for each 
firm in each quarter, which approximate the firm’s non-discretionary accruals (scaled by 
assets).81 The measure of abnormal accruals (scaled by assets) is calculated as the difference 
between total accruals and non-discretionary accruals.  
3.2.3 Analyst consensus earnings forecasts 
We use the I/B/E/S database to construct the variables for estimating a firm’s propensity 
to meet or narrowly beat analyst consensus earnings estimates. From I/B/E/S, we obtain reported 
quarterly earnings per share (EPS) and consensus EPS forecast numbers. For each quarter, we 
compare a firm’s actual EPS with the latest analyst consensus (median) EPS before the end of 
the quarter and construct two dummy variables indicating whether the firm’s earnings meet or 
narrowly beat market expectations. The first dummy variable is equal to one if the quarterly EPS 
number either exactly equals the analyst consensus forecast or exceeds the consensus by just one 
                                                          
80 For each regression, we require that at least six firms with available data exist in the industry-quarter cluster.  
81 The modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995) adjusts changes in net sales by changes in 
accounts receivable to account for the discretion made on the realization of revenues from sales on credit and uses 
the adjusted change in net sales in the prediction stage.  
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cent and zero otherwise. The second dummy variable is equal to one if the quarterly EPS number 
exceeds the analyst consensus forecast by just one cent and zero otherwise.  
3.2.4 Firm news releases 
We use two data sources for analyzing firm new releases. The first is the Key 
Development Database provided by Capital IQ. This database collects all the key events of 
public firms from various third party news sources, corporate press releases, as well as corporate 
filings to the SEC. For each piece of news, the database provides the announcement date and 
time, the headline, and the content of the news. More importantly, it reports the news category 
into which Capital IQ classifies each news article. The major categories with most news stories 
include “Client Announcements”, “Product-related Announcements”, “Strategic Alliances”, 
“Discontinued operations/Downsizings”, etc. To examine the release of negative firm news, we 
count for each firm the number of news articles classified as “Discontinued 
operations/Downsizings”, “Corporate Guidance – Lowered”, or “Dividend Decrease” in the one-
year period leading to the contract ending date as well as in the one-year periods before and after 
the contract year. Since about 80% of the negative news comes from the “Discontinued 
operations/Downsizings” category, we also examine the number of downsizing and layoff news 
articles separately.  
Our second news data source is compiled from the 8-K filings of our sample firms. Major 
downsizings and layoffs constitute material events that require the filing of Form 8-K. We first 
parse all 8-K filings of our sample firms and search for the keywords “workforce reduction”, 
“layoff”, “downsize”, “discontinued operation”, “shutdown”, “disposal activities”, and their 
variations. Next, we manually read the content of each Form 8-K that contains one or more of 
the keywords and retain only those filings that include news related to major downsizing or 
layoff events. For each firm, we then count the number of layoff or downsizing news releases 
filed through 8-K filings during the CEO contract year and its surrounding years.  
3.2.5 Acquisitions 
We obtain acquisition data for the sample firms from the Securities Data Company 
(SDC) U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions Database, including the acquisition announcement date, 
the target type, the value of the transaction, and the percentage of cash and stock used in the 
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financing. We manually search corporate filings and news reports to fill in any missing values, 
when possible. We require that the acquisition be completed and that the acquirer own less than 
50% of target shares at the announcement date and acquire 100% of target shares after the 
transaction. To study the market’s reaction to the acquisition announcement, we calculate for 
each transaction the three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) surrounding the deal 
announcement date. Daily abnormal returns are calculated as differences between the actual 
daily returns and the predicted values using a market model estimated in the period from days -
205 to -6 relative to the announcement date (Brown and Warner, 1985). Daily abnormal returns 
are then cumulated over the three-day event window to arrive at the cumulative abnormal 
returns. Our final acquisition sample consists of 264 transactions conducted by the sample firms 
in a CEO contract year and its surrounding years. 
3.3 Empirical results 
Our empirical strategy to analyze how CEOs act differently during contract renewal times 
relies on a comparison of firm behavior during the contract year versus during the surrounding 
years. Specifically, we estimate the following empirical model: 
     𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑏𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑟 =  𝑓(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟, 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠, 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸, 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝐸)         (3.1)
In (3.1), the dependent variable is an aspect of firm behavior that we examine: earnings 
management, the propensity to meet or narrowly beat consensus earnings estimates, negative 
news release, or acquirer announcement return. The key independent variable of interest is 
Contract year, a dummy variable that equals one if the observation occurs in the contract ending 
year and zero if the observation occurs in the year before or the year after the contract ending 
year. Other independent variables include firm controls such as firm size, Q, leverage, and 
operating performance as well as year and firm fixed effects.82 The identification is relatively 
clean because contract ending years are predetermined at the time when the contracts are signed, 
often several years apart. Moreover, including firm fixed effects in our model allows us to 
                                                          
82 Firm size is measured by log total assets. Q is calculated as total assets plus market equity minus book equity and 
deferred taxes all over total assets. Leverage is calculated as the sum of debt in current liabilities and long-term debt, 
divided by total assets. Operating performance is defined as operating income before depreciation divided by total 
assets.   
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compare corporate policies of the same firm under the same CEO during contract renewal times 
versus during normal times while controlling for a full range of unobservable firm characteristics.  
3.3.1 Earnings management 
We first examine earnings management activities around CEO contract renewal. 
Corporate earnings are a highly visible signal commonly used by the market and the firm in 
forecasts and evaluations and are thus prone to strategic manipulation by management, especially 
when performance assessment and contract renegotiation are under way (e.g., Healy 1985; Stein, 
1989; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995; Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Table 3.2 presents the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression results contrasting earnings management activities in the CEO 
contract year versus in the surrounding years.  
For each sample firm, we include in the regressions 12 quarterly observations, the four 
quarters leading up to the contract ending and the eight surrounding quarters (four before and 
four after). The dependent variable is the quarterly abnormal accruals (scaled by assets) as a 
proxy for earnings management intensity, estimated from quarterly income and financial data 
using the modified Jones model (Jones, 1991; Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995). The key 
independent variable of interest, Contract year, is a dummy variable that takes the value one for 
the four quarters leading up to the contract ending and zero for the four quarters before and four 
quarters after the contract year. We run four regression specifications. The first includes the 
Contract year dummy only on the right hand side. The second adds firm controls, and the third 
further adds year fixed effects. The fourth is the full specification with firm fixed effects added. 
Across all specifications, we see that the coefficient on the Contract year dummy is 
significantly positive. Everything else equal, the average quarterly abnormal accruals of a sample 
firm are 0.014 higher in the CEO contract year than those of the same firm during the one-year 
period before or after. This difference is highly significant both statistically and economically, 
representing a nearly three-fold increase in earnings management intensity in the contract year 
over the sample average abnormal accruals of 0.005. The sharp increase in earnings management 
activities during the contract year is consistent with the hypothesis that the heightened pressure 
of job uncertainty associated with contract renewal induces CEOs to engage in strategic 
manipulation in the hopes of increasing their bargaining power in the negotiation process.  
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3.3.2 Propensity to meet or narrowly beat analyst consensus earnings estimates 
We next examine how a firm’s likelihood to meet or marginally beat analyst consensus 
earnings estimates changes in the CEO contract year. Matching or beating earnings consensus 
number is one of the most commonly used yardstick by investors and directors for assessing 
corporate performance. Firms that miss consensus forecasts are penalized by the market while 
firms that meet and especially those that beat the consensus estimates experience price run-ups 
after earnings announcements (e.g., Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki, 2004; Bhojraj, Hribar, 
Picconi, and McInnis, 2009). Therefore, managers use analyst consensus earnings forecasts as a 
benchmark in earnings management, and as a result, a disproportionately higher number of firms 
meet or narrowly beat (by one cent) consensus estimates than would be expected by chance 
alone (e.g., Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser, 1999). Indeed, most managers acknowledge that 
they are willing to manipulate earnings so that their reported quarterly earnings number does not 
fall short of the current quarter consensus estimate according to a survey conducted by Graham, 
Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005). A firm’s propensity to meet, and especially to just beat, the analyst 
consensus earnings forecast is thus a useful proxy for earnings management activities 
encompassing manipulation through accruals as well as real activities (e.g., Roychowdhury, 
2006; Bhojraj, Hribar, Picconi, and McInnis, 2009). 
In Table 3.3, we present the results of our analysis of this propensity in the contract year 
versus during the surrounding years using Probit regressions (with marginal effects reported).  
For each sample firm, we include in the regressions 12 quarterly observations, four quarters 
before, four quarters during, and four quarters after the contract year. In Columns 1 through 4, 
the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the quarterly EPS number either 
equals the analyst consensus forecast or exceeds the consensus by just one cent and zero 
otherwise. In Columns 5 through 8, we examine separately the likelihood to narrowly beat 
consensus forecast using a dependent variable that is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
quarterly EPS number exceeds the analyst consensus forecast by just one cent and zero otherwise. 
As before, the key independent variable, Contract year, is a dummy variable that takes the value 
one for the four quarters leading up to the contract ending and zero for the four quarters before 
and four quarters after the contract year.  
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The consistently positive and significant estimates on Contract year across all columns in 
Table 3.3 indicate that firms are more likely to report earnings that meet or narrowly beat analyst 
consensus forecasts when the CEO is going through the employment contract renewal. Using the 
estimates from Column 4 with firm and year fixed effects, for example, the propensity for a firm 
to meet or just beat the consensus earnings forecast is 9.3 percentage points higher in the four 
quarters during the contract year than in the four quarters before or after the contract year. This is 
a substantial increase in likelihood given that the sample average propensity to meet or just beat 
consensus estimates is 19.4%. Similarly, estimates from Column 8 show that the likelihood for a 
firm to marginally beat the consensus forecast by just one cent is 7.8 percentage points higher in 
the contract year, representing an 87% jump over the sample average propensity to just beat 
consensus forecasts (9.0%). Using the likelihood to meet or narrowly beat analyst earnings 
consensus as an all-encompassing measure for earnings manipulation activities, these results 
corroborate our findings on accruals management and suggest that CEOs strategically 
manipulate earnings during their contract renewal times to deliver window-dressed earnings that 
appeal to the shareholders and directors.  
3.3.3 Release of negative firm news 
In addition to manipulating earnings, CEOs can also strategically control the amount of 
negative firm news disseminated during their contract year. Existing studies show that corporate 
news releases, especially negative ones, affect asset prices (e.g., Tetlock, 2007). Accordingly, 
managers, realizing the potential impact of news, often strategically control the timing of 
negative news or delay the release of bad news in order to manipulate investor perceptions and 
influence market responses (e.g., Dellavigna and Pollet, 2009; Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki, 2009; 
Ahern and Sosyura, 2014). In this subsection, we therefore examine the pattern of negative firm 
news releases around the CEO contract year. 
Table 3.4 presents the OLS regression results from this investigation. For each sample 
firm, we include in the regressions three annual observations for the contract year and its 
neighboring years.  The dependent variable in Columns 1 through 4 is the total number of 
negative news articles reported in the Capital IQ database. In Columns 5 through 8, our 
dependent variable focuses on the number of downsizing and layoff news articles separately 
since this is the major news category that contains approximately 80% of the negative news 
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compiled by Capital IQ. The dependent variable in Columns 9 to 12 is the number of layoff or 
downsizing news releases filed through 8-K filings. These are major downsizings and layoffs 
that constitute material events that require the filing of Form 8-K. The key independent variable, 
Contract year, is a dummy variable that equals one for the one-year period leading to the contract 
ending date and zero for the one-year period before or after.   
The results are consistent across different specifications and different definitions of 
negative news. The negative and significant coefficients on Contract year indicate that the 
average number of negative news pieces disclosed by a sample firm through SEC filings and 
press releases decreases sharply in its CEO’s contract year. The economic magnitude is also 
significant. Relative to sample means, the amount of all negative news released, the amount of 
downsizing and layoff news released, and the amount of major downsizing and layoff news 
released drop by 35%, 41%, and 74%, respectively, during the contract year. These results 
suggest that in addition to manipulating quantitative signals through window-dressed earnings, 
CEOs faced with the pressure from contract renewal also actively control the more qualitative 
signals (such as news) that may impact the evaluation and renegotiation process.  
3.3.4 Acquisition performance 
So far we have shown that the expiration of fixed-term employment contracts creates 
incentives for CEOs to engage in strategic behavior in the final year of the contracts to “game” 
the evaluation and renewal process. However, the desire to show good performance in the 
contract renewal period and the job uncertainty created by the impending contract expiration can 
also have disciplinary effects on potential value-destroying behaviors of CEOs. At contract 
expiration, the probability of CEO dismissal increases, and the threat of possible turnovers can 
restrain CEOs’ self-serving behaviors that may not be in the best interest of the shareholders (e.g., 
Weisbach, 1988; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Xu, 2011). As a result, CEOs may be 
particularly cautious during the contract renegotiation period and refrain from making decisions 
that detract from performance or are perceived as salient mistakes by the market.  
In this subsection, we focus on CEOs’ acquisition decisions. Mergers and acquisitions are 
important corporate events that generally have large impacts on shareholder wealth yet are often 
conducted for CEOs’ private benefits (e.g., Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990). Acquisition 
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performance is an important aspect of CEOs’ performance evaluation, and CEOs who conduct 
value-destroying transactions are more likely to be dismissed (Lehn and Zhao, 2006). Moreover, 
the market’s reaction to firms’ acquisition decisions is highly visible and immediately observable 
upon deal announcement, providing a strong and timely signal on performance. Therefore, CEOs 
may exercise particular caution in their acquisition decisions during contract renewal to ensure 
performance and avoid value destruction.  
We examine the acquisition announcement returns of all acquisitions conducted by 
sample firms around CEO contract renewals in Table 3.5 using OLS regressions. The dependent 
variable is the three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR[-1, +1]) for the acquirer. The key 
independent variable, Contract year, is a dummy variable that equals one if the acquisition takes 
place in the one-year period leading up to the contract ending date and zero if the acquisition 
takes place in the one-year period before or after. In addition to acquirer characteristics, we also 
control for deal characteristics including the relative size of the transaction, whether the 
acquisition is financed 100% with equity, whether the acquirer and the target are in related 
industries, and whether the target is a public firm.83  
The results in Table 3.5 show that the market reacts more favorably to acquisitions 
announced in the CEO contract year than to those announced in surrounding years. The 
coefficient on Contract year is positive and highly significant across all specifications. Based on 
the estimates from Column 4 with the addition of both year and firm fixed effects, for example, 
the average three-day CAR for acquisitions announced in the contract year is 1.3 percentage 
points higher, a difference that is significant not only statistically but also economically. This 
pattern of acquisition announcement returns around CEO contract renewal times is consistent 
with the disciplinary effect of the impending contract expiration on CEO behavior during the 
contract year.  
3.3.5 Behavior of CEOs who are not subject to contract renewal pressure 
To confirm that CEOs’ behavioral changes in the contract year are induced by pressures 
and uncertainties associated with the evaluations and renegotiations involved in the contract 
                                                          
83 Relative transaction value is defined as the transaction value divided by acquirer market capitalization. A deal is 
classified as related if the acquirer and the target have the same two-digit SIC code.  
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renewal process, we also examine firm behavior under CEOs who are not subject to contract 
renewal pressure. Specifically, we study the behavior of CEOs who are bound to leave office 
upon contract expiration as well as the behavior of a sample of CEOs who are matched to our 
main sample by industry, tenure, and year around “pseudo” contract years.    
We first focus on CEOs who are scheduled or expected to leave their posts upon contract 
expiration. If it is the impending contract renewal that brings about the changes in CEO behavior, 
the CEOs who know that they will step down after the expiration of their current employment 
contracts should not have as strong an incentive to engage in strategic or manipulative activities 
during the contract ending year. 
From the data we collected, we thus construct a sample of CEOs who are bound to leave 
office upon contract expiration. This sample consists of 24 CEOs who work under fixed-term 
employment contracts of at least two years’ length, are aware before or in the contract year that 
their contracts will not be renewed upon expiration, and leave office after their contracts expire. 
In Table 3.6, we compare the changes in firm behavior around contract expiration for this group 
of “departing CEOs” against our main sample of CEOs using the difference-in-differences 
analysis. 
The first, the second and the third panel, top to bottom, of Table 3.6 focus on earnings 
management (abnormal accruals), the propensity to meet or narrowly beat consensus EPS 
forecasts, and acquirer announcement returns, respectively.84 For departing CEOs, non-contract 
year is the year before the contract year. For CEOs in our main sample, non-contract year 
denotes the year before and the year after the contract year. The first column in each panel shows 
that firms with departing CEOs and firms with CEOs renewing their contracts are similar in their 
earnings management activities, likelihood to meet or just beat EPS consensus, and acquisition 
performance. None of the differences between the two groups in the first column is statistically 
significant. In the contract year, however, the two groups of CEOs behave very differently. 
While firms under CEOs seeking contract renewal increase earnings management, become more 
likely to meet or narrowly beat earnings consensus, and have better acquisition performance in 
                                                          
84 Negative news release is not included in the difference-in-differences analysis because all firms in the departing 
CEO sample have zero negative news release before or during the contract year.  
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the contract year, we observe no significant changes in any of these aspects of firm behavior in 
the final year of their contracts as compared to non-contract years for the departing CEOs. 
Furthermore, the difference-in-differences estimates compare corporate behavior changes around 
contract expiration for the two groups and show that CEOs whose contracts are under review for 
renewal change their behavior during the contract year in a way that is significantly different 
from CEOs who are bound to leave office upon contract expiration.  
We also examine the behavior of a sample of CEOs who are matched to the main sample 
by industry, tenure, and year around pseudo contract years. The matching CEOs and the pseudo 
contract years are chosen in the following manner. For each CEO in our main sample, we 
calculate the length of his CEO tenure at his firm as of the actual contract year and then identify 
all CEOs in other S&P 500 firms in the same 3-digit SIC industry as potential matches. For each 
potential match, the associated pseudo contract year is the year in which the length of CEO 
tenure for the potential match equals the actual tenure length of the main sample CEO. To be 
further considered as a matching candidate, we require that the pseudo contract year be indeed 
pseudo, i.e., it is not an actual contract ending year for the potential match, to make sure that the 
matching CEO is not subject to contract renewal pressure in the pseudo contract year. We also 
require that the potential match preside over his firm as CEO in the three years around the 
pseudo contract year. From the qualified matching candidates, we then choose the matching 
CEO as the potential match whose pseudo contract year is the closest in time to the actual 
contract year for the main sample CEO. In essence, matched by industry, tenure, and year, the 
matching sample provides a set of pseudo contract years for CEOs with the same length of tenure 
in the same industry as our main sample CEOs. 
Table 3.7 reports estimates from the difference-in-differences analysis that compares firm 
policy changes for the sample of matching CEOs around the pseudo contract year and CEOs in 
our main sample around the actual contract year. non-contract year denotes the year before and 
the year after the (actual or pseudo) contract year. The results in Table 3.7 show that, for the 
sample of matching CEOs, there is no significant change in any firm behavior around pseudo 
contract years, in terms of earnings manipulation (the first panel, top to bottom), likelihood to 
meet or just beat earnings forecasts (the second panel), negative news release (the third panel), or 
acquisition performance (the fourth panel). The difference-in-differences estimates are 
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statistically significant in all four panels, indicating that the changes in firm behavior around 
actual CEO contract ending years are significantly different from any changes (if at all) around 
pseudo contract years.  
Overall, the results from these analyses support that it is the impending contract renewal 
and the associated incentives to influence the evaluation and renegotiation process, rather than 
the contract ending per se or other industry- or tenure-related factors, that drive the changes in 
CEO behavior during the contract year.  
3.3.6 Benefits accrued to CEOs from manipulation during contract renewal 
In this subsection, we examine whether CEOs’ strategic behaviors in the contract year 
strengthen their bargaining position in the contract renewal process and bring them any benefits 
as reflected in their new contracts. To assess this, we use the incremental earnings management 
intensity in the contract year as a proxy for the extent of CEOs’ manipulative behavior and 
explore its link to improvements in the contract terms of their new employment agreements after 
renewal. Table 3.8 presents the results from this investigation. 
We examine changes in three contract terms: contract length, severance, and salary and 
bonus. In Columns 1 through 3, we run Probit regressions (with marginal effects reported) in 
which the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the contract length is 
improved in the new employment agreement and zero otherwise. The contract length is 
considered improved if the new contract length is greater than the old one or if the new 
employment contract switches from a fixed-term contract to a contract with indefinite term. In 
Columns 4 through 6, we run Probit regressions (with marginal effects reported) in which the 
dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO’s severance package 
improves in the new contract and zero otherwise. Severance is considered improved if the 
amount of severance pay specified in the new contract is greater than that in the old contract or if 
the circumstances under which the CEO can receive severance pay upon leaving post become 
broader. In Columns 7 through 9, we run OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is the 
difference between the sum of salary and bonus specified in the new contract versus the sum of 
salary and bonus the CEO earns in the last year of the current contract, scaled by the sum of 
salary and bonus in the last year of the current contract. The key independent variable, 
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Incremental earnings management intensity in the contract year, is defined as the difference 
between the average abnormal accruals in the contract year and the non-contract years, scaled by 
the average abnormal accruals in the non-contract years, and serves as a proxy for the extent of 
manipulative activities by the CEO. 
The estimates in Table 3.8 indicate that the extent of the CEO’s opportunistic behavior is 
positively and significantly associated with the likelihood that the new employment agreement 
has greater contract length and more generous severance benefits as well as the change in salary 
and bonus. This relationship is robust across all specifications. CEOs who more actively engage 
in window-dressing activities in the contract year benefit from their “gaming” behaviors: they 
tend to end up with overall more favorable employment terms in their new contracts. 
3.4 Conclusion 
The aim of this paper has been to investigate how CEO employment contracts influence 
CEO behavior and firm financial policies during the final year of the contract term. We 
document the contract year phenomenon in the corner officer: CEOs faced with the pressure and 
uncertainty associated with the impending contract expiration engage in strategic behaviors in 
the contract ending year in order to increase their bargaining power in the evaluation and 
renegotiation process and influence the renewal outcome. We find that CEOs employ window-
dressing strategies in the contract year by managing up earnings and controlling the release of 
negative firm news. Firms have higher abnormal accruals, are more likely to meet or just beat 
analyst earnings consensus estimates, and release less negative news in their CEOs’ contract year 
compared to during normal periods. At the same time, we find that the upcoming contract 
renewal and the associated evaluation and possibility of termination have disciplinary effects on 
CEOs’ potential value-destroying behaviors. Acquisitions conducted in the CEO contract year 
have significantly higher abnormal returns upon announcement than those conducted during 
normal times. In addition, we show that firms under CEOs who are not subject to contract 
renewal pressure do not exhibit the same pattern of changes in behavior and that CEOs who 
engage in manipulation during contract renewal obtain better employment terms in their new 
contracts, in terms of contract length, severance benefits, and salary and bonus. 
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Overall, our results suggest that job uncertainty created by expiring employment 
contracts induces changes in managerial behaviors that have significant impacts on firm financial 
activities and outcomes. The countervailing forces associated with contract renewal uncovered in 
this paper, namely the gaming incentives versus the disciplinary effects, enrich our 
understanding of CEO incentives and behaviors and provide useful insights towards the design 
of optimal managerial contracts. 
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
Figure 1.1 Comparative statics of optimal coupon rate  
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Figure 1.2  Comparative statics of expected tenure 
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Figure 1.3 Comparative statics of the stationary cross-sectional density function of cash flow state 
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Figure 1.4 Comparative statics of unemployment rate  
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Figure 1.5 Comparative statics of initial wage  
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Figure 1.6 Comparative statics of labor force participation 
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Figure 2.1 Cumulative abnormal returns for withdrawn LBOs 
Cumulative abnormal returns for all withdrawn deals 
 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns for exogenously withdrawn deals 
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Figure 3.1 Firm behavior around the CEO contract year 
 
This figure depicts four aspects of firm behavior— from top to bottom, earnings management, the propensity to just beat consensus 
earnings estimates, negative news release, and acquirer announcement returns — around the CEO contract year.  Each date on a 
graph represents a quarter (year) relative to the contract ending quarter (year), which is denoted by 0. 
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Figure 3.1 (cont.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
-1 0 1
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
la
y
o
ff
/d
o
w
n
si
zi
n
g
 
n
ew
s 
re
le
as
es
 
Year relative to the contract ending year
Negative news release
Contract year
-0.008
-0.006
-0.004
-0.002
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
0.012
-1 0 1
A
cq
u
ir
er
 c
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e 
ab
n
o
rm
al
 r
et
u
rn
 
Year relative to the contract ending year
Acquirer announcement returns
Contract year
97 
 
Table 1.1 Model parameters for baseline calibration 
Parameters Interpretation Values Reference 
𝛽 Worker’s bargaining power 0.75 Shimer (2005) 
𝛼 Bankruptcy cost 0.5 Leland (1994) 
𝑏 Unemployment benefit 0.4 Shimer (2005) 
𝑠 Exogenous separation rate 0.15 Monacelli, Quadrini and Trigari (2011) 
𝜅 Cost of maintaining a vacancy 0.4 Moen and Rosen (2011) 
𝑋0 Initial cash flow state 1  
𝜃 Productivity 1  
𝑟 Interest rate 0.05 Brunnermeier Sannikov (2014) 
𝜇 Drift −0.022 He and Milbradt (2014) 
𝜎 Volatility 0.25 He and Milbradt (2014) 
𝑓 Flow operational cost 0  
𝐹 Present value of 𝑓 0  
𝜄 Matching elasticity on 𝑢 0.3 Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) 
𝐴 Matching efficiency 4 Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) 
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Table 2.1 Annual distribution of leveraged buyouts with private equity participation 
Table 2.1 reports the annual distribution of number of total LBOs with private equity participation, as well as number of the 
successful deals and withdrawn deals according to deal announcement year. 
Announcement year Total LBOs  Successful LBOs Withdrawn LBOs 
1979 1 0 1 
1984 9 4 5 
1985 22 12 10 
1986 25 22 3 
1987 26 18 8 
1988 53 41 12 
1989 15 9 6 
1990 4 4 0 
1991 2 1 1 
1992 3 1 2 
1993 4 4 0 
1994 5 4 1 
1995 5 4 1 
1996 10 9 1 
1997 17 14 3 
1998 17 13 4 
1999 36 28 8 
2000 33 28 5 
2001 9 9 0 
2002 12 9 3 
2003 12 9 3 
2004 23 18 5 
2005 39 33 6 
2006 64 55 9 
2007 64 50 14 
2008 21 14 7 
2009 19 13 6 
2010 37 35 2 
2011 23 23 0 
Total 610 484 126 
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Table 2.2 Distribution of deal withdrawn reasons 
Table 2.2 presents the reason behind each withdrawn deal. I search for news articles around deal withdrawal dates from LexisNexis 
for withdrawal reasons. The 40 deals withdrawn for reasons specified in bold letters are the ones withdrawn without disclosing any 
information with regard to target performance or target stock price during the deal outstanding period (“exogenously withdrawn” 
sample thereafter). 
Withdrawal reason # cases 
Adverse change in capital market and economic conditions 7 
Favorable change in public equity market 1 
Lack of finance 5 
Target's high leverage 1 
Negotiation failed due to price disagreement 19 
Negotiation failed due to reasons other than bid price issue, target news or target performance 24 
Negative target news (material adverse change of the target) /poor performance 17 
Outbid by another acquirer 37 
Positive target news/strong performance 3 
Rejected by regulatory government agency 3 
Withdrawn reason not specified 9 
Total cases 126 
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Table 2.3 LBO characteristics 
Table 2.3 reports the mean, median and standard deviation of characteristics for successful LBOs, Withdrawn LBOs, as well as 
“exogenously withdrawn” LBOs. The definitions of variables are present in section 2.5 
Successful LBOs  
  N Mean Median S.D. 
deal value ($ million) 473 1622.56 344.5 4493 
hostile bid dummy 484 0.01 0 0.1 
target cash flow 429 0.07 0.09 0.16 
target financial leverage 439 0.29 0.27 0.26 
target market-to-book ratio 433 4.19 1.23 57.71 
target cash holdings 439 0.12 0.06 0.15 
target stock performance 457 0 -0.02 0.41 
deal length (days) 484 125.35 113 76.12 
announcement return 422 0.2 0.17 0.23 
competing deal 484 0.11 0 0.32 
All withdrawn LBOs  
deal value ($ million) 117 1297.97 378.85 2965.71 
hostile bid dummy 126 0.06 0 0.23 
target cash flow 120 0.07 0.08 0.11 
target financial leverage 122 0.3 0.28 0.23 
target market-to-book ratio 122 6.19 1.17 53.62 
target cash holdings 122 0.11 0.04 0.15 
target stock performance 122 -0.08 -0.1 0.41 
deal length (days) 126 130.72 106.5 107.85 
announcement return 120 0.18 0.15 0.16 
competing deal 126 0.33 0 0.47 
"Exogenously withdrawn" LBOs  
deal value ($ million) 34 1171.54 468.64 1983.71 
hostile bid dummy 35 0.09 0 0.28 
target cash flow 34 0.09 0.09 0.07 
target financial leverage 35 0.28 0.29 0.2 
target market-to-book ratio 35 1.25 1.08 0.53 
target cash holdings 35 0.08 0.03 0.12 
target stock performance 35 -0.03 -0.07 0.4 
deal length (days) 35 125.06 102 115.58 
announcement return 35 0.17 0.14 0.18 
competing deal 35 0.06 0 0.24 
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Table 2.4 Stock returns for withdrawn leveraged buyouts 
For each LBO deal, I calculate the abnormal buy-and-hold return, cumulative abnormal return, and standardized daily abnormal 
return for the target stock in question, from 25 trading days before the deal announcement date till 25 trading days after the deal 
withdrawn date. The benchmark portfolios are value-weighted market portfolio for “Market portfolio” column and a three-firm 
portfolio matching on Fama-French 49 industry, size and book-to-market ratio, similar to Barber and Lyon (1997), in the “Matching 
portfolio” column. LBOs withdrawn for exogenous reasons are defined in Table 2.2. I classify LBOs withdrawn due to adverse 
change in high-yield bond market since announcement if the change in average log high-yield bond market index between one 
quarter before the announcement and the LBO period are among the worst 25% among all LBOs announced during that year. 
Withdrawn LBOs without subsequent bids are withdrawn deals without any subsequent acquisition bids at least one year thereafter. 
T-statistics are in parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes statistically significant below 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
All withdrawn LBOs 
    Market portfolio Matching portfolio 
 105 cases 
Raw buy-and-hold return 0.173***   
 (4.212)   
Raw cumulative return 0.203***   
 (5.833)   
Abnormal buy-and-hold return  0.119*** 0.106** 
  (2.987) (2.385) 
Cumulative abnormal return  0.149*** 0.135*** 
  (4.434) (3.640) 
Standardized daily abnormal buy-and-hold return  0.0011*** 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 
  (4.071) (3.122) (2.922) 
LBOs withdrawn for "exogenous" reasons 
    Market portfolio Matching portfolio 
 35 cases 
Raw buy-and-hold return 0.145**   
 (2.692)   
Raw cumulative return 0.181***   
 (3.794)   
Abnormal buy-and-hold return  0.099* 0.134*** 
  (1.980) (3.086) 
Cumulative abnormal return  0.134*** 0.165*** 
  (3.040) (3.960) 
Standardized daily abnormal buy-and-hold return  0.0011** 0.0009** 0.0012*** 
  (2.317) (2.267) (2.968) 
Withdrawn LBOs with adverse change in high-yield bond market since announcements 
    Market portfolio Matching portfolio 
 21 cases 
Raw buy-and-hold return 0.105   
 (1.219)   
Raw cumulative return 0.161*   
 (1.986)   
Abnormal buy-and-hold return  0.180** 0.203*** 
  (2.251) (3.078) 
Cumulative abnormal return  0.227*** 0.253*** 
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Table 2.4 (Cont.)    
  (2.993) (4.038) 
Standardized daily abnormal buy-and-hold return  0.0008 0.0015** 0.0016*** 
  (1.171) (2.678) (3.099) 
Withdrawn LBOs without subsequent bids one year thereafter 
Abnormal buy-and-hold return   Market portfolio Matching portfolio 
Full sample  
79 cases 
  0.179*** 0.145** 
    (3.620) (2.526) 
LBOs withdrawn for "exogenous" reasons  23 cases 
  0.174** 0.202*** 
    (2.759) (4.052) 
LBOs withdrawn due to adverse change in high-yield bond market   
14 cases 
  0.281** 0.281*** 
    (2.740) (3.255) 
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Table 2.5 Relationship between target firm information asymmetry and target firm stock return 
Table 2.5 reports the relationship between stock returns during LBO periods and the information asymmetry of target firms. I use 
three measures for information asymmetry, obtained from I/B/E/S database of analyst forecasts on firm annual EPS: absolute 
difference between analyst consensus forecasted EPS and actual EPS over fiscal year-end stock price (the first panel, from top to 
bottom), standard deviation of analyst forecasted EPS over firm assets for the month before the deal announcement (the second 
panel), and number of analysts covering the target firms during past 12 months ending in one month before the deal announcement 
(the third panel). “Exogenously withdrawn” LBOs are defined in Table 2.  Measures of stock returns are the same as in Table 2.4. 
T-statistics are in parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes statistically significant below 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
  Opaque targets   Transparent targets 
|consensus forecasted EPS-actual EPS| / stock price 
  Analyst forecast error > sample median    
Analyst forecast error <= sample 
median  
BHAR  
Market portfolio Matching portfolio   
Market 
portfolio 
Matching portfolio 
Full sample 40 cases  41 cases 
 0.205*** 0.164**  0.016 0.048 
 (3.393) (2.548)  (0.353) (1.049) 
LBOs withdrawn for "exogenous" 
reasons 
14 cases   14 cases 
 0.257*** 0.201**  -0.038 0.077 
  (3.941) (2.940)   (0.637) (1.244) 
Analyst forecast standard deviation/total assets 
  
Analyst forecast dispersion > sample 
median    
Analyst forecast dispersion <= sample 
median  
BHAR  
Market portfolio Matching portfolio   
Market 
portfolio 
Matching portfolio 
Full sample 40 cases  41 cases 
 0.136** 0.131**  0.059 0.038 
 (2.294) (2.316)   (1.052) (0.565) 
LBOs withdrawn for "exogenous" 
reasons 
14 cases   14 cases 
 0.138 0.165**  0.049 0.107 
  (1.649) (2.314)   (0.623) (1.481) 
Analyst coverage  
  Analyst coverage < sample median    Analyst coverage >= sample median 
BHAR  
Market portfolio Matching portfolio   
Market 
portfolio 
Matching portfolio 
Full sample 49 cases  54 cases 
 0.105 0.147**  0.129** 0.070 
 (1.583) (2.117)  (2.595) (1.214) 
LBOs withdrawn for "exogenous" 
reasons 
20 cases   15 cases 
 0.069 0.175***  0.138 0.080 
  (1.135) (3.358)   (1.632) (1.084) 
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Table 2.6 Operating performance and firm policy following LBO transactions: All withdrawn 
sample 
Table 2.6 compares the operating performance, investment and capital structure, for successful and withdrawn LBOs three years 
before and after the LBO closing. I exclude the year during which the LBO ends. Operating cash flow is defined as EBITDA minus 
capital expenditure. Financial leverage is defined as the sum of debt in current liabilities and long-term debt. Robust T-statistics 
are in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes statistically significant below 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
EBITDA/Total assets 
  Before  After After-Before 
Withdrawn deals 0.126 0.124 -0.002 
   (0.253) 
Successful deals 0.095 0.125 0.031*** 
   (6.303) 
Withdrawn-successful 0.031*** -0.001 -0.032*** 
  (5.504) (0.137) (-3.574) 
EBITDA/Total assets - 4 digit SIC industry median 
  Before  After After-Before 
Withdrawn deals 0.012 0.013 0.000 
   (0.064) 
Successful deals -0.027 0.011 0.038*** 
   (7.239) 
Withdrawn-successful 0.039*** 0.001 -0.038*** 
  (6.705) (0.209) (-4.228) 
Operating cash flows/Total assets 
  Before  After After-Before 
Withdrawn deals 0.06 0.065 0.005 
   (0.493) 
Successful deals 0.05 0.085 0.035*** 
   (7.260) 
Withdrawn-successful 0.010 -0.020** -0.030*** 
  (1.563) (2.409) (2.856) 
Operating cash flows/Total assets - 4 digit SIC industry median 
  Before  After After-Before 
Withdrawn deals 0.02 0.012 -0.008 
   (1.026) 
Successful deals -0.002 0.026 0.028*** 
   (5.744) 
Withdrawn-successful 0.023*** -0.013* -0.036*** 
  (3.903) (1.864) (3.929) 
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Table 2.6 (cont.) 
CAPEX/Total assets 
  Before  After After-Before 
Withdrawn deals 0.066 0.057 -0.009 
   (1.473) 
Successful deals 0.045*** 0.040 -0.005 
   (-1.472) 
Withdrawn-successful 0.021*** 0.017*** -0.004 
  (4.475) (3.559) (0.598) 
CAPEX/Total assets - 4 digit SIC industry median 
  Before  After After-Before 
Withdrawn deals 0.000 0.008 0.007 
   (1.640) 
Successful deals -0.015 -0.008 0.008*** 
   (2.700) 
Withdrawn-successful 0.016*** 0.015*** -0.000 
  (4.381) (3.895) (0.047) 
Financial leverage/Total assets 
  Before  After After-Before 
Withdrawn deals 0.319 0.396 0.077*** 
   (2.646) 
Successful deals 0.222 0.686 0.464*** 
   (22.216) 
Withdrawn-successful 0.097*** -0.290*** -0.387*** 
  (5.330) (9.361) (10.771) 
Financial leverage/Total assets - 4 digit SIC industry median 
  Before  After After-Before 
Withdrawn deals 0.039 0.142 0.103*** 
   (4.083) 
Successful deals -0.036 0.376 0.412*** 
   (21.580) 
Withdrawn-successful 0.075*** -0.234*** -0.309*** 
  (4.989) (8.383) (9.747) 
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Table 2.7 Operating performance and firm policy following LBO transactions: “Exogenously 
withdrawn” sample 
Table 2.7 repeats the analyses presented in Table 6, with the exception that only LBOs withdrawn for “exogenous” reasons are 
included in the withdrawn deal sample.  “Exogenously withdrawn” LBOs are defined in Table 2.2.  Robust T-statistics are in 
parentheses. ***, **, * denotes statistically significant below 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
EBITDA/Total assets 
  Before  After After-Before 
Withdrawn deals 0.126 0.126 -0.001 
   (0.043) 
Successful deals 0.095 0.125 0.031*** 
   (6.299) 
Withdrawn-successful 0.031*** 0.000 -0.031** 
  (3.699) (0.030) (2.285) 
EBITDA/Total assets - 4 digit SIC industry median 
  Before  After After-Before 
Withdrawn deals 0.020 0.012 -0.008 
   (0.625) 
Successful deals -0.027 0.011 0.038*** 
   (7.234) 
Withdrawn-successful 0.046*** 0.000 -0.046*** 
  (5.372) (0.020) (3.385) 
Operating cash flows/Total assets 
  Before  After After-Before 
Withdrawn deals 0.060 0.067 0.007 
   (0.449) 
Successful deals 0.050 0.085 0.035*** 
   (7.256) 
Withdrawn-successful 0.010 -0.018 -0.028* 
  (0.954) (1.426) (1.707) 
Operating cash flows/Total assets - 4 digit SIC industry median 
  Before  After After-Before 
Withdrawn deals 0.033 0.021 -0.013 
   (0.999) 
Successful deals -0.002 0.026 0.028*** 
   (5.740) 
Withdrawn-successful 0.036*** -0.005 -0.041*** 
  (4.108) (0.477) (2.982) 
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Table 2.7 (cont.) 
CAPEX/Total assets 
  Before  After After-Before 
Withdrawn deals 0.067 0.054 -0.012 
   -1.217 
Successful deals 0.045 0.040 -0.005 
   -1.471 
Withdrawn-successful 0.022*** 0.014** -0.008 
  (2.757) (2.023) (0.722) 
CAPEX/Total assets - 4 digit SIC industry median 
  Before  After After-Before 
Withdrawn deals -0.006 -0.003 0.003 
   (0.353) 
Successful deals -0.015 -0.008 0.008*** 
   (2.698) 
Withdrawn-successful 0.009 0.004 -0.005 
  (1.402) (0.714) (0.514) 
Financial leverage/Total assets 
  Before  After After-Before 
Withdrawn deals 0.287 0.434 0.148*** 
   (2.735) 
Successful deals 0.222 0.686 0.464*** 
   (22.202) 
Withdrawn-successful 0.065** -0.252*** -0.317*** 
  (2.558) (4.836) (5.468) 
Financial leverage/Total assets - 4 digit SIC industry median 
  Before  After After-Before 
Withdrawn deals 0.031 0.180 0.149*** 
   (3.061) 
Successful deals -0.036 0.376 0.412*** 
   (21.566) 
Withdrawn-successful 0.068*** -0.196*** -0.264*** 
  (3.085) (4.132) (5.047) 
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Table 2.8 Operating performance and firm policy following LBO transactions: Full control and      
predicted withdrawal 
Table 2.8 repeats analyses presented in Table 2.6 and Table 2.7, but with more controls. Log (deal value) is logarithm of deal value. 
Hostile deal is equal to one if the LBO is classified as hostile. Target financial conditions before the LBO announcement are 
obtained from COMPUSTAT annual tapes. Target cash flow is defined as the sum of COMPUSTAT Item IB and DP over AT. 
Target financial leverage is defined as sum of DLTT and DLC over AT. Target Q is defined as market value of assets over book 
value of assets, where market value of assets is equal to AT plus market value of equity minus TXDB minus CEQ, and market value 
of equity is PRCC multiplied by CSHO. Target cash holdings is defined as CHE over AT. Target stock price performance is defined 
as abnormal buy-and-hold return against market portfolio for one-year period ending in 11 days before deal announcement. LBO 
duration is logarithm of number of days between deal announcement and deal close. LBO announcement return is defined as the 
three-day cumulative abnormal return surrounding the LBO announcement dates. Competing deal is equal to one if there are 
multiple bidders for the target. Changes in average Log high-yield bond market index is defined as change in average log high-
yield bond market index between one quarter period before the announcement and the period from deal announcement to deal 
ending. Industry fixed effects are included in the regressions. Standard errors are robust and clustered by industry. T-statistics are 
in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes statistically significant below 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
Actual withdrawn LBOs 
  
EBITDA/Total 
assets 
Operating cash 
flow/Total 
assets 
Capital 
expenditure/Total 
assets 
Financial 
leverage/Total 
assets 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
After 0.030*** 0.034*** -0.004* 0.479*** 
 (8.138) (8.244) (-1.681) (24.260) 
After × Withdrawn -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.003 -0.394*** 
 (-4.358) (-3.471) (-0.534) (-12.498) 
Withdrawn 0.029*** 0.015* 0.014** 0.095*** 
 (4.454) (1.679) (2.255) (3.521) 
Log (deal value) -0.002 0.005** -0.008*** 0.022** 
 (-1.034) (2.059) (-4.190) (2.060) 
Hostile deal  0.034** 0.013 0.023** -0.002 
 (2.027) (0.765) (2.249) (-0.029) 
Target cash flow before LBO 0.389*** 0.173 0.205*** 0.046 
 (4.316) (1.469) (2.893) (0.303) 
Target financial leverage before LBO 0.104*** 0.130*** -0.029 0.657*** 
 (3.363) (3.192) (-1.186) (5.195) 
Target Q before LBO 0.003 0.005 -0.004 0.066 
 (0.305) (0.389) (-0.834) (1.488) 
Target cash holdings before LBO 0.084** 0.129*** -0.055** -0.007 
 (1.979) (2.820) (-2.002) (-0.044) 
Target stock price run-up before LBO -0.013 -0.004 -0.008 -0.075* 
 (-1.552) (-0.389) (-1.265) (-1.780) 
LBO time length 0.002 -0.001 0.004 -0.016 
 (0.439) (-0.188) (0.922) (-0.796) 
LBO announcement return -0.012 -0.009 -0.004 -0.146* 
 (-0.498) (-0.246) (-0.158) (-1.776) 
Competing deals 0.004 -0.004 0.008 -0.062* 
 (0.562) (-0.478) (1.423) (-1.858) 
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Table 2.8 (cont.)     
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 929 929 929 929 
R-squared 0.555 0.502 0.562 0.631 
Predicted withdrawal probabilities      
  =1 if LBO is withdrawn EBITDA 
Operating 
CF 
Capital 
expenditure 
Financial 
leverage 
  OLS Probit         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
After   0.031*** 0.034*** -0.004 0.415*** 
   (5.140) (4.759) (-1.182) (11.496) 
After ×    -0.052** -0.046 -0.008 -0.372** 
Predicted withdrawn probability   (-1.994) (-1.477) (-0.530) (-2.260) 
Predicted withdrawn probability   -0.152* 0.017 -0.160** -0.916** 
   (-1.784) (0.147) (-2.139) (-2.085) 
Changes in high-yield  -0.850*** -0.902***     
bond market index (-3.242) (-3.821)     
Log (deal value) -0.007 -0.006 -0.005* 0.006** -0.011*** 0.030*** 
 (-0.645) (-0.579) (-1.951) (2.008) (-5.488) (2.662) 
Hostile deal  0.375** 0.390** 0.125*** 0.022 0.102*** 0.372* 
 (2.705) (2.548) (3.274) (0.452) (3.323) (1.944) 
Target cash flow before LBO 0.216 0.162 0.439*** 0.174 0.251*** 0.197 
 (1.046) (0.793) (4.509) (1.395) (3.556) (0.928) 
Target financial leverage before LBO 0.135** 0.120* 0.134*** 0.136*** -0.007 0.930*** 
 (2.243) (1.742) (4.516) (3.857) (-0.316) (5.566) 
Target Q before LBO -0.057* -0.060* -0.009 0.003 -0.015* 0.051 
 (-2.129) (-1.753) (-0.736) (0.200) (-1.793) (0.989) 
Target cash holdings before LBO 0.101 0.070 0.116*** 0.131*** -0.026 0.118 
 (1.095) (0.630) (2.685) (3.044) (-0.985) (0.589) 
Target stock price performance before LBO -0.183*** -0.183*** -0.047** -0.002 -0.042** -0.249** 
 (-5.264) (-4.302) (-2.251) (-0.078) (-2.396) (-2.477) 
LBO duration -0.062** -0.049** -0.011 0.000 -0.009 -0.076** 
 (-2.221) (-2.146) (-1.397) (0.031) (-1.483) (-2.252) 
LBO announcement return -0.153* -0.173** -0.033 -0.012 -0.020 -0.339*** 
 (-2.056) (-2.090) (-1.361) (-0.399) (-1.021) (-2.867) 
Competing deals 0.234*** 0.244*** 0.038** -0.007 0.044*** 0.144 
 (3.975) (4.333) (2.030) (-0.287) (2.672) (1.599) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 469 469 844 844 844 844 
R-squared 0.135 0.13 0.544 0.497 0.574 0.571 
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Table 2.9 Tax policies following LBO transactions 
Table 2.9 examines whether target firms make more use of tax benefit of interest deductions after the LBO transaction. The 
dependent variable is equal to one if the difference between marginal tax rate before and after interest expenses is greater or equal 
to 50 basis points (“Graham's Kink”, Graham, 2000).  Panel 9A uses all withdrawn sample as control group, while Panel 9B uses 
only LBOs withdrawn for “exogenous” reasons as the control sample.  “Exogenously withdrawn” LBOs are defined in Table 2.2.  
Robust T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes statistically significant below 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
Full sample 
  Before  After After-Before 
Withdrawn deals 0.711 0.756 0.045 
   (0.952) 
Successful deals 0.576 0.807 0.231*** 
   (5.982) 
Withdrawn-successful 0.135*** -0.051 -0.187*** 
  (3.047) (-1.232) (-3.066) 
Exogenously withdrawn sample 
  Before  After After-Before 
Withdrawn deals 0.716 0.679 -0.038 
   (-0.453) 
Successful deals 0.576 0.807 0.231*** 
   (5.977) 
Withdrawn-successful 0.140** -0.129* -0.269*** 
  (2.243) (-1.908) (-2.925) 
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Table 2.10 CEO turnovers after LBOs 
Table 2.10 compares the probability of CEO turnovers between completed and withdrawn LBOs. Industry fixed effects are included 
in the regressions. Standard errors are robust and clustered by industry. All target characteristics are most recent measures before 
the LBO. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes statistically significant below 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
 
 All withdrawn LBOs 
Exogenously 
Withdrawn LBOs 2SLS regression 
Turnover 
sensitivity 
 =1 if turnover =1 if turnover stage          
Second stage      
=1 if turnover =1 if turnover 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Withdraw -0.178*** -0.291***  -1.232* -0.210*** 
 (-7.066) (-4.592)  (-1.837) (-8.673) 
Withdraw ×      -0.353*** 
Target stock return      (-2.754) 
Log (deal value) 0.034** 0.039*** -0.005 0.029 0.036** 
 (2.320) (3.533) (-0.49) (1.542) (2.496) 
Hostile deal  0.315*** 0.476*** 0.374** 0.696** 0.298*** 
 (4.453) (5.995) (2.68) (2.092) (3.923) 
Target cash flow  -0.718 -0.919* 0.224 -0.368 -0.753 
 (-1.524) (-1.689) (1.07) (-0.668) (-1.642) 
Target financial leverage  -0.029 -0.072 0.137** 0.112 -0.037 
 (-0.411) (-1.339) (2.30) (0.999) (-0.554) 
Target Q  -0.007 -0.005 -0.058** -0.085* -0.003 
 (-0.154) (-0.115) (-2.23) (-1.647) (-0.069) 
Target cash holdings  0.053 0.098 0.101 0.178 0.047 
 (0.383) (0.492) (1.09) (1.099) (0.338) 
Target stock return  -0.148** -0.115* -0.184*** -0.332* -0.091 
 (-2.568) (-1.911) (-5.21) (-1.815) (-1.405) 
LBO duration -0.074** -0.143*** -0.072** -0.168*** -0.084*** 
 (-2.462) (-3.818) (-2.68) (-4.440) (-2.659) 
LBO announcement return -0.189* -0.247* -0.148 -0.391 -0.201* 
 (-1.741) (-1.833) (-1.72) (-1.567) (-1.914) 
Competing deals 0.119 0.070 0.234*** 0.377** 0.117 
 (1.606) (0.543) (3.96) (2.002) (1.505) 
Changes in high-yield    -0.812***   
bond market index   (-3.28)   
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F statistic on excluded IV   10.77***   
Observations 506 432 469 469 506 
R-squared 0.076 0.098     0.076 
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Table 3.1 Summary statistics 
This table presents the mean, standard deviation, and number of observations (N) for the variables used in the paper.   
Variable name Mean Standard deviation N 
Total assets (in million $) 15,492.56 23,436.05 1,132 
Q 1.840 0.853 1,132 
Financial leverage 0.272 0.168 1,132 
Operating performance 0.039 0.022 1,132 
    
Earnings management    
Abnormal accruals 0.005 0.086 1,132 
    
Propensity to meet or just beat consensus forecasts    
Meet or just beat consensus EPS forecast? 0.194 0.396 1,551 
Just beat consensus EPS forecast? 0.090 0.286 1,551 
    
Negative news release    
Number of negative news releases from Capital IQ 0.964 2.012 439 
Number of layoff/downsizing news releases from Capital IQ 0.781 1.894 439 
Number of major layoff/downsizing news releases from 8-K 0.109 0.455 439 
    
Acquisitions    
Cumulative abnormal return (CAR [-1, +1]) -0.037% 0.036 264 
Relative transaction value 0.073 0.154 264 
Pure stock deal? 0.042 0.200 264 
Related deal? 0.470 0.500 264 
Public target? 0.197 0.398 264 
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Table 3.2 Earnings management 
This table presents the OLS regression results for earnings management around the CEO contract year.  For each sample firm, 12 
quarterly observations are included in the regressions including the four quarters before, four quarters during, and four quarters 
after the contract year.  The dependent variable is the quarterly abnormal accruals (scaled by assets) estimated from quarterly 
income and financial data using the modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995).  Contract year is a dummy variable 
that takes the value one for the four quarters leading up to the contract ending and zero for the four quarters before and four quarters 
after the contract year.  Control variables include firm size, Q, leverage, and operating performance.  Robust standard errors 
clustered by firm are in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
   Abnormal accruals 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Contract year? 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015** 0.014** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Log assets  0.004 0.006* -0.020 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.016) 
Q  0.008* 0.012** 0.016 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) 
Financial leverage  -0.006 -0.010 -0.013 
  (0.021) (0.023) (0.043) 
Operating performance  -0.210 -0.289 -0.248 
  (0.200) (0.199) (0.352) 
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes  
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes  
Number of observations 1,132 1,132 1,132 1,132 
R-squared 0.007 0.011 0.023 0.150 
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Table 3.3 Propensity to meet or narrowly beat analyst consensus earnings estimates 
This table presents the Probit regression results (with marginal effects reported) for the propensity to meet or narrowly beat analyst 
consensus earnings estimates around the CEO contract year.  For each sample firm, 12 quarterly observations are included in the 
regressions including the four quarters before, four quarters during, and four quarters after the contract year.  In Columns 1 through 
4, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the quarterly EPS number either equals the analyst consensus 
forecast or exceeds the consensus by just one cent and zero otherwise.  In Columns 5 through 8, the dependent variable is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the quarterly EPS number exceeds the analyst consensus forecast by just one cent and zero otherwise.  
Contract year is a dummy variable that takes the value one for the four quarters leading up to the contract ending and zero for the 
four quarters before and four quarters after the contract year.  Control variables include firm size, Q, leverage, and operating 
performance.  Robust standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 
5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
 
 Meet or just beat consensus EPS estimates? Just beat consensus EPS estimates? 
 Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) 
Contract year? 0.064** 0.065** 0.067*** 0.093*** 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.049*** 0.078*** 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.034) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.021) 
Log assets  0.018 0.020 0.078  0.005 0.004 0.011 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.070)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.037) 
Q  0.093*** 0.087*** 0.066  0.039*** 0.034*** 0.048 
  (0.027) (0.028) (0.044)  (0.010) (0.011) (0.034) 
Financial leverage  0.044 0.022 -0.294  -0.036 -0.041 -0.293* 
  (0.080) (0.081) (0.229)  (0.042) (0.043) (0.171) 
Operating performance  -1.037 -0.868 2.246*  -0.330 -0.219 -0.043 
  (0.972) (0.976) (1.336)  (0.422) (0.434) (1.126) 
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Number of observations 1,551 1,551 1,526 1,226 1,551 1,551 1,515 1,008 
R-squared 0.006 0.028 0.045 0.159 0.012 0.029 0.041 0.105 
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Table 3.4 Release of negative firm news 
This table reports the OLS regression results for negative firm news release around the CEO contract year.  For each sample firm, 
three annual observations for the contract year and its neighboring years are included in the regressions.  The dependent variable 
in Columns 1 through 4 is the total number of negative news articles reported in the Capital IQ database.  In Columns 5 through 8, 
the dependent variable is the number of downsizing and layoff news articles reported in the Capital IQ database.  The dependent 
variable in Columns 9 to 12 is the number of major layoff or downsizing news releases filed through 8-K filings.  Contract year is 
a dummy variable that equals one for the one-year period leading to the contract ending date and zero for the one-year period before 
or after.  Control variables include firm size, Q, leverage, and operating performance.  Robust standard errors clustered by firm are 
in parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Number of negative news releases 
reported in Capital IQ 
Number of layoff/downsizing news releases 
reported in Capital IQ 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Contract year? -0.302** -0.300** -0.320** -0.339** -0.282** -0.280** -0.303** -0.322** 
 (0.142) (0.141) (0.146) (0.169) (0.130) (0.131) (0.133) (0.152) 
Log assets  0.534*** 0.490*** 0.473*  0.530*** 0.513*** 0.300 
  (0.166) (0.170) (0.265)  (0.162) (0.166) (0.245) 
Q  0.156 0.130 -0.284  0.168 0.169 -0.252 
  (0.183) (0.202) (0.244)  (0.175) (0.190) (0.235) 
Financial leverage  0.046 -0.121 -0.419  0.199 0.079 -0.200 
  (0.473) (0.485) (1.101)  (0.428) (0.447) (1.039) 
Operating performance  1.257 1.153 0.588  1.170 1.005 0.644 
  (2.029) (2.107) (2.018)  (1.931) (1.970) (1.818) 
Year FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No No Yes No No No Yes 
# Obs 439 439 439 439 439 439 439 439 
R-squared 0.005 0.110 0.185 0.597 0.005 0.120 0.185 0.628 
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Table 3.4 (cont.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Number of major layoff/downsizing news 
filed in 8-K 
 
(9) (10) (11) (12) 
Contract year? -0.073** -0.075** -0.079** -0.081** 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.037) 
Log assets  -0.025 -0.042 -0.042 
  (0.027) (0.033) (0.160) 
Q  -0.001 -0.015 -0.100 
  (0.053) (0.046) (0.144) 
Financial leverage  -0.069 -0.139 -0.653 
  (0.116) (0.134) (0.658) 
Operating performance  -0.414 -0.412 -0.091 
  (0.412) (0.386) (1.034) 
Year FE No No Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No No Yes 
# Obs 439 439 439 439 
R-squared 0.006 0.013 0.056 0.376 
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Table 3.5 Acquirer announcement returns 
This table reports results of OLS regressions for acquirer announcement returns around the CEO contract year.  The 
dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return over the three-day event window (CAR [-1, +1]) for the acquirer.  
Contract year is a dummy variable that equals one if the acquisition takes place in the one-year period leading up to 
the contract ending date and zero if the acquisition takes place in the one-year period before or after.  Control variables 
include the size, Q, leverage, and operating performance of the acquirer, the relative size of the acquisition, and dummy 
variables indicating whether the transaction is financed 100 percent with stock, whether the acquirer and the target are 
in related industries, and whether the target is a public firm.  Robust standard errors clustered by firm are in 
parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level.   
  CAR [-1, +1] 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Contract year? 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
Log assets  -0.001 -0.002 0.005 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.014) 
Q  -0.004 -0.004 -0.014 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.013) 
Financial leverage  -0.001 -0.003 -0.074 
  (0.016) (0.017) (0.058) 
Operating performance  0.052 0.045 0.232* 
  (0.063) (0.068) (0.127) 
Relative transaction value  0.009 0.005 -0.023 
  (0.031) (0.032) (0.050) 
Pure stock deal?  -0.013 -0.012 -0.008 
  (0.015) (0.018) (0.029) 
Related deal?  0.001 0.002 0.009 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
Public target?  -0.016** -0.018** -0.023** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) 
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes 
Number of observations 264 264 264 264 
R-squared 0.028 0.082 0.134 0.511 
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Table 3.6 Behavior of CEOs that are bound to leave office upon contract expiration 
This table reports estimates from the difference-in-differences analysis that compares firm policy changes around the contract year 
for CEOs who are bound to leave office upon contract expiration (“departing CEOs”) and CEOs in our main sample.  Panels A, B, 
and C focus on earnings management (abnormal accruals), the propensity to meet or narrowly beat consensus EPS forecasts, and 
acquirer announcement returns, respectively.  For departing CEOs, Non-contract year is the year before the contract year.  For 
CEOs in our main sample, Non-contract year denotes the year before and the year after the contract year.  Robust standard errors 
clustered by firm are in parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level.  
Earnings management 
  Non-contract year Contract year Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) = (2) - (1) 
Departing CEOs 0.009 0.000 -0.009 
    (N=142) (0.009) (0.004) (0.009) 
Main sample CEOs 0.002 0.015*** 0.013*** 
    (N=1,225) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Difference  
  Difference-in-Differences 
    Departing CEOs - Main sample CEOs 0.007 -0.015*** -0.022** 
  (0.009) (0.005) (0.010) 
 
Propensity to meet or narrowly beat consensus EPS forecasts 
 
  Non-contract year Contract year Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) = (2) - (1) 
Departing CEOs 0.195*** 0.122*** -0.073 
    (N=164) (0.038) (0.034) (0.044) 
Main sample CEOs 0.169*** 0.223*** 0.054** 
    (N=1,714) (0.016) (0.025) (0.024) 
Difference    Difference-in-Differences 
    Departing CEOs - Main sample CEOs 0.026 -0.101** -0.127** 
  (0.040) (0.042) (0.049) 
 
Acquirer announcement returns 
  Non-contract year Contract year Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) = (2) - (1) 
Departing CEOs 0.001 -0.005 -0.005 
    (N=24) (0.008) (0.003) (0.008) 
Main sample CEOs -0.005* 0.008** 0.013*** 
    (N=275) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Difference    Difference-in-Differences 
    Departing CEOs - Main sample CEOs 0.006 -0.013*** -0.018** 
  (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) 
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Table 3.7 Behavior of a matched sample of CEOs around the pseudo contract year 
This table reports estimates from the difference-in-differences analysis that compares firm policy changes for a sample of CEOs 
matched to the main sample by industry, tenure, and year (“matching CEOs”) around the pseudo contract year and CEOs in our 
main sample around the actual contract year.  Panels A, B, C, and D focus on earnings management (abnormal accruals), the 
propensity to meet or narrowly beat consensus EPS forecasts, negative news release, and acquirer announcement returns, 
respectively.  Non-contract year denotes the year before and the year after the (actual or pseudo) contract year.  Robust standard 
errors clustered by firm are in parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level.  
Earnings management 
  Non-contract year Contract year Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) = (2) - (1) 
Matching CEOs 0.008** 0.010*** 0.002 
    (N=1,057) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Main sample CEOs 0.004 0.020*** 0.016*** 
    (N=1,012) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Difference    Difference-in-Differences 
     Matching CEOs - Main sample CEOs 0.005 -0.010 -0.014** 
  (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
 Propensity to meet or narrowly beat consensus EPS forecasts 
  Non-contract year Contract year Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) = (2) - (1) 
Matching CEOs 0.228*** 0.207*** -0.021 
    (N=1,492) (0.024) (0.030) (0.022) 
Main sample CEOs 0.161*** 0.215*** 0.054** 
    (N=1,412) (0.017) (0.027) (0.027) 
Difference    Difference-in-Differences 
    Matching CEOs - Main sample CEOs 0.067** -0.008 -0.075** 
  (0.029) (0.040) (0.036) 
 
  Negative news release 
  Non-contract year Contract year Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) = (2) - (1) 
Matching CEOs 0.445*** 0.473*** 0.027 
    (N=438) (0.086) (0.121) (0.084) 
Main sample CEOs 0.842*** 0.590*** -0.252* 
    (N=417) (0.161) (0.108) (0.130) 
Difference    Difference-in-Differences 
    Matching CEOs - Main sample CEOs -0.397** -0.117 0.279* 
  (0.176) (0.148) (0.157) 
 
 Acquirer announcement returns 
  Non-contract year Contract year Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) = (2) - (1) 
Matching CEOs -0.000 -0.003 -0.003 
    (N=150) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
Main sample CEOs -0.005* 0.009** 0.014*** 
    (N=203) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Difference    Difference-in-Differences 
    Matching CEOs - Main sample CEOs 0.005 -0.012* -0.017** 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
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Table 3.8 Relation between earnings manipulation in the contract year and subsequent contract 
terms 
This table reports regression results for the relation between the extent of CEOs’ earnings manipulation in the contract year and 
improvements in the contract terms of their new employment agreement after renewal.  Columns 1 through 3 present estimates 
from Probit regressions (with marginal effects reported) in which the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
contract length is improved in the new employment agreement and zero otherwise.  The contract length is considered improved if 
the new contract length is greater than the old one or if the new employment contract switches from a fixed-term contract to a 
contract with indefinite term.  Columns 4 through 6 present estimates from Probit regressions (with marginal effects reported) in 
which the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO’s severance package improves in the new contract 
and zero otherwise.  Severance is considered improved if the amount of severance pay specified in the new contract is greater than 
that in the old contract or if the circumstances under which the CEO can receive severance pay upon leaving post become broader.  
Columns 7 through 9 present estimates from OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is the difference between the sum 
of salary and bonus specified in the new contract versus the sum of salary and bonus the CEO earns in the last year of the current 
contract, scaled by the sum of salary and bonus in the last year of the current contract.  Incremental earnings management intensity 
in the contract year is defined as the difference between the average abnormal accruals in the contract year and the non-contract 
years, scaled by the average abnormal accruals in the non-contract years.  Control variables include firm size, Q, leverage, and 
operating performance.  Robust standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 
1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
  Improved contract length? Improved severance? Change in salary and bonus 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Incremental earnings 
  management intensity 
  in the contract year 0.018** 0.015** 0.023*** 0.014*** 0.012** 0.017** 0.049** 0.043* 0.039* 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) 
Log assets  0.051* 0.034  -0.002 0.005  0.010 -0.033 
  (0.029) (0.029)  (0.022) (0.026)  (0.150) (0.148) 
Q  0.010 -0.037  -0.008 -0.008  -0.072 -0.052 
  (0.058) (0.066)  (0.031) (0.043)  (0.115) (0.160) 
Financial leverage  0.646*** 0.614***  0.119 0.176  -0.280 -0.260 
  (0.184) (0.220)  (0.141) (0.180)  (0.361) (0.510) 
Operating performance  0.589 0.992*  0.446 0.567  1.917 2.386 
  (0.570) (0.601)  (0.353) (0.425)  (1.478) (1.641) 
Year fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Number of observations 132 132 120 132 132 103 132 132 132 
R-squared 0.050 0.161 0.184 0.082 0.100 0.184 0.034 0.044 0.139 
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APPENDIX A: DETERMINISTIC AND PUBLICLY OBSERVABLE PRODUCTIVITY 
A1 Proof of Lemma 1.1 
 I speculate 𝑤(𝑋) is linear in 𝑋. Notice that 𝑈 and 𝑉 are independent of 𝑋. From the HJB 
equations in (1.5), (1.7), (1.10) and free-entry condition, multiply both sides of (1.5) by 𝛽. 
𝛽𝑟𝐸(𝑋) = 𝛽 [(𝜃𝑋 − 𝑓 − 𝑐 − 𝑤) + 𝜇𝑋𝐸′(𝑋) +
1
2
𝜎2𝐸″(𝑋) − 𝑠𝐸(𝑋)] (𝐴. 1) 
and multiply the difference between (1.7) and (1.10) by 1 − 𝛽. 
(1 − 𝛽)𝑟[𝑊(𝑋) − 𝑈] = (1 − 𝛽) {
𝑤 + 𝜇𝑋𝑊′(𝑋) +
1
2
𝜎2𝑋2𝑊′′(𝑋) − 𝑠[𝑊(𝑋) − 𝑈] −
𝑏 − 𝑔(𝜖)[𝑊(𝑋0) − 𝑈]
} (𝐴. 2) 
By (1.16), (A.1) is equal to (A.2), and using (1.17) and (1.18) in the main text and simplifying, I 
have proved (1.19). || 
A2 Proof of Proposition 1.1 
Notice that the homogeneous part of (1. 22) and (1. 23) is a Cauchy-Euler equation, and the 
general solution takes the form: 
𝑆𝐻𝐺(𝑋) = 𝐴𝑋
𝜈 + ?̃?𝑋?̃? 
where 𝜈 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ?̃? are negative and positive solutions of the equation 𝜈(𝜈 − 1) +
2𝜇
𝜎2
𝜈 −
2𝛿
𝜎2
= 0. 
The general solution of (1.22) and (1.23) takes the form85: 
𝑆(𝑋) = 𝜃𝛱(𝑋) − 𝐹 −
𝑐 + 𝑏 − 𝜅 + [𝑔𝛽 + ℎ(1 − 𝛽)]𝑆0 + ℎ𝐷0
𝛿
+ 𝐴𝑋𝜈
= 𝜃𝛱(𝑋) − 𝐹 −
𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈 + 𝑟𝑉
𝛿
+ 𝐴𝑋𝜈                                             (𝐴. 3)
 
By “value-matching” condition: 
            −𝐴𝑋𝜈 = 𝜃𝛱(𝑋) − 𝐹 −
𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈 + 𝑟𝑉
𝛿
 
                                                        
85 Notice that ?̃? = 0 by “no-bubble” condition. 
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𝐴 = −𝑋−𝜈 [𝜃𝛱(𝑋) − 𝐹 −
𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈 + 𝑟𝑉
𝛿
] (𝐴. 4) 
Bringing (A.4) to (A.3), I have obtained (1.25) in Proposition 1.1.  
𝑆′(𝑋)|𝑋=𝑋 = 0 
From (1.25), taking derivatives with respect to 𝑋 and by “smooth-pasting” condition, I 
have  
𝜃
𝛿 − 𝜇
− [𝜃𝛱(𝑋) − 𝐹 −
𝑐 + 𝑏 − 𝜅 + [𝑔𝛽 + ℎ(1 − 𝛽)]𝑆0 + ℎ𝐷0
𝛿
] (
𝜈
𝑋
) = 0 
(1 − 𝜈)𝜃𝛱(𝑋) = −𝜈 [𝐹 +
𝑐 + 𝑏 − 𝜅 + [𝑔𝛽 + ℎ(1 − 𝛽)]𝑆0 + ℎ𝐷0
𝛿
] 
𝑋 =
−𝜈
1 − 𝜈
𝛿 − 𝜇
𝜃
[𝐹 +
𝑐 + 𝑏 − 𝜅 + [𝑔𝛽 + ℎ(1 − 𝛽)]𝑆0 + ℎ𝐷0
𝛿
]
=
−𝜈
1 − 𝜈
𝛿 − 𝜇
𝜃 
[𝐹 +
𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈 + 𝑟𝑉
𝛿
]                                             (𝐴. 5)
 
The last line gives (1.26) in Proposition 1.1. In equilibrium, by free-entry condition of the firms, 
𝑉 = 0, bringing the free-entry condition to (1.25) and (1.26) yields (1.27) and (1.28) in Proposition 
1.1. || 
A3 Proof of Proposition 1.2 
A3.1 First order condition  
The optimal coupon rate 𝑐 solves the constrained maximization problem defined by (1.29).  
First, I solve several quantities that will facilitate the calculation of the first order condition. The 
derivative of  𝑋 with respect to 𝑐, 𝑋(𝑐), from (1.28), is                                           
𝑋(𝑐) =
−𝜈
1 − 𝜈
𝛿 − 𝜇
𝜃
1
𝛿
(𝐴. 6) 
It is convenient to calculate some quantities that I use repeatedly in this appendix. From (1.28), 
𝜃𝛱(𝑋) = 𝜃
𝑋
𝛿 − 𝜇
=
𝜃
𝛿 − 𝜇
−𝜈
1 − 𝜈
𝛿 − 𝜇
𝜃
𝛿𝐹 + 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
𝛿
=
−𝜈
1 − 𝜈
𝛿𝐹 + 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
𝛿
(𝐴. 7) 
𝜃𝛱(𝑋) −
𝛿𝐹 + 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
𝛿
=
−𝜈
1 − 𝜈
𝛿𝐹 + 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
𝛿
−
𝛿𝐹 + 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
𝛿
= −
𝛿𝐹 + 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
(1 − 𝜈)𝛿
(𝐴. 8) 
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 From (1.28) and (𝐴. 6), 
𝜕
𝜕𝑐
 (
𝑋
𝑋
)
𝜈
= (
𝑋
𝑋
)
𝜈
 (−𝜈)
1 − 𝜈
−𝜈
𝜃
𝛿 − 𝜇
𝛿
𝛿𝐹 + 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
−𝜈
1 − 𝜈
 
𝛿 − 𝜇
𝜃
1
𝛿
= (
𝑋
𝑋
)
𝜈
−𝜈
𝛿𝐹 + 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
(A. 9) 
From (1.27) and (A.8), the matching surplus function 𝑆(𝑋) becomes 
𝑆(𝑋) = 𝜃𝛱(𝑋) − 𝐹 −
𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
𝛿
+
𝛿𝐹 + 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
(1 − 𝜈)𝛿
(
𝑋
𝑋
)
𝜈
(𝐴. 10) 
and from (A.9) and (A.10), in equilibrium, its derivative with respect to 𝑐 is  
𝑆(𝑐)(𝑋) = −
1
𝛿
+
𝛿𝐹 + 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
(1 − 𝜈)𝛿
(
𝑋
𝑋
)
𝜈
−𝜈
𝛿𝐹 + 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
+
1
(1 − 𝜈)𝛿
 (
𝑋
𝑋
)
𝜈
= −
1
𝛿
+
1
𝛿
(
𝑋
𝑋
)
𝜈
= −
1
𝛿
(1 − (
𝑋
𝑋
)
𝜈
)                           (𝐴. 11)
 
From (1.3) and (A.8), the value of debt contract 𝐷(𝑋) is  
𝐷(𝑋) =
𝑐
𝛿
− (
𝑐
𝛿
− (1 − 𝛼) (𝜃𝛱(𝑋) − 𝐹 −
𝑟𝑈
𝛿
)) (
𝑋
𝑋
)
𝜈
                        =
𝑐
𝛿
− (
𝛼𝑐
𝛿
− (1 − 𝛼) (𝜃𝛱(𝑋) −
𝛿𝐹 + 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
𝛿
)) (
𝑋
𝑋
)
𝜈
=
𝑐
𝛿
− (
𝛼𝑐
𝛿
+ (1 − 𝛼)
𝛿𝐹 + 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
(1 − 𝜈)𝛿
) (
𝑋
𝑋
)
𝜈
(𝐴. 12)
 
Bringing (A.9) into (A.12), the derivative of 𝐷𝑘(𝑋) with respect to 𝑐𝑘, 𝐷𝑘
(𝑐)(𝑋), is  
𝐷(𝑐)(𝑋) =
1
𝛿
− (
𝛼
𝛿
+
1 − 𝛼
(1 − 𝜈)𝛿
) (
𝑋
𝑋
)
𝜈
− (
𝛼𝑐
𝛿
+ (1 − 𝛼)
𝛿𝐹 + 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
(1 − 𝜈)𝛿
) 
−𝜈
𝛿𝐹 + 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
(
𝑋
𝑋
)
𝜈
=
1
𝛿
−
1
𝛿
(𝛼 +
1 − 𝛼
1 − 𝜈
−
𝜈(1 − 𝛼)
1 − 𝜈
) (
𝑋
𝑋
)
𝜈
+
𝛼𝜈
𝛿
𝑐
𝛿𝐹 + 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
(
𝑋
𝑋
)
𝜈
                 
=
1
𝛿
−
1
𝛿
(
𝑋
𝑋
)
𝜈
+  
𝛼𝜈
𝛿
𝑐
𝛿𝐹 + 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
(
𝑋
𝑋
)
𝜈
                                                               
=
1
𝛿
[1 − (1 − 𝛼𝜈
𝑐
𝛿𝐹 + 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
) (
𝑋
𝑋
)
𝜈
]                                                                (𝐴. 13)
 
From (1.29), the first order condition of the maximization problem (1.29) with respect to 𝑐 is  
ℎ(𝜖(𝑈, 𝑐))[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0 (𝑐) + 𝐷0 (𝑐)] + ℎ(𝑐)(𝜖(𝑈, 𝑐))[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0 + 𝐷0 ] = 0 (𝐴. 14) 
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where 𝑆0, 𝐷0, 𝑆0(𝑐)  and 𝐷0(𝑐)  is specified by (A.10), (A.12), (A.11), and (A.13), respectively, 
with 𝑋 = 𝑋0, and ℎ(𝜖(𝑈, 𝑐)) is such that  𝜖ℎ(𝜖) = 𝑔(𝜖) =
𝑟𝑈−𝑏
𝛽𝑆0
. Simple algebraic manipulation 
gives (1. 30). 
From Section 1.2.3, ℎ = ℎ(𝜖) = ℎ(𝑔−1(𝑔)) = ℎ(𝑔), where ℎ′(𝑔) < 0 . Differentiating 
(1.10) with respect to 𝑐 on both sides86, I have  
𝑔(𝑐)𝛽𝑆0 + 𝑔𝛽𝑆0 (𝑐) = 0 (𝐴. 15)                                                  
thereby proving the first order condition in Proposition 1.2. || 
A3.2 The second order condition for optimal coupon rate 𝑐  
It is obvious that the objective function in (1.29) is continuously differentiable, and the set 
of viable coupon rate 𝑐 is a closed interval in 𝑅+, i.e., 𝑐 ∈ [0, 𝑐̅], which is closed and bounded. 
Obviously, one candidate of 𝑐̅ is value of 𝑐  such that 𝑋 = 𝑋0 . In other words, default occurs 
immediately after matching. Therefore, the maximization problem is well defined and a maximizer 
𝑐 exists.  
The second order derivative on the left hand side of (1.30) with respect to 𝑐 at the optimal 
𝑐 is 
ℎ [
1
𝛿
(𝛼𝜈
𝛿𝐹 + 𝑟𝑈 − 𝜈𝑐
(𝛿𝐹 + 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈)2
+ 𝛽
𝜈
𝛿𝐹 + 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
) (
𝑋0
𝑋
)
𝜈
 ]
+2ℎ(𝑔)𝑔(𝑐) [
𝛽
𝛿
+
1
𝛿
(𝛼𝜈
𝑐
𝛿𝐹 + 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
− 𝛽) (
𝑋0
𝑋
)
𝜈
]
+ [ℎ(𝑔)𝑔(𝑐𝑐) + ℎ(𝑔𝑔)(𝑔(𝑐))
2
] [(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0 + 𝐷0]     (A. 16)
 
Notice that the first two terms of (A.16) are obviously negative. Take the second-order 
derivative of 𝑔(𝜖(𝑐, 𝑈)) with respect to 𝑐: 
𝑔(𝑐𝑐) = −𝑔(𝑐)
𝑆0 (𝑐)
𝑆0
− 𝑔
𝑆0 (𝑐𝑐)𝑆0 − (𝑆0(𝑐))2 
(𝑆0)2
 
                                                        
86 Notice that in equilibrium, 𝑈 only depends on the aggregate debt level. 
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The first term of 𝑔(𝑐𝑐) is greater than zero. In order to have 𝑔(𝑐𝑐) > 0, the second term must be 
smaller than zero87, i.e., 
𝑆0 (𝑐)
𝑆0
 is decreasing in 𝑐. To ensure ℎ(𝑔𝑔)(𝑔(𝑐))2 < 0, I need ℎ(𝑔𝑔) < 0.  In 
sum, I have proved Proposition 1.2. || 
A4 Proof of Proposition 1.3 
Again, the homogenous part of ODE (1.32) is a Cauchy-Euler equation, which admits a 
general form of solution:  
𝑇𝐻𝐺(𝑋) = 𝐻𝑋
𝜌 + ?̃?𝑋?̃? 
where 𝜌 and ?̃? is negative and positive solution to 
1
2
𝜎2?̅?(?̅? − 1) + 𝜇?̅? − 𝑠 = 0, respectively. 
𝜌 = (
1
2
−
𝜇
𝜎2
) − √(
1
2
−
𝜇
𝜎2
)
2
+
2𝑠
𝜎2
   and   ?̃? = (
1
2
−
𝜇
𝜎2
) + √(
1
2
−
𝜇
𝜎2
)
2
+
2𝑠
𝜎2
 
Therefore, the general solution of the boundary problem (1.32) and (1.33) takes the form 
𝑇(𝑋) = 𝐻𝑋𝜌 + ?̃?𝑋?̃? +
1
𝑠
(𝐴. 17) 
Since 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑋→∞
𝑇(𝑋) =
1
𝑠
< ∞, I have ?̃? = 0. 𝐻 can be determined by another boundary condition 
𝑇(𝑋) = 0.  
𝐻𝑋𝜌 +
1
𝑠
= 0 ⇒ 𝐻 = −
1
𝑠
 𝑋−𝜌 (𝐴. 18) 
Bringing (A.18) to (A.17) leads to (1.34). ||  
A5 Proof of Proposition 1.4  
From Gabaix (2009), the general solution of (1. 36) is 
𝒻𝑖(𝑋) = 𝜁−
𝑖 𝑋−𝑚0−1 + 𝜁+
𝑖 𝑋−𝑚1−1   𝑋 ≠ 𝑋0 (𝐴. 19)                               
where 𝑖 ∈ {0,1}, in which 𝒻0(𝑋) represents the probability density function for 𝑋 ∈ [𝑋, 𝑋0) and 
𝒻1(𝑋)  represents the probability density function for 𝑋 ∈ (𝑋0, ∞] . In (A.19), 𝑚0  and 𝑚1  is 
                                                        
87 Notice that ℎ(𝑔) < 0 by assumption. 
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negative and positive root for the equation 
𝜎2
2
𝑚(𝑚 − 1) + 𝜇𝑚 − 𝑠 = 0, respectively, from which 
I get the expressions for 𝑚0 and 𝑚1 in Proposition 1.4.  
By the definition of probability density function, the expression ∫ 𝒻(𝑋)𝑑𝑋
∞
𝑋
 must be 
integrable. From which, I have: 
∫ 𝒻(𝑋)𝑑𝑋
∞
𝑋
= 𝒻(𝑋0) + ∫ 𝒻
0(𝑋)𝑑𝑋
𝑋0
𝑋
+ ∫ 𝒻1(𝑋)𝑑𝑋
∞
𝑋0
< ∞ (𝐴. 20) 
From (A.19), I have 𝜁−
1 = 0, otherwise ∫ 𝒻1(𝑋)𝑑𝑋
∞
𝑋0
 explodes as 𝑋 → ∞88. 
From (1.37), I have 𝜁−
0𝑋−𝑚0−1 + 𝜁+
0𝑋−𝑚1−1 = 0, i.e.,  
𝜁+
0 = −𝜁−
0𝑋−𝑚0−1𝑋𝑚1+1 
= −𝜁−
0𝑋𝑚1−𝑚0 
The two remaining unknown coefficients 𝜁+
1 and 𝜁−
0 are determined by (1.38) and (1.39). Letting 
𝜁 ≔ 𝜁+
1  and 𝜁 ≔ 𝜁−
0, we have (1.40) in Proposition 1.4. In what following, I will solve 𝜁 and 𝜁 
explicitly. The solution procedure consists of several steps. 
Firstly, using (1.40), I obtain the left and right derivatives of 𝑓(𝑋) with respected to 𝑋 at 
𝑋 = 𝑋0. 
𝑓′(𝑋0 −) = −𝜁(𝑚0 + 1)𝑋0
−𝑚0−2 + 𝜁(𝑚1 + 1)𝑋0
−𝑚0−2 (
𝑋
𝑋0
)
𝑚1−𝑚0
(𝐴. 21) 
𝑓′(𝑋0 +) = −𝜁(𝑚1 + 1)𝑋0
−𝑚1−2 (𝐴. 22) 
 Secondly, using (1.40), I obtain the integral of 𝑓(𝑋) over the domain of viable 𝑋. 
                                                        
88 ∫ 𝒻1(𝑋)𝑑𝑋 = −
𝜁−
1
𝑚−
𝑋−𝑚−  |𝑋0
∞  
∞
𝑋0
−
𝜁+
1
𝑚+
𝑋−𝑚+  |𝑋0
∞ , from which I could see that if 𝜁−
1 ≠ 0, the first term explodes as 
𝑋 → ∞. 
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∫ 𝑓(𝑋)𝑑𝑋
𝑋0
𝑋
= ∫ (𝜁𝑋−𝑚0−1 − 𝜁𝑋𝑚1−𝑚0𝑋−𝑚1−1)𝑑𝑋
𝑋0
𝑋
                           = 𝜁 (−
1
𝑚0
𝑋−𝑚0 + 𝑋𝑚1−𝑚0
1
𝑚1
𝑋−𝑚1) |𝑋
𝑋0  
                                              = 𝜁 [
1
𝑚1
𝑋−𝑚0 ((
𝑋
𝑋0
)
𝑚1
− 1) +
1
𝑚0
(𝑋−𝑚0 − 𝑋0
−𝑚0)] (𝐴. 23)
 
Similarly, 
∫ 𝑓(𝑋)𝑑𝑋
∞
𝑋0
= ∫ 𝜁𝑋−𝑚1−1𝑑𝑋
∞
𝑋0
= 𝜁 (−
1
𝑚1
) 𝑋−𝑚1|𝑋0
∞ =
𝜁
𝑚1
𝑋0
−𝑚1 (𝐴. 24) 
Thirdly, I obtain the right derivatives of 𝑓(𝑋) with respected to 𝑋 at 𝑋 = 𝑋. 
𝑓′(𝑋 +) = 𝜁(𝑚1 − 𝑚0)𝑋
−𝑚0−2 (𝐴. 25) 
Fourthly, I express boundary conditions (1.38) and (1.39) from (A.21) — (A.25). (1.38) 
becomes 
                                                        𝜁𝛬1 − 𝜁𝛬2 = 𝑠𝜁𝛬3 + 𝑠𝜁𝛬4 + 𝜁𝛬5 
⇔ (𝛬1 − 𝑠𝛬3 − 𝛬5)𝜁 − (𝛬2 + 𝑠𝛬4)𝜁 = 0 (𝐴. 26) 
and (1.39) becomes 
                                                        𝑔 − 𝑔(𝜁𝛬3 + 𝜁𝛬4) = 𝑠𝜁𝛬3 + 𝑠𝜁𝛬4 + 𝜁𝛬5 
⇔ [(𝑔 + 𝑠)𝛬3 + 𝛬5]𝜁 + (𝑔 + 𝑠)𝛬4𝜁 = 𝑔 (𝐴. 27) 
The parameters 𝛬𝑖, 𝑖 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} are defined as follows: 
𝛬1 =
1
2
𝜎2 [−(𝑚0 + 1) + (𝑚1 + 1) (
𝑋
𝑋0
)
𝑚1−𝑚0
] 𝑋0
−𝑚0 (𝐴. 28) 
𝛬2 = −
1
2
𝜎2(𝑚1 + 1)𝑋0
−𝑚1 (𝐴. 29) 
𝛬3 = ∫ 𝑋
−𝑚0−1 [1 − (
𝑋
𝑋
)
𝑚1−𝑚0
] 𝑑𝑋
𝑋0
𝑋
=
1
𝑚1
𝑋−𝑚0 ((
𝑋
𝑋0
)
𝑚1
− 1) +
1
𝑚0
(𝑋−𝑚0 − 𝑋0
−𝑚0)(𝐴. 30) 
𝛬4 = ∫ 𝑋
−𝑚1−1𝑑𝑋
∞
𝑋0
=
1
𝑚1
𝑋0
−𝑚1 (𝐴. 31) 
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𝛬5 =
𝜎2
2
(𝑚1 − 𝑚0)𝑋
−𝑚0 (𝐴. 32) 
 (A.26) and (A.27) pin down 𝜁 and 𝜁. It can be shown that 𝑓(𝑋0 +) = 𝑓(𝑋0−), in other 
words, 𝑓(𝑋) is continuous at 𝑋0. Therefore, 𝜁 and 𝜁 are positive and unique. || 
A6 Proof of Proposition 1.5 
A6.1 First order condition 
The proof of the first order condition (1.46) is the same as the proof of first order condition 
(1.30) in the baseline case. Therefore, I focus on the solutions of 𝑔(𝑐) and 𝑒(𝑐) in this appendix 
section. 
Taking the derivative with respect to 𝑐 on both sides of (1.43), notice that 𝑈 only depends 
on 𝑐 through 𝑒, by the envelope theorem 
𝑔𝛽𝑆0(𝑐) + 𝑔(𝑐)𝛽𝑆0 − 𝑙′(𝑒)𝑒(𝑐) = 0 (𝐴. 33) 
Taking the derivative with respect to 𝑐 on both sides of (1.44), 
𝑔(𝑒)𝛽𝑆0(𝑐) + (𝑔(𝑒𝑒)𝑒(𝑐) + 𝑔(𝑒𝑔)𝑔(𝑐))𝛽𝑆0 − 𝑙″(𝑒)𝑒(𝑐) = 0  
Collecting terms yields 
𝑔(𝑒)𝛽𝑆0(𝑐) + 𝑔(𝑒𝑔)𝛽𝑆0𝑔(𝑐) + (𝑔(𝑒𝑒)𝛽𝑆0 − 𝑙″(𝑒)) 𝑒(𝑐) = 0 (𝐴. 34) 
Solving 𝑔(𝑐) and 𝑒(𝑐) from (A.33) and (A.34) we have  
𝑔(𝑐) =
𝛤3𝛤5 − 𝛤2𝛤6
𝛤1𝛤5 − 𝛤2𝛤4
(𝐴. 35) 
and  
𝑒(𝑐) =
𝛤1𝛤6 − 𝛤3𝛤4
𝛤1𝛤5 − 𝛤2𝛤4
(𝐴. 36) 
where 𝛤1 = 𝛽𝑆
0 , 𝛤2 = −𝑙′(𝑒), 𝛤3 = −𝑔𝛽𝑆
0(𝑐) , 𝛤4 = 𝑔
(𝑒𝑔)𝛽𝑆0 , 𝛤5 = 𝑔
(𝑒𝑒)𝛽𝑆0 − 𝑙″(𝑒) and 𝛤6 =
−𝑔(𝑒)𝛽𝑆0(𝑐). || 
A6.2 Second order condition 
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The first term of the second order condition is similar to that of (A.16), except for the fact 
that ℎ now also depends on 𝑒 in additional to 𝑔. The second term of the second order condition is 
similar to that of (A.16) except that ℎ(𝑔)𝑔(𝑐) is replaced by ℎ(𝑒)𝑒(𝑐) + ℎ(𝑔)𝑔(𝑐). The first two terms 
are smaller than zero. The third term of the second order condition is the same as that of (A.16) 
except that ℎ(𝑔)𝑔(𝑐𝑐) + ℎ(𝑔𝑔)(𝑔(𝑐))
2
 is replaced by  
ℎ(𝑐𝑐)(𝑒, 𝑔) = ℎ(𝑒𝑒)(𝑒(𝑐))
2
+ ℎ(𝑒𝑔)𝑔(𝑐)𝑒(𝑐) + ℎ(𝑒)𝑒(𝑐𝑐) + ℎ(𝑔𝑔)(𝑔(𝑐))
2
+ ℎ(𝑔𝑒)𝑒(𝑐)𝑔(𝑐) + ℎ(𝑔)𝑔(𝑐𝑐)
                     = ℎ(𝑒𝑒)(𝑒(𝑐))
2
+ ℎ(𝑔𝑔)(𝑔(𝑐))
2
+ 2ℎ(𝑒𝑔)𝑒(𝑐)𝑔(𝑐) + ℎ(𝑒)𝑒(𝑐𝑐) + ℎ(𝑔)𝑔(𝑐𝑐)               (𝐴. 37)
 
The third term is smaller than zero if ℎ(𝑐𝑐)(𝑒, 𝑔) < 0 . The remaining part of this subsection 
calculates 𝑔(𝑐𝑐) and  𝑒(𝑐𝑐). 
Take derivative with respect to 𝑐 on both sides of (A.33) 
𝑔(𝑐)𝛽𝑆0(𝑐) + 𝑔𝛽𝑆0(𝑐𝑐) + 𝑔(𝑐𝑐)𝛽𝑆0 + 𝑔(𝑐)𝛽𝑆0(𝑐) − 𝑙″(𝑒)(𝑒(𝑐))
2
− 𝑙′(𝑒)𝑒(𝑐𝑐) = 0 
Collecting terms yields 
−𝛽𝑆0𝑔(𝑐𝑐) + 𝑙′(𝑒)𝑒(𝑐𝑐) = 𝑔𝛽𝑆0(𝑐𝑐) + 2𝑔(𝑐)𝛽𝑆0(𝑐) − 𝑙″(𝑒)(𝑒(𝑐))
2
(𝐴. 38) 
Take derivative with respect to 𝑐 on both sides of (A.34) 
𝑔(𝑒)𝛽𝑆0(𝑐𝑐) + (𝑔(𝑒𝑒)𝑒(𝑐) + 𝑔(𝑒𝑔)𝑔(𝑐))𝛽𝑆0(𝑐) + 𝑔(𝑒𝑔)𝑔(𝑐)𝛽𝑆0(𝑐) + 𝑔(𝑒𝑔)𝑔(𝑐𝑐)𝛽𝑆0 +
(𝑔(𝑒𝑔𝑒)𝑒(𝑐) + 𝑔(𝑒𝑔𝑔)𝑔(𝑐))𝛽𝑆0𝑔(𝑐) +
(𝑔(𝑒𝑒𝑒)𝑒(𝑐)𝛽𝑆0 + 𝑔(𝑒𝑒𝑔)𝑔(𝑐)𝛽𝑆0 + 𝑔(𝑒𝑒)𝛽𝑆0(𝑐) − 𝑙‴(𝑒)𝑒(𝑐))𝑒(𝑐) +
(𝑔(𝑒𝑒)𝛽𝑆0 − 𝑙″(𝑒)) 𝑒(𝑐𝑐) = 0
 
Collecting terms yields 
−𝑔(𝑒𝑔)𝛽𝑆0𝑔(𝑐𝑐) + (𝑙″(𝑒) − 𝑔(𝑒𝑒)𝛽𝑆0)𝑒(𝑐𝑐) =
𝑔(𝑒)𝛽𝑆0(𝑐𝑐) + 2(𝑔(𝑒𝑒)𝑒(𝑐) + 𝑔(𝑒𝑔)𝑔(𝑐))𝛽𝑆0(𝑐) + (𝑔(𝑒𝑔𝑒)𝑒(𝑐) + 𝑔(𝑒𝑔𝑔)𝑔(𝑐))𝛽𝑆0𝑔(𝑐) +
(𝑔(𝑒𝑒𝑒)𝑒(𝑐)𝛽𝑆0 + 𝑔(𝑒𝑒𝑔)𝑔(𝑐)𝛽𝑆0 − 𝑙‴(𝑒)𝑒(𝑐))𝑒(𝑐) (𝐴. 39)
 
Solving 𝑔(𝑐𝑐) and 𝑒(𝑐𝑐) from (A.38) and (A.39) we have  
𝑔(𝑐𝑐) =
𝛥3𝛥5 − 𝛥2𝛥6
𝛥1𝛥5 − 𝛥2𝛥4
(𝐴. 40) 
𝑒(𝑐𝑐) =
𝛥1𝛥6 − 𝛥3𝛥4
𝛥1𝛥5 − 𝛥2𝛥4
(𝐴. 41) 
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where Δ1 = −𝛽𝑆
0 , Δ2 = 𝑙′(𝑒), Δ3 = 𝑅𝐻𝑆 𝑜𝑓 (A. 38) , Δ4 = −𝑔
(𝑒𝑔)𝛽𝑆0 , Δ5 = 𝑙
″(𝑒) − 𝑔(𝑒𝑒)𝛽𝑆0 
and Δ6 = 𝑅𝐻𝑆 𝑜𝑓 (A. 39). || 
A7 Numerical example 
In Table 1, I present model parameters for baseline calibration. 
A7.1 An illustration of solution procedure 
Firstly, the optimal coupon rate 𝑐, value of being unemployed 𝑈 and matching rate of 
workers 𝑔 are jointly determined by the worker’s and firm’s value function (1.20) and (1.21), 
respectively and the first order condition for firm’s optimal coupon choice (1.30). After checking 
the second order condition for the optimality of coupon choice obtained from the first step, the 
expected tenure is derived according to (1.34) of Proposition 1.3. The stationary cross-sectional 
density function of cash flow state 𝑋, 𝒻(𝑋), is derived according to (1.40) of Proposition 1.4. The 
unemployment rate 𝑢 = 1 − ∫ 𝒻(𝑋)𝑑𝑥
∞
𝑋
. 
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APPENDIX B: BAYESIAN LEARNING ABOUT THE UNKNOWN MATCH QUALITY 
B1 Asset values and Wage function 
Let Σ(𝑝) ≔
1
2
𝑝2(1 − 𝑝)2𝜙2 and ?̅?(𝑝) ≔ 𝑝𝜇𝐻 + (1 − 𝑝)𝜇𝐿. Throughout Section 1.4 and 
Appendix B, I assume that the flow operating cost 𝑓 = 089.  
B1.1 Debt 
Given a coupon rate 𝑐 and value of being unemployed 𝑈, the bellman equation for a debt 
contract is:  
𝑟𝐷(𝑝) = 𝑐 + 𝛴(𝑝)𝐷′′(𝑝) − 𝑠𝐷(𝑝) (𝐵. 1)  
subject to the boundary conditions90: 
𝐷 (𝑝) = 𝐷𝐵 = (1 − 𝛼)
?̅? (𝑝)
𝛿
−
𝑟𝑈
𝛿
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑝→1
𝐷(𝑝) <
𝜇𝐻
𝛿
< ∞ (𝐵. 2) 
From Polyanin and Zaitsev (2003, 2.1.7 — 6, equation 216), the homogeneous part of (B.1) 
has a general solution of the form: 
𝛾1𝑝
?̂?1(1 − 𝑝)?̂?2 + 𝛾2𝑝
?̂?2(1 − 𝑝)?̂?1 
where ?̂?1 and ?̂?2 is negative and positive root of the equation ?̂?(?̂? − 1) −
2𝛿
𝜙2
= 0.  
?̂?1 =
1
2
− √
1
4
+
2𝛿
𝜙2
 𝑎𝑛𝑑  ?̂?2 =
1
2
+ √
1
4
+
2𝛿
𝜙2
(𝐵. 3)  
The general solution for (B.1) is 
𝐷(𝑝) =
𝑐
𝛿
+ 𝛾1𝑝
?̂?1(1 − 𝑝)?̂?2 + 𝛾2𝑝
?̂?2(1 − 𝑝)?̂?1 
Since 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑝→1
𝐷(𝑝) <
𝜇𝐻
𝛿
< ∞, I have 𝛾2 = 0. Let 𝛾 ≔ 𝛾1. Using 𝐷 (𝑝) = 𝐷𝐵 = (1 − 𝛼)
?̅?(𝑝)
𝛿
−
𝑟𝑈
𝛿
, I 
have 𝛾 =
(1−𝛼)?̅?(𝑝)−𝑟𝑈−𝑐
𝛿𝑝?̂?1(1−𝑝)
?̂?2
. Then the debt value 𝐷(𝑝) is given by   
                                                        
89 This assumption is innocuous. 
90 The bankruptcy cost definition is slight different from the benchmark case to make the calculation less cumbersome. 
It is not crucial.  
139 
 
𝐷(𝑝) =
𝑐
𝛿
−
𝑐 − (1 − 𝛼)?̅? (𝑝) + 𝑟𝑈
𝛿
 (
𝑝
𝑝
)
?̂?1
(
1 − 𝑝
1 − 𝑝
)
?̂?2
(B. 4) 
|| 
B1.2 Other asset values, wage function and match surplus 
The equity value follows the HJB equation 
𝑟𝐸(𝑝) = ?̅?(𝑝) − 𝑐 − 𝑤 + 𝛴(𝑝)𝐸′′(𝑝) − 𝑠(𝐸(𝑝) − 𝑉) (𝐵. 5)   
subject to boundary conditions  
𝐸 (𝑝) = 𝑉; 𝐸′(𝑝)|𝑝=𝑝 = 0; 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑝→1
𝐸(𝑝) < ∞ (𝐵. 6) 
Similarly, the value of being employed satisfies the HJB equation  
𝑟𝑊(𝑝) = 𝑤 + 𝛴(𝑝)𝑊′′(𝑝) − 𝑠(𝑊(𝑝) − 𝑈) (𝐵. 7) 
subject to boundary conditions 
𝑊 (𝑝) = 𝑈; 𝑊′(𝑝)|𝑝=𝑝 = 0; 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑝→1
𝑊(𝑝) < ∞ (𝐵. 8) 
The value of being unemployed satisfies the HJB equation 
𝑟𝑈 = 𝑏 + 𝑔(𝜖)[𝑊(𝑝0) − 𝑈] (𝐵. 9) 
The value of an idle vacancy obeys the HJB equation 
𝑟𝑉 = −𝜅 + ℎ(𝜖)[𝐸(𝑝0) + 𝐷(𝑝0) − 𝑉] (𝐵. 10) 
Before I move on to calculate the matching surplus 𝑆(𝑝), I derive a wage function that is linear in 
posterior belief 𝑝. Specifically, I have the following lemma. 
Lemma B.1 In equilibrium, under generalized Nash bargaining, the wage function is linear 
in X 
𝑤(𝑝) = 𝛽(?̅?(𝑝) − 𝑐) + (1 − 𝛽)𝑏 + 𝛽𝑔(𝜖)𝐸(𝑝0)
                                   = 𝛽(?̅?(𝑝) − 𝑐) + (1 − 𝛽)𝑏 + (1 − 𝛽)𝑔(𝜖)[𝑊(𝑝0) − 𝑈] (𝐵. 11)
 
Proof: Similar to Lemma 1.1.  || 
By the virtue of continuous generalized Nash bargaining solution, I have  
𝛽𝐸(𝑝) = (1 − 𝛽)[𝑊(𝑝) − 𝑈] (𝐵. 12) 
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Taking derivatives of both sides of (B.12) with respect to 𝑝. I have: 
𝛽𝐸′(𝑝) = (1 − 𝛽)𝑊′(𝑝) (𝐵. 13) 
and  
𝛽𝐸′′(𝑝) = (1 − 𝛽)𝑊′′(𝑝) (𝐵. 14)                                     
Again I have proved that the worker and the firm of a given matching pair agree to separate the 
matching relationship and return to search when 𝑝 hits the same threshold, i.e., 𝑝𝐸 = 𝑝𝑊: = 𝑝. || 
B1.3 Solve for the matching surplus 𝑆(𝑝),  𝑝 and 𝑐 
Similar to Section 1.3, I define matching surplus 𝑆 ≔ 𝐸 + 𝑊 − 𝑉 − 𝑈. Then by Nash 
bargaining: 
𝐸 − 𝑉 = (1 − 𝛽)𝑆 
and  
𝑊 − 𝑈 = 𝛽𝑆 
Denote 𝐷0 ≔ 𝐷(𝑝0) , 𝑆
0 ≔ 𝑆(𝑝0)  ,  𝑔 ≔ 𝑔(𝜖)  and  ℎ ≔ ℎ(𝜖) . The value function of being 
unemployed (B.9) can be expressed in terms of 𝑆: 
𝑟𝑈 = 𝑏 + 𝑔𝛽𝑆0 (𝐵. 15) 
Similarly, the value function of an idled vacancy becomes 
𝑟𝑉 = −𝜅 + ℎ[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0 + 𝐷0] (𝐵. 16) 
By the definition of 𝑆, the HJB equation for 𝑆 is as follows: 
𝛿𝑆(𝑝) = ?̅?(𝑝) − 𝑐 − 𝑏 + 𝜅 − [𝑔𝛽 + ℎ(1 − 𝛽)]𝑆0 − ℎ𝐷0 + 𝛴(𝑝)𝑆′′(𝑝) (𝐵. 17) 
with boundary conditions: 
𝑆 (𝑝) = 0; 𝑆′(𝑝)| 𝑝=𝑝 = 0;  𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑝→1
𝑆(𝑝) < ∞ (𝐵. 18) 
Similar to derivation of debt value function, I have  
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𝑆(𝑝) =
?̅?(𝑝) − 𝑐 − 𝑏 + 𝜅 − (𝑔𝛽 + ℎ(1 − 𝛽))𝑆0 − ℎ𝐷0
𝛿
−
                                        
?̅? (𝑝) − 𝑐 − 𝑏 + 𝜅 − (𝑔𝛽 + ℎ(1 − 𝛽))𝑆0 − ℎ𝐷0
𝛿
(
𝑝
𝑝
)
?̂?1
(
1 − 𝑝
1 − 𝑝
)
?̂?2
(𝐵. 19)
 
where ?̂?1 and ?̂?2 are the same as those in (B.3). 
The optimal separation threshold 𝑝  is determined by smooth-pasting condition: 
𝑆′(𝑝)| 𝑝=𝑝 = 0  
𝜇𝐻 − 𝜇𝐿
𝛿
−
?̅? (𝑝) − 𝑐 − 𝑏 + 𝜅 − (𝑔𝛽 + ℎ(1 − 𝛽))𝑆0 − ℎ𝐷0
𝛿
(
?̂?1
𝑝
−
?̂?2
1 − 𝑝
) = 0 (𝐵. 20) 
Using the fact that ?̂?1 + ?̂?2 = 1 and denoting Δ ≔ 𝑐 + 𝑏 − 𝜅 + (𝑔𝛽 + ℎ(1 − 𝛽))𝑆
0 + ℎ𝐷0 give 
rise to the expression for optimal separation threshold 𝑝. 
𝑝 =
(𝜇𝐿 − 𝛥)?̂?1
?̂?2𝜇𝐻 + ?̂?1𝜇𝐿 − 𝛥
(𝐵. 21) 
In equilibrium, by free entry, 𝑉 = 0, then 
𝑆(𝑝) =
?̅?(𝑝) − 𝑐 − 𝑟𝑈
𝛿
−
?̅? (𝑝) − 𝑐 − 𝑟𝑈
𝛿
(
𝑝
𝑝
)
?̂?1
(
1 − 𝑝
1 − 𝑝
)
?̂?2
(𝐵. 22) 
and the optimal separation threshold 𝑝 is 
𝑝 =
(𝜇𝐿 − 𝑐 − 𝑟𝑈)?̂?1
?̂?2𝜇𝐻 + ?̂?1𝜇𝐿 − 𝑐 − 𝑟𝑈
(𝐵. 23) 
𝑝(𝑐) =
−?̂?1?̂?2(𝜇𝐻 − 𝜇𝐿)
(?̂?2𝜇𝐻 + ?̂?1𝜇𝐿 − 𝑐 − 𝑟𝑈)2
> 0 (𝐵. 24) 
(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0 + 𝐷0 =
(1 − 𝛽)
?̅?(𝑝0) − 𝑟𝑈
𝛿
+
𝛽𝑐
𝛿
−
(𝛼 − 𝛽)?̅? (𝑝) + 𝛽(𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈)
𝛿
(
𝑝0
𝑝
)
?̂?1
(
1 − 𝑝0
1 − 𝑝
)
?̂?2
(𝐵. 25)
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𝜕
𝜕𝑐
[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0 + 𝐷0] =
𝛽
𝛿
−
𝛽 + (𝛼 − 𝛽)(𝜇𝐻 − 𝜇𝐿)𝑝
(𝑐)
𝛿
 (
𝑝0
𝑝
)
?̂?1
(
1 − 𝑝0
1 − 𝑝
)
?̂?2
− 
                                 
(𝛼 − 𝛽)?̅? (𝑝) + 𝛽(𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈)
𝛿
(
𝑝0
𝑝
)
?̂?1
(
1 − 𝑝0
1 − 𝑝
)
?̂?2
(
?̂?2
1 − 𝑝
−
?̂?1
𝑝
) 𝑝(𝑐) (𝐵. 26)
 
The first-order condition of the optimal 𝑐 is 
ℎ(𝜖(𝑈, 𝑐))[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0 (𝑐) + 𝐷0 (𝑐)] + ℎ(𝑐)(𝜖(𝑈, 𝑐))[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0 + 𝐷0 ] = 0 (𝐵. 27)            
where the (1 − 𝛽)𝑆0 (𝑐) + 𝐷0 (𝑐) is defined in (B.26), and (1 − 𝛽)𝑆0 + 𝐷0 is defined in (B.25), 
and  
ℎ(𝑐)(𝜖(𝑈, 𝑐)) = ℎ(𝑔)𝑔(𝑐) < 0 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑔(𝑐) = −𝑔
𝑆0 (𝑐)
𝑆0
> 0 (𝐵. 28) 
||  
B2 Expected job tenure  
Extending the baseline model to allow for Bayesian learning about the matching quality 
does not compromise the closed-form representation of the expected job tenure, i.e., the expected 
match duration.  
Specifically, let ?̂?(𝑝) be the expected remaining duration of a match when current posterior 
about matching quality is 𝑝. ?̂?(𝑝) solves the following boundary value problem: 
𝛴(𝑝)?̂?′′(𝑝) − 𝑠?̂?(𝑝) = −1 (𝐵. 29) 
The boundary conditions are: 
?̂? (𝑝) = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑝→1
?̂?(𝑝) =
1
𝑠
(𝐵. 30) 
Intuitively, the remaining tenure is zero if 𝑝 hits the separation threshold, 𝑝. Meanwhile, 
as both parties are certain that the match quality is high, only event that could end the match is the 
exogenous matching destruction event, with arrival intensity 𝑠.  
Again, the homogenous part of (B.29) admits a general form of solution:  
𝛾1𝑝
𝜏1(1 − 𝑝)𝜏2 + 𝛾2𝑝
𝜏2(1 − 𝑝)𝜏1 (𝐵. 31) 
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where 𝜏1 and 𝜏2 is negative and positive root of the equation 𝜏(𝜏 − 1) −
2𝑠
𝜙2
= 0, respectively. 
𝜏1 =
1
2
− √
1
4
+
2𝑠
𝜙2
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜏2 =
1
2
+ √
1
4
+
2𝑠
𝜙2
(𝐵. 32) 
Therefore, the general solution of the boundary problem (B.29) and (B.30) takes the form 
?̂?(𝑝) = 𝛾1𝑝
𝜏1(1 − 𝑝)𝜏2 + 𝛾2𝑝
𝜏2(1 − 𝑝)𝜏1 +
1
𝑠
(𝐵. 33) 
Since 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑋→1
?̂?(𝑝) =
1
𝑠
< ∞, I have 𝛾2 = 0. 𝛾1 can be determined by another boundary condition 
?̂?(𝑝) = 0.  
𝛾1𝑝
𝜏1 (1 − 𝑝)
𝜏2
+
1
𝑠
= 0 ⇒ 𝛾1 = −
1
𝑠𝑝𝜏1 (1 − 𝑝)
𝜏2
(𝐵. 34) 
Bringing (B.34) to (B.33) leads to  
?̂?(𝑝) =
1
𝑠
[1 − (
𝑝
𝑝
)
𝜏1
(
1 − 𝑝
1 − 𝑝
)
𝜏2
] (𝐵. 35) 
where 𝜏1 and 𝜏2 are given in (B.32). It is straightforward that the expect tenure of a job decreases 
in coupon rate 𝑐 and increases in the current posterior 𝑝. Recall that wage also increases in the 
current cash flow state 𝑝. Again I obtain a positive relationship between job tenure and wage.  
B3 Derive the stationary cross-sectional probability density function of 𝑝 
To close the equilibrium, in this section, I characterize the stationary cross-sectional 
distribution of the posterior on match-specific quality 𝑝 in the economy. The stochastic process 
governing the evolution of the posterior 𝑝, is a Brownian motion with respect to the filtration {ℱ𝑡
𝑋}. 
Obviously, 𝑝 is a Kolmogorov-Feller diffusion process.  Let 𝒻(𝑝) be the transition probability 
density function for 𝑝 in the economy. Similar to Section 1.3.5.5, the Fokker-Planck equation, also 
known as Kolmogorov forward equation of the posterior 𝑝, governs the dynamics of 𝒻(𝑝).  
𝑑𝒻(𝑝)
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑑2
𝑑𝑝2
[𝛴(𝑝)𝒻(𝑝)] − 𝑠𝒻(𝑝) (𝐵. 36) 
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Let 𝒻(𝑝)  denote the stationary 𝒻(𝑝) , I have the following boundary value problems 
governing the dynamics of 𝒻(𝑝): 
𝑑2
𝑑𝑝2
[𝛴(𝑝)𝒻(𝑝)] − 𝑠𝒻(𝑝) = 0 (𝐵. 37) 
with boundary conditions91: 
𝒻 (𝑝 +) = 0 (𝐵. 38) 
𝛴(𝑝0)[𝒻
′(𝑝0 −) − 𝒻
′(𝑝0 +)] = 𝑠 ∫ 𝒻(𝑝)𝑑𝑝 + 𝛴 (𝑝) 𝒻
′ (𝑝 +)
1
𝑝
(𝐵. 39) 
𝑔 [1 − ∫ 𝒻(𝑝)𝑑𝑝
1
𝑝
] = 𝑠 ∫ 𝒻(𝑝)𝑑𝑝 + 𝛴 (𝑝) 𝒻′ (𝑝 +)
1
𝑝
(𝐵. 40) 
As in Appendix A5, define 𝒻𝑖(𝑝),  𝑖 ∈ {0,1}, in which 𝒻0(𝑝) represents the probability 
density function for 𝑝 ∈ [𝑝, 𝑝0) and 𝒻
1(𝑝) represents the probability density function for 𝑝 ∈
(𝑝0, 1]. The solution procedure of the boundary problem (B.37) and (B.38) — (B.40) is more 
complicated than the geometric Brownian motion case, due to the fact that a general solution of 
the homogeneous part of (B.37) is difficult to obtain directly. I resort to the following change-of-
variable technique. 
Specifically, define 𝜂𝑖(𝑝) ≔ 𝑝2(1 − 𝑝)2𝒻𝑖(𝑝) , multiplying both sides of (B.37) by 
𝑝2(1 − 𝑝)2, and dividing both sides using 
𝜙2
2
 . (B.37) becomes: 
𝑝2(1 − 𝑝)2𝜂′′(𝑝) −
2𝑠
𝜙2
𝜂(𝑝) = 0 (𝐵. 41) 
Again from Polyanin and Zaitsev (2003, 2.1.7 — 6, equation 216), a general solution of 
(B.37) takes the form of  
𝜂𝑖(𝑝) = 𝜉1
𝑖 𝑝?̃?1(1 − 𝑝)?̃?2 + 𝜉2
𝑖 𝑝?̃?2(1 − 𝑝)?̃?1    𝑝 ≠ 𝑝0 (𝐵. 42) 
where ?̃?1 and ?̃?2 is negative and positive root for the equation 
𝜙2
2
?̃?(?̃? − 1) − 𝑠 = 0.  
                                                        
91 𝑝+∶= lim
𝑝′↓𝑝
𝑝′ and 𝑝−∶= lim
𝑝′↑𝑝
𝑝′ 
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?̃?1 =
1
2
− √
1
4
+
2𝑠
𝜙2
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ?̃?2 =
1
2
+ √
1
4
+
2𝑠
𝜙2
 (𝐵. 43) 
Then, inverting 𝒻𝑖(𝑝) from 𝜂𝑖(𝑝), 
𝒻𝑖(𝑝) = 𝜂𝑖(𝑝)𝑝−2(1 − 𝑝)−2
                                                           = 𝜉1
𝑖 𝑝?̃?1−2(1 − 𝑝)?̃?2−2 + 𝜉2
𝑖 𝑝?̃?2−2(1 − 𝑝)?̃?1−2
                                                               = 𝜉1
𝑖 𝑝?̃?1−2(1 − 𝑝)−?̃?1−1 + 𝜉2
𝑖 𝑝−?̃?1−1(1 − 𝑝)?̃?1−2 (𝐵. 44)
 
The last equality comes from the fact that ?̃?1 + ?̃?2 = 1. The expression ∫ 𝒻(𝑝)𝑑𝑝
1
𝑝
 must be 
integrable, i.e., 
∫ 𝒻(𝑝)𝑑𝑝
1
𝑝
= 𝒻(𝑝0) + ∫ 𝒻
0(𝑝)𝑑𝑝
𝑝0
𝑝
+ ∫ 𝒻1(𝑝)𝑑𝑝
1
𝑝0
< ∞ (𝐵. 45) 
Notice that 
∫ 𝒻1(𝑝)𝑑𝑝
1
𝑝0
= ∫ 𝜉1
1𝑝?̃?1−2(1 − 𝑝)−?̃?1−1𝑑𝑝 + ∫ 𝜉2
1𝑝−?̃?1−1(1 − 𝑝)?̃?1−2𝑑𝑝
1
𝑝0
1
𝑝0
 
Let 𝜄 ̂ = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (1, 𝑝0
−?̃?1−1), then I have  
∫ 𝜉2
1𝑝−?̃?1−1(1 − 𝑝)?̃?1−2𝑑𝑝
1
𝑝0
> 𝜉2
1𝜄 ̂ ∫ (1 − 𝑝)?̃?1−2𝑑𝑝 = 𝜉2
1𝜄 ̂
 (1 − 𝑝)?̃?1−1
?̃?1 − 1
|𝑝0
1 → ∞  
1
𝑝0
 
as 𝑝 → 1 , since ?̃?1 < 0  thus ?̃?1 − 1 < −1 . ∫ 𝒻
1(𝑝)𝑑𝑝
1
𝑝0
< ∞ , therefore 𝜉2
1 = 0 , otherwise 
∫ 𝒻1(𝑝)𝑑𝑝
1
𝑝0
 explodes as 𝑝 → 1. 
On the other hand, 
∫ 𝜉1
1𝑝?̃?1−2(1 − 𝑝)−?̃?1−1𝑑𝑝 >
1
𝑝0
𝜉1
1 ∫ (1 − 𝑝)−?̃?1−1𝑑𝑝 = 𝜉1
1
(1 − 𝑝)−?̃?1
−?̃?1
|𝑝0
1 < ∞
1
𝑝0
 
because ?̃?1 < 0. Therefore 𝜉1
1 can be nonzero. 
At 𝑝 = 𝑝, by boundary condition 𝒻 (𝑝 +) = 0, I have 
𝜉1
0𝑝?̃?1−2 (1 − 𝑝)
−?̃?1−1
+ 𝜉2
0𝑝−?̃?1−1 (1 − 𝑝)
?̃?1−2
= 0 
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𝜉2
0 = −𝜉1
0 (
𝑝
1 − 𝑝
)
2?̃?1−1
 
The two remaining unknown coefficients 𝜉1
0 and 𝜉1
1 are determined by (B39) and (B40).  
Now I present the stationary cross-sectional distribution density function for 𝑝 ∈
[𝑝, 1] \{𝑝0} in equilibrium:  
𝒻(𝑝) = {
               𝜉1
1𝑝?̃?1−2(1 − 𝑝)−?̃?1−1              , 𝑝0 < 𝑝 ≤ 1
𝜉1
0𝑝?̃?1−2(1 − 𝑝)−?̃?1−1[1 − (
𝑝
1 − 𝑝
1 − 𝑝
𝑝
)
2?̃?1−1
] , 𝑝 ≤ 𝑝 < 𝑝0
(𝐵. 46) 
where ?̃?1 =
1
2
− √
1
4
+
2𝑠
𝜙2
 . 
The expression of the stationary cross-sectional density function 𝒻(𝑝) of posterior 𝑝 takes 
the Double-Pareto distribution form, as shown in the stochastic growth literature (e.g., Gabaix, 
2009; Achdou, Han, Lasry, Lions and Moll, 2015).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
147 
 
APPENDIX C: ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION ABOUT FIRM PRODUCTIVITY 
C1 Separating equilibrium 
C1.1 Proof of Proposition 1.6 
Let 𝐼𝑉 ≔ (1 − 𝛽)𝑆0(𝑐; 𝜃𝑘) + 𝐷
0(𝑐; 𝜃𝑘) be the intrinsic value of financial claims. Along 
any iso-value curve, I have: 
𝜔
𝜕𝑀
𝜕𝑐
+ (1 − 𝜔)
𝜕𝐼𝑉
𝜕𝑐
= 0 
⇒
𝜕𝑀
𝜕𝑐
= −
1 − 𝜔
𝜔
𝜕𝐼𝑉
𝜕𝑐
= − 
1 − 𝜔
𝜔
[
𝛽
𝛿
−
𝛽 − 𝛼𝜈
𝛿
(
𝑋0
𝑋𝑘
)
𝜈
] (𝐶. 1) 
where the last equality follows from the fact that Nash bargaining outcome holds for separating 
equilibrium.  Taking the derivative with respect to 𝜃𝑘 on both sides of (C.1), I have: 
𝜕
𝜕𝜃𝑘
(
𝜕𝑀
𝜕𝑐
) = −
1 − 𝜔
𝜔
[−
𝛽 − 𝛼𝜈
𝛿
(
𝑋0
𝑋𝑘
)
𝜈
(−𝜈)
1 − 𝜈
−𝜈
𝜃𝑘
𝛿 − 𝜇
𝛿
𝛿𝐹 + 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
−𝜈
1 − 𝜈
𝛿 − 𝜇
−𝜃𝑘
2
𝛿𝐹 + 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
𝛿
]
                =
1 − 𝜔
𝜔
 
𝛽 − 𝛼𝜈
𝛿
(
𝑋0
𝑋𝑘
)
𝜈
𝜈
𝜃𝑘
< 0                                                                                         (𝐶. 2)
 
since 𝜈 < 0. || 
C1.2 Proof of Lemma 1.2 
Notice that the difference between left hand side and right hand side of (IC.L) (1.59) is 
continuous in 𝑐𝑠. Consider 𝑐𝑠 = 𝑐𝐿, i.e., the separating coupon rate is equal to the full-information 
first best coupon choice of the low-type firms. Under this case, it is obvious that left hand side of 
(IC.L) (1.59) is greater than the right-hand side, since the first term on the left hand side is greater 
than the second term, which is equal to a proportion 1 − 𝜔 of the right hand side of (IC.L) (1.59).  
At 𝑐̅ specified in footnote 48, under the parameter restriction, left hand side of (IC.L) (1.59) is 
strictly smaller than the right hand side. By continuity, there exists a 𝑐𝑠∗ ∈ (𝑐𝐿 , 𝑐̅) such that the left 
hand side of (IC.L) (1.59) is equal to the right hand side.  
Notice that at 𝑐𝐿, the left hand side of (IC.L) (1.59) is strictly increasing in 𝑐, because the 
derivative of the first term on the left hand side with respect to 𝑐 at 𝑐 = 𝑐𝐿 is greater than zero, 
whereas the derivative of the second term with respect to 𝑐 at 𝑐 = 𝑐𝐿  is equal to zero, by the 
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optimality of 𝑐𝐿 and optimal 𝑐𝐻 > 𝑐𝐿. Moreover, the left hand side of (IC.L) (1.59) is concave 
since it is a linear combination of two concave shareholder value functions. Thus the left hand side 
of (IC.L) (1.59) admits a unique maximizing coupon rate, denoted as 𝑐𝑚. Since at 𝑐𝑠∗, the left 
hand side of (IC.L) (1.59) is equal to the right hand side, I must have 𝑐𝑠∗ > 𝑐𝑚. Using the fact that 
the left hand side of (IC.L) (1.59) decreases in 𝑐 for 𝑐 > 𝑐𝑚, I have that (IC.L) (1.59) holds for 
∀𝑐𝑠 ∈ [𝑐𝑠∗, 𝑐̅]. || 
C1.3 Proof of Lemma 1.3 
I focus on case in which 𝑐𝑠∗ > 𝑐𝐻, since in this case, the separating equilibrium creates 
under-employment problem. Notice that the difference between left hand side and right hand side 
of (IC.H) (1.60) is continuous in 𝑐𝑠. Consider 𝑐𝑠 = 𝑐𝐻, i.e., the separating coupon rate is equal to 
the full-information first best coupon choice of the high-type firm. Under this circumstance, it is 
obvious that left hand side of (IC.H) (1.60) is greater than the right-hand side, since the high-type 
firm cannot fare better than its full-information first best scenario.  At 𝑐̅ specified in footnote 48, 
left hand side of (IC.H) (1.60) is strictly smaller than the right hand side. By continuity, there exists 
a 𝑐𝑠∗∗ ∈ (𝑐𝐻, 𝑐̅) such that the left hand side of (IC.H) (1.60) is equal to the right hand side. Notice 
that the left hand side of (IC.H) (1.60) is strictly decreasing in 𝑐𝑠 for 𝑐𝑠 ∈ (𝑐𝐻, 𝑐̅). Therefore, I 
have that (IC.H) (1.60) holds for ∀𝑐𝑠 ∈ [𝑐𝐻, 𝑐
𝑠∗∗].  
In order to show that the separating equilibrium exits, I must show that 𝑐𝑠∗ < 𝑐𝑠∗∗. I prove 
this inequality by demonstrating that 𝑐𝑠∗∗ satisfies the (IC.L) (1.59). Notice that at  𝑐𝑠∗∗, (IC.H) 
(1.60) holds with equality by definition. Therefore (IC.L) (1.59) at 𝑐𝑠∗∗ is equivalent to:  
 𝜔[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0(𝑐𝐿; 𝜃𝐿) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝐿; 𝜃𝐿)] + (1 − 𝜔)[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆
0(𝑐𝐿; 𝜃𝐻) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝐿; 𝜃𝐻)]
−(1 − 𝜔)[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0(𝑐𝑠∗∗; 𝜃𝐻) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑠∗∗; 𝜃𝐻)] +
(1 − 𝜔)[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0(𝑐𝑠∗∗; 𝜃𝐿) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑠∗∗; 𝜃𝐿)] <
(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0(𝑐𝐿; 𝜃𝐿) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝐿; 𝜃𝐿) (𝐶. 3)
                   
⇔ 
(1 − 𝜔)[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0(𝑐𝑠∗∗; 𝜃𝐻) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑠∗∗; 𝜃𝐻)] −
(1 − 𝜔)[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0(𝑐𝑠∗∗; 𝜃𝐿) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑠∗∗; 𝜃𝐿)] >
(1 − 𝜔)[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0(𝑐𝐿; 𝜃𝐻) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝐿; 𝜃𝐻)] − (1 − 𝜔)[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆
0(𝑐𝐿; 𝜃𝐿) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝐿; 𝜃𝐿)] (𝐶. 4)
 
I prove (C.4) holds by showing that the function 
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[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0(𝑐; 𝜃𝐻) + 𝐷
0(𝑐; 𝜃𝐻)] − [(1 − 𝛽)𝑆
0(𝑐; 𝜃𝐿) + 𝐷
0(𝑐; 𝜃𝐿)] (𝐶. 5) 
increases in 𝑐. (C.5) is equal to92 
(1 − 𝛽)(𝜃𝐻 − 𝜃𝐿)𝛱(𝑋0) +
𝛼𝜈 − 𝛽
1 − 𝜈
𝛿𝐹 + 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑈
𝛿
[(
𝑋0
𝑋𝐻
𝑐 )
𝜈
− (
𝑋0
𝑋𝐿
𝑐)
𝜈
] (𝐶. 6) 
Taking the derivative of (C.6) with respect to 𝑐 gives: 
𝛼𝜈 − 𝛽
1 − 𝜈
1
𝛿
[(
𝑋0
𝑋𝐻
𝑐 )
𝜈
− (
𝑋0
𝑋𝐿
𝑐)
𝜈
] +
𝛼𝜈 − 𝛽
1 − 𝜈
(−𝜈)
1
𝛿
[(
𝑋0
𝑋𝐻
𝑐 )
𝜈
− (
𝑋0
𝑋𝐿
𝑐)
𝜈
] > 0 (𝐶. 7) 
I have proved that 𝑐𝑠∗ < 𝑐𝑠∗∗ . Therefore, there exists a 𝑐𝑠  that enforces a separating 
equilibrium and 𝑐𝑠 ∈ [𝑐𝑠∗, 𝑐𝑠∗∗]. || 
C2. Pooling equilibrium 
C2.1 “Screening demand” 
As mentioned in Section 1.5.3.2, I compare the value accrued to the firm from pooling in 
the capital market, to that from the least-cost separating equilibrium outcome, characterized by 
coupon choices by the high and low productivity firms, (𝑐𝑠,𝐿𝐶 , 𝑐𝐿). The incentive compatibility 
constraint for the low-type firms is: 
(𝐼𝐶𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙. 𝐿) 𝜔 {
𝑝[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐻) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐻)] +
(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝛽)[𝑆0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐿) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐿)]
} +
(1 − 𝜔)(1 − 𝛽)[𝑆0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐿) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐿)] ≥
(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0(𝑐𝐿; 𝜃𝐿) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝐿; 𝜃𝐿) (𝐶. 8)
   
The second term of the left hand side of (C.8) reflects the fact that if the wage demand is 
rejected by the firm, with probability 𝛽, the match dissolves and all financial claims against future 
cash flows from the match are worthless. 
Next, I consider the incentive constraint for the high-productivity firm, which is: 
                                                        
92 𝑋𝑘
𝑐 is the optimal separation threshold of the firm with productivity type 𝑘 ∈ {𝐿, 𝐻} for a particular coupon rate 𝑐, 
as in (1.28). 
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  (𝐼𝐶𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙. 𝐻) 𝜔 {
𝑝[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐻) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐻)] +
(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝛽)[𝑆0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐿) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐿)]
} +
(1 −  𝜔)[(1 −  𝛽)𝑆0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐻) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐻)] ≥
(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0(𝑐𝑠∗; 𝜃𝐻) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑠∗; 𝜃𝐻) (𝐶. 9)
 
First, notice that whenever 𝑐𝑠∗ < 𝑐𝐻, no pooling equilibrium could survive the equilibrium 
refinement in Maskin and Tirole (1992). Under this case, the least-cost separating equilibrium is 
characterized by (𝑐𝐻, 𝑐𝐿). In other words, the high-productivity firm separates itself from low-
productivity firm at its full-information first best coupon rate. It cannot not do any better than the 
full-information first best scenario. Therefore, in order for the existence of a pooling equilibrium 
in “screening offer” case, I must have 𝑐𝑠∗ > 𝑐𝐻. Moreover, if 𝜔 is too small, the (ICpool.L) (C.8) 
cannot hold.  
Let me compare the two incentive constraints, (ICpool.L) (C.8) and (ICpool.H) (C.9), notice 
that the first terms in the braces are the same for (ICpool.L) (C.8) and (ICpool.H) (C.9). Take the 
difference in differences between the second term of the left hand side and the term on the right 
hand side, for both (ICpool.L) (C.8) and (ICpool.H) (C.9).  
(1 −  𝜔)[(1 −  𝛽)𝑆0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐻) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐻)] − [(1 − 𝛽)𝑆
0(𝑐𝑠∗; 𝜃𝐻) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑠∗; 𝜃𝐻)] −
(1 − 𝜔)(1 − 𝛽)[𝑆0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐿) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐿)] + (1 − 𝛽)𝑆
0(𝑐𝐿; 𝜃𝐿) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝐿; 𝜃𝐿) (𝐶. 10)
 
Taking derivative of (C.10) with respect to 𝜔, I get 
−[(1 −  𝛽)𝑆0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐻) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐻)] + (1 − 𝛽)[𝑆
0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐿) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐿)] < 0 (𝐶. 11) 
At 𝜔 = 1, (C.10) is smaller than zero. Therefore, I must have a 𝜔 such that whenever 𝜔 >
𝜔,  (ICpool.H) (C.9) implies (ICpool.L) (C.8), which is the case I focus on.  
Notice that the left hand side of (ICpool.H) (C.9) admits a unique maximizing 𝑐𝑝. This is 
because the left hand side of (ICpool.H) (C.9) is a linear combination of nonnegative concave 
functions, thus is concave, and the choice set of 𝑐𝑝 is a compact set. The first order condition for 
the maximization problem is93:  
                                                        
93 𝑋𝑘
𝑝
 denotes the optimal separation threshold for firms with productivity type 𝑘 ∈ {𝐿, 𝐻}, when coupon rate is 𝑐𝑝 
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(1 − 𝜔 + 𝜔𝑝) [
𝛽
𝛿
−
𝛽 − 𝛼𝜈
𝛿
(
𝑋0
𝑋𝐻
𝑝)
𝜈
] + 𝜔(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝛽)
𝛼𝜈
𝛿
(
𝑋0
𝑋𝐿
𝑝)
𝜈
(𝐶. 12) 
Denote the maximizing coupon rate is 𝑐1
𝑝∗
, I need restrictions on model parameters so that 
(ICpool.H) (C.9) holds for 𝑐𝑝∗. Notice that 𝑐1
𝑝∗ < 𝑐𝐻, because the second term inside the braces of 
the left hand side of (C.9) decreases in 𝑐𝑝. || 
C2.2 “Pooling demand” 
As mentioned in Section 1.5.3.2, I compare the value accrued to the firm from pooling in 
the capital market, to that from the least-cost separating equilibrium outcome, characterized by 
coupon choice, (𝑐𝑠,𝐿𝐶 , 𝑐𝐿).
94 The incentive compatibility constraint for the low-type firms is: 
(𝐼𝐶𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙. 𝐿) 𝜔 {
𝑝[𝑆0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐻) − 𝛽𝑆
0(𝑐𝑝, 𝜃𝐿) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐻)] +
(1 − 𝑝)[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐿) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐿)]
} +
(1 − 𝜔)[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐿) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐿)] ≥ (1 − 𝛽)𝑆
0(𝑐𝐿; 𝜃𝐿) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝐿; 𝜃𝐿) (𝐶. 13)
 
Next, I consider the incentive constraint for the high-productivity firm, which is: 
 (𝐼𝐶𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙. 𝐻)𝜔 {
𝑝[𝑆0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐻) − 𝛽𝑆
0(𝑐𝑝, 𝜃𝐿) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐻)] +
(1 − 𝑝)[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐿) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐿)]
} +
(1 −  𝜔)[𝑆0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐻) − 𝛽𝑆
0(𝑐𝑝, 𝜃𝐿) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐻)] ≥ (1 − 𝛽)𝑆
0(𝑐𝑠∗; 𝜃𝐻) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑠∗; 𝜃𝐻) (𝐶. 14)
 
The term 𝑆0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐻) − 𝛽𝑆
0(𝑐𝑝, 𝜃𝐿) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐻) reflects the fact that the high-
productivity firm enjoys an information rent with the amount equal to the difference in expected 
matching surplus values between the high and low productivity firms, when the worker makes a 
pooling wage demand. Similar to “screening demand” case, if 𝜔 is too small, the (ICpool.L) (C.13) 
does not hold.  
Let me compare the two incentive constraints, (ICpool.L) (C.13) and (ICpool.H) (C.14), 
notice that the first term under the braces is the same for (ICpool.L) (C.13) and (ICpool.H) (C.14). 
Take the expression similar to (C.10),  
                                                        
94 One subtlety is that if the worker makes a pooling demand, he might leave the match when cash flow state 𝑋 hits 
the separation threshold for the low-productivity firm. I assume that the high-productivity firm can always make a 
flow of side-payments equal to 𝑟𝑈, to keep the worker until 𝑋 hits the separation threshold for the high-productivity 
firm. 
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(1 −  𝜔)[𝑆0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐻) − 𝛽𝑆
0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐿) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐻)] −
[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0(𝑐𝑠∗; 𝜃𝐻) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑠∗; 𝜃𝐻)] −
(1 − 𝜔)[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐿) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐿)] + (1 − 𝛽)𝑆
0(𝑐𝐿; 𝜃𝐿) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝐿; 𝜃𝐿) (𝐶. 15)
 
Taking derivative of (C.15) with respect to 𝜔, I get 
−[𝑆0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐻) − 𝛽𝑆
0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐿) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐻)] + [(1 − 𝛽)𝑆
0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐿) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐿)] < 0 (𝐶. 16) 
At 𝜔 = 1, (C.15) is smaller than zero. Therefore, I must have a 𝜔 such that whenever 𝜔 > 𝜔,  
(ICpool.H) (C.14) implies (ICpool.L) (C.13), which is the case I focus on.  
Notice that the left hand side of (ICpool.H) (C.14) admits a unique maximizing 𝑐𝑝. This is 
because the left hand side of (ICpool.H) (C.14) is a linear combination of nonnegative concave 
functions, thus is concave, and the choice set of 𝑐𝑝  is a compact set. To further clarify this 
observation, rewrite the left hand side of (ICpool.H) (C14) as  
(1 − 𝜔 + 𝜔𝑝)[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐻) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐻)] + 𝜔(1 − 𝑝)[(1 − 𝛽)𝑆
0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐿) + 𝐷
0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐿)]
+ (1 − 𝜔 + 𝜔𝑝)𝛽[𝑆0(𝑐𝑝; 𝜃𝐻) − 𝑆
0(𝑐𝑝, 𝜃𝐿)] 
The first two terms are obviously concave. The sign of the second order derivative of the 
last term with respect to 𝑐𝑝 is determined by that of the term in the brackets, whose second order 
derivative with respect to 𝑐𝑝 is  
−𝜈
𝛿
1
𝛿𝐹+𝑐+𝑟𝑈
[(
𝑋0
𝑋𝐻
𝑝)
𝜈
− (
𝑋0
𝑋𝐿
𝑝)
𝜈
] < 0. 
The first order condition for the maximization problem is:  
(1 − 𝜔 + 𝜔𝑝) [
𝛽
𝛿
−
𝛽 − 𝛼𝜈
𝛿
(
𝑋0
𝑋𝐻
𝑝)
𝜈
] + 𝜔(1 − 𝑝) [
𝛽
𝛿
−
𝛽 − 𝛼𝜈
𝛿
(
𝑋0
𝑋𝐿
𝑝)
𝜈
] +
(1 − 𝜔 + 𝜔𝑝)
𝛽
𝛿
[(
𝑋0
𝑋𝐻
𝑝)
𝜈
− (
𝑋0
𝑋𝐿
𝑝)
𝜈
] = 0 (𝐶. 17)
 
Simplifying, 
𝛽
𝛿
+ (1 − 𝜔 + 𝜔𝑝)
𝛼𝜈
𝛿
(
𝑋0
𝑋𝐻
𝑝)
𝜈
−
𝛽 − 𝜔(1 − 𝑝)𝛼𝜈
𝛿
(
𝑋0
𝑋𝐿
𝑝)
𝜈
= 0 (𝐶. 18) 
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Recall that at 𝑐𝐿, the full-information optimal coupon rate for the low-productivity firm, 
the first order condition of the asset value for low-productivity firm is such that 
𝛽
𝛿
−
𝛽−𝛼𝜈
𝛿
(
𝑋0
𝑋𝐿
𝑝)
𝜈
=
0. Therefore, at 𝑐𝑝 = 𝑐𝐿, the second term of (C.17) is equal to zero, and (C.17) becomes: 
(1 − 𝜔 + 𝜔𝑝) [
𝛽
𝛿
+
𝛼𝜈
𝛿
(
𝑋0
𝑋𝐻
𝑝)
𝜈
−
𝛽
𝛿
(
𝑋0
𝑋𝐿
𝑝)
𝜈
] > (1 − 𝜔 + 𝜔𝑝) [
𝛽
𝛿
−
𝛽 − 𝛼𝜈
𝛿
(
𝑋0
𝑋𝐿
𝑝)
𝜈
] (𝐶. 19) 
The inequality comes from the fact that 𝑋𝐿
𝑃 > 𝑋𝐻
𝑃 and 𝜈 < 0. Therefore, at 𝑐𝐿, the left hand 
side of (C.17) is greater than zero. Therefore, I have 𝑐2
𝑝∗ > 𝑐𝐿, by the concavity of (ICpool.H) (C.14). 
It is obvious that 𝑐2
𝑝∗ < 𝑐𝐻. If the parameter restrictions are such that (ICpool.H) (C.14) holds at 𝑐2
𝑝∗
, 
then 𝑐2
𝑝∗ ∈ (𝑐𝐿, 𝑐𝐻), between the full-information first best coupon choices of the low-productivity 
and high-productivity firms. ||  
